Mobilités et dynamiques salariales sur le marché du travail français by Poncon-Beffy, Magalie
Mobility and wage dynamics in the French labour
market
Magalie Poncon-Beffy
To cite this version:
Magalie Poncon-Beffy. Mobility and wage dynamics in the French labour market. Economies
and finances. Universite´ Panthe´on-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2008. English. <tel-00407679>
HAL Id: tel-00407679
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00407679
Submitted on 27 Jul 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS I - PANTHÉON SORBONNE
UFR de Sciences Economiques
Magali PONCON, BEFFY
Mobilités et dynamiques salariales
sur le marché du travail français
Mobility and wage dynamics on the French labor market
Directeur de thèse :
Thierry KAMIONKA, directeur de recherche CNRS
Jury :
Pierre CAHUC (Rapporteur), Professeur à l’Ecole Polytechnique
Thierry MAGNAC (Rapporteur), Professeur à l’Ecole d’Economie de Toulouse
Costas MEGHIR, Professeur à UCL (University College London)
Jean-Marc ROBIN, Professeur à l’Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne
Patrick SEVESTRE, Professeur à l’Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne
c© Magali BEFFY (née PONCON), 2008
iContents
Introduction générale 1
Chapitre 1 : The returns to seniority in France (and Why they are lower than in the
United States? 15
1. Introduction 16
2. The Statistical Model 19
2.1. The structural model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2. Specification of the General Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3. Stochastic Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3. Estimation 28
3.1. Principles of the Gibbs Sampler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2. Application to our Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. The Data 32
5. The Empirical Results 35
5.1. A brief summary of main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2. Certificat d’Etudes Primaires Holders (High School Dropouts) . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3. CAP-BEP Holders (Vocational Technical School, basic) . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4. Baccalauréat Holders (High-School Graduates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.5. University and Grandes Ecoles Graduates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6. A Comparison with the United States 44
6.1. Comparison of Selected Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2. The Returns to Experience and Seniority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.3. Robustness and Specification Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.4. Are the Returns to Seniority an “Incentive Device”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7. Conclusion 51
ii
A. Appendix A 53
A.1. Mobility equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.2. Wage equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.3. Participation equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.4. Initial equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.5. Latent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.6. Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.7. Individual effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
B. Results 62
C. Simulations 75
Chapitre 2 : Job Mobility and Wages with Worker and Firm Heterogeneity 84
1. Introduction 84
2. Statistical model 86
2.1. Some definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.2. Specification of the General Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.3. Stochastic Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3. Estimation 90
3.1. Principles of the Gibbs Sampler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4. Data 94
5. Results 96
5.1. Women with a Vocational-Technical Degree (Basic, CAP - BEP) . . . . . . . 96
5.2. Men with a Vocational Technical degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3. Women with Technical College and Undergraduate University (BTS, DEUG) . 99
5.4. Men with a Technical College or a Undergraduate University degree (BTS,
DEUG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
iii
6. Conclusion 101
A. Appendix A 103
A.1. Mobility equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.2. Wage equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.3. Participation equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.4. Initial equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.5. Latent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.5.1. Latent participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.5.2. Latent mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A.5.3. Latent location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A.6. Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.7. Variance-Covariance Matrices of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.8. Firm effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B. Results 116
Chapitre 3 : Is civil-servant human capital sector-specific? 146
1. Introduction 146
2. The Search Model 148
3. The data 153
3.1. A brief description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.2. Some descriptive statistics on balanced data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4. Econometric model and estimation principles 156
4.1. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.2. Likelihood and estimation principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5. Results 161
5.1. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.2. Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.2.1. Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
iv
5.2.2. Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6. Simulations 166
6.1. Model fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.2. What private wages would civil servants have? Counterfactual distributions . . 169
7. Conclusion 173
A. Structural model 174
B. Descriptive Statistics 179
C. Implementation 180
D. Cross-section results 180
E. Quantile differences between the public log of wage distributions and the coun-
terfactual distribution 185
Chapitre 4 : Who is confronted to insecure labor market histories? Some evidence
based on the French labor market transitions. 188
1. Introduction 188
2. Data 191
2.1. Summary statistics and representativeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
2.2. Descriptive statistics on transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
3. Methodology: the conditional confined-unconfined worker model 196
4. Results 199
4.1. Sectorisation in the labor market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
4.1.1. The confined movers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.1.2. The nonparticipant stayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.1.3. The stable-job stayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
4.2. Dynamics on the labor market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
4.2.1. Confined and unconfined mover transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
v5. Robustness analysis 204
5.1. Heckman-Singer approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
5.2. Specification tests: stability of transition matrices across gender . . . . . . . . 206
6. Conclusion 209
A. Stationary occupation probabilities 210
B. Darmois-type test for coefficient equality across subsamples 211
C. Detailed results 211
C.1. Women between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
C.2. Men between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Bibliographie 218
vi
List of Tables
1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2 Descriptive Statistics (Continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3 Wage equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 Wage Equation (Continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5 Participation Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6 Mobility Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7 Mobility Equation (Continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8 Elements of Variance Covariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
9 Comparison of the United States and France, College Graduates . . . . . . . . 71
10 Comparison of the United States and France, High School Dropouts . . . . . . 72
11 Cumulative and Marginal Returns to Experience and Seniority for the United
States and France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
12 Comparison of Alternative Estimates of the Return to Seniority . . . . . . . . 74
1 Participation equation for women with a vocational-technical school . . . . . . 117
2 Mobility equation for women with a vocational-technical school . . . . . . . . 118
3 Wage equation for women with a vocational-technical school . . . . . . . . . . 119
4 Initial Participation Equation for women with a vocational-technical school. . . 120
5 Initial Mobility Equation for women with a vocational-technical school. . . . . 120
6 Variance-covariance matrix for women with a vocational-technical school. . . . 121
7 Summary statistics for women with a vocational-technical school. . . . . . . . 122
8 Initial Participation Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . 123
9 Initial Mobility Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . 123
10 Participation Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . . . 124
11 Mobility Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . . . . . 125
12 Wage Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . . . . . . 126
13 Variance-covariance matrix for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . 127
14 Summary statistics for men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . . . . 128
15 Participation equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
vii
16 Mobility equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate Uni-
versity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
17 Wage equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate University131
18 Initial Participation equation for women with a Technical College or Under-
graduate University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
19 Initial Mobility equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
20 Variance covariance matrix for women with a Technical College or Undergrad-
uate University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
21 Summary Statistics for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate Uni-
versity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
22 Participation Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
23 Mobility Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate Univer-
sity degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
24 Wage Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
25 Initial Participation Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergrad-
uate University degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
26 Initial Mobility Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
27 Variance-Covariance Matrix for Men with a Technical College or Undergradu-
ate University degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
28 Descriptive Statistics for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate Uni-
versity degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
1 Nonemployment, employment in public and private sectors . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2 General descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3 Employment equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4 Sector choice equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5 Public wage equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6 Private wage equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
viii
7 Other parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
8 Model Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
9 Public wage equation without selection - 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
10 Private wage equation without selection - 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
11 Switching regression model with sector selection - 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
12 Switching regression model with sector selection - 1994 - continued . . . . . . 184
13 Quantile differences between the public log of wage and the counterfactual
distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
2 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
3 Four-State Markov transition matrices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4 Marginal probabilities for each type, given gender and age . . . . . . . . . . . 200
5 Average Type-probabilities conditional on initial states . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
6 Stationary equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7 Types Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8 Transition matrices according to types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
9 Limiting Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
10 Tests for stability of dynamics across gender (p-values). . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
11 Data : women between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
12 Coefficients: women between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
13 Transition matrices: women between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
14 Data : men between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
15 Coefficients: men between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
16 Transition matrices: men between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
ix
List of Figures
1 Proportion of long-term contracts and short-term contracts within economically
active population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Distribution of tenure among the employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1 Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 0.2 . . . . . . . . . . 75
2 Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 0.2 . . . . . . 76
3 Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 0.4 . . . . . . . . . . 77
4 Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 0.4 . . . . . . 78
5 Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 0.8 . . . . . . . . . . 79
6 Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 0.8 . . . . . . 80
7 Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 1.4 . . . . . . . . . . 81
8 Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure in days - figure with 1.4 . . . . . . 82
1 Posterior distributions - Women with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . . 141
2 Posterior distributions - Women with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3 Posterior distributions - Men with a Vocational Technical Degree . . . . . . . . 143
4 Posterior distributions - men with a technical college or undergraduate univer-
sity degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
1 Density of the log of wages in 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
2 Predicted log of monthly wages - 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3 Counterfactual log of monthly wages for civil servants - 1994 . . . . . . . . . 171
4 Counterfactual log of monthly wages according to degrees . . . . . . . . . . . 172
5 Quantile differences between counterfactual and public log of wage distribution 178
6 Function value comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7 Wages according to degrees in 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8 Quantile differences between the public log of wage and the counterfactual
distributions given sex and degrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
1 Densities of individual probabilities of being stayer in 1, stayer in 4 and con-
fined conditional on initial states: women between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . 212
2 Densities of individual probabilities of being stayer in 1, stayer in 4 and con-
fined conditional on initial states: men between 30 and 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
xRemerciements
Avant toute chose, je tiens à remercier chaleureusement Thierry Kamionka qui a suivi et
encadré ce travail. Je tiens aussi à remercier Pierre Cahuc et Thierry Magnac pour avoir accepté
d’être les rapporteurs de ma thèse, ainsi que les membres de mon jury.
Par ailleurs, je tiens à remercier l’ensemble de mes coauteurs, avec qui le travail a toujours
été fructueux et enrichissant, et pour les nommer, Moshe Buchinsky, Denis Fougère, Francis
Kramarz, Christian Robert, Roland Rathelot et Elise Coudin.
Compte tenu de la patience et de l’écoute d’Elise, je la remercie plus personnellement.
Relectrice fervente, oreilles à toute épreuve, toujours à m’encourager, sans elle, ma thèse ne
serait sans doute pas terminée. Je voudrais aussi remercier un autre de mes lecteurs patients et
assidus à savoir Arnaud Maurel qui a pourtant déjà bien à faire avec sa propre thèse.
Je voudrais également remercier Fabienne Rosenwald pour le temps qu’elle m’a laissé con-
sacrer à ma thèse, pour ces nombreuses journées recherche qu’elle m’a laissé prendre. Sa pa-
tience et sa compréhension m’ont été précieuses.
Je voudrais enfin remercier mon mari et ma petite fille. Cette thèse leur est dédicacée, ils
la méritent pour leur patience à toute épreuve malgré le temps que j’y ai consacré, malgré les
sorties au parc qu’elle a remplacées...
1Introduction
Le marché du travail français est caractérisé par une très forte proportion de contrats à durée
indéterminée (Figure 1) et de façon corrélée, par une forte proportion de relations de long terme
entre employeurs et employés (Figure 2). Malgré l’existence de ces relations pérennes entre
employeurs et employés, la part de contrats de courte durée (Contrats à Durée Déterminée,
missions d’intérim) ne cesse d’augmenter depuis leur introduction au début des années 1980
(Figure 1). En 2005, les contrats de court terme représentent 66% des embauches, et sont à
l’origine de 60% des transitions de l’emploi vers le non-emploi. Outils de flexibilité des en-
treprises, ces contrats de court terme sont de plus en plus utilisés au détriment du salarié. Ils
servent alors de variable d’ajustement protègeant ainsi les salariés employés en contrat à durée
indéterminée. Cette polarisation croissante du marché du travail français oppose des contrats
courts perçus comme outil de précarisation et des contrats à durée indéterminée synonyme de
réussite d’intégration sur le marché du travail. Elle se traduit ainsi par la coexistence d’une forte
proportion de relations de long terme entre salariés et employeurs et d’une part importante de
changement d’employeurs dans les premiers temps de présence dans l’entreprise. Confortant ce
constat, la fréquence des changements d’entreprises des travailleurs français est d’autant plus
faible que l’expérience, mais aussi l’ancienneté dans l’entreprise, sont élevées. Par exemple, en
moyenne sur 1991-2002, 13.7% des cadres ayant moins de 10 ans de carrière perdent leur em-
ploi ou changent d’employeur. Parmi les cadres ayant 20 à 30 ans de carrière, cette proportion
n’est plus que de 5.3% (Amossé (2003)). Cette mobilité diminue d’autant avec l’ancienneté
que les salaires sont en moyenne plus élevés pour un temps plus grand passé dans l’entreprise
(Pouget (2005b)). La probabilité de quitter l’entreprise est alors plus faible car les salaires
alternatifs proposés le sont aussi. En France, la figure emblématique de cette faible mobilité
associée à de très longues relations employeur employé est constituée par la Fonction Publique,
qui représente, dans son acception la plus large, plus d’un emploi sur cinq (Pouget (2005a)).
Le statut particulier de l’agent fonctionnaire est aujourd’hui débattu. En 2003, le rapport du
Conseil d’Etat (Conseil d’Etat (2003)) pose par exemple le problème de l’évolution de la Fonc-
tion Publique : compte tenu de ses dépenses de personnel, soit au sens large 40% du budget de
l’Etat, ce rapport indique que la Fonction Publique devrait faire preuve d’une efficacité accrue,
et d’une meilleure adaptation aux exigences de la gestion des ressources humaines. Il souligne
2que la capacité concurrentielle de la France dépend tout autant de la maîtrise de ses dépenses
publiques que de la performance de ses services publics. Se pose alors la question de la ré-
munération des fonctionnaires : il existerait une prime à l’emploi dans la Fonction Publique
(Pouget (2005b)). Dans un contexte de fort déficit budgétaire, et de recherche d’efficience de la
Fonction Publique, ce constat mérite approfondissement.
Figure 1.Part des contrats de long et de court terme au sein de la population active
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Figure 2. Répartition de l’ancienneté parmi les salariés
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Ainsi, autour de ces faits brièvement présentés, s’articulent différentes questions qui sont
abordées de façon détaillée par la suite :
3a) d’une part, comment expliquer que les salaires croissent avec l’ancienneté et comment
mesurer ce phénomène ?
b) d’autre part, compte tenu de la relation particulière qui lie l’agent fonctionnaire et son
employeur, et de l’intérêt particulier que suscite la Fonction Publique dans un contexte
budgétaire difficile, existe-t-il des différences de salaire effectives entre le secteur public
et le secteur privé ? Cette question est d’autant plus cruciale que la maîtrise de la dépense
publique est aujourd’hui difficile à atteindre. Le secteur public ne paie-t-il pas donc trop
ses employés comparativement au secteur privé ?
c) enfin, à l’opposé des agents fonctionnaires, symbole d’une flexibilité accrue du marché du
travail, les contrats courts, dont la proportion est en augmentation depuis leur introduc-
tion, constituent-ils un marchepied vers une relation de long terme avec l’entreprise ou
plutôt un frein à une insertion durable ?
Salaires, mobilité et ancienneté
Qu’est-ce qui pourrait expliquer que les salaires augmentent avec l’ancienneté ?
Des relations d’emploi durables et des salaires plus élevés en fonction de l’ancienneté
seraient expliquées de façon évidente par l’existence d’un capital humain spécifique à
l’entreprise. D’après Becker (1964) et Mincer (1974), les salariés investissent dans le capi-
tal spécifique à leur entreprise et de ce fait, avec une acquisition croissante de connaissances
spécifiques, leur salaire augmenterait avec leur ancienneté dans l’entreprise. Ce capital humain
spécifique, non transférable, serait valorisable pour le couple salarié - entreprise mais n’aurait
aucune valeur monétaire en dehors. Parsons (1972) présente un modèle détaillé d’accumulation
du capital humain spécifique qui explique la diminution de la probabilité de changer d’emploi
en fonction de l’investissement en connaissances spécifiques à l’entreprise. Farber (1994b), à
l’aide d’un modèle simple à vocation illustrative montre que si le capital humain spécifique
s’accroît avec l’ancienneté, alors les taux de séparation sont élevés au début de la relation avec
l’entreprise mais ils décroissent par la suite. De plus, en présence de capital spécifique, une
rente est attribuée au salarié, augmentant ainsi son salaire par rapport au salaire alternatif qu’il
pourrait obtenir. Sa probabilité de quitter l’entreprise en est diminuée d’autant.
L’existence d’une productivité spécifique au couple employeur - employé donné, inconnue
4ex ante, peut aussi expliquer cette croissance des salaires avec l’ancienneté (Jovanovic (1979a)).
Le salarié apprend au fur et à mesure du temps passé dans l’entreprise sur la qualité de ses liens
avec elle. Ce modèle permet ainsi d’expliquer les relations de long terme ainsi que les forts taux
de séparation observés en début de poste. Il explique par ailleurs l’augmentation des salaires
avec l’ancienneté, une composante essentielle des salaires étant le terme d’appariemment,
supposé croissant avec le temps passé dans l’entreprise.
L’ensemble de ces faits pourrait aussi être expliqué par la présence d’une hétérogénéité
individuelle inobservée. Une simple généralisation du modèle mover stayer de Blumen, Kogan,
and MacCarthy (1955), avec la coexistence de deux types de travailleurs, ceux à faible et
ceux à forte mobilité (ou ceux à forte et à faible habileté) conclut à l’existence de relations
de long terme, à la diminution de la mobilité avec l’ancienneté, ainsi qu’à des salaires élevés
aux anciennetés les plus grandes. En effet, les personnes les plus productives ont dès le début
de leur carrière un salaire plus élevé. La probabilité qu’elles changent d’emploi est donc plus
faible, la probabilité que leur soit offert un salaire alternatif plus élevé étant moins grande. Ces
personnes changent alors d’emploi moins souvent, et ont au final une ancienneté plus élevée.
Ceci expliquerait en particulier que la productivité des personnes dont l’ancienneté est élevée
soit plus grande, et donc que leur salaire soit plus élevé.
Enfin l’entreprise peut tenir à fidéliser ses meilleurs salariés, et à récompenser leurs efforts.
De ce fait, l’employeur crée une incitation pour l’employé, soit à rester, soit à fournir l’effort
approprié, en différant une partie de son revenu dans le temps : s’établissent des contrats de
travail implicites où les salaires augmentent avec le temps (see Blumen, Kogan, and MacCarthy
(1955), Becker and Stigler (1974), Rosen (1976), Lazear and Rosen (1981), et plus récemment,
Burdett and Coles (2003)). Dans les entreprises à fort capital spécifique, le revenu versé
par l’employeur est implicitement différé dans le temps afin que l’employé ne quitte pas son
entreprise ; ce profil de rémunération se rencontre aussi quand l’effort à fournir est important.
La perspective d’une compensation financière incite le travailleur à fournir la quantité de travail
appropriée. Cette structure de compensation différée permet enfin d’auto sélectionner les
travailleurs aux compétences hétérogènes (Salop and Salop (1976)).
5Se pose alors le problème de l’estimation du lien entre croissance du salaire et ancienneté
ou capital spécifique. En effet, par analogie avec l’utilisation de l’expérience comme mesure
du capital humain général (Mincer (1974) and Willis (1986)), l’ancienneté est utilisée comme
mesure du capital spécifique à l’entreprise. Le logarithme du salaire est supposée dépendre de
la même façon de l’ancienneté et de l’expérience. Bien que cette analogie implique certaines
hypothèses (Farber (1994a)), un nombre élevé de papiers adoptent cette stratégie afin de tester
l’existence de capital spécifique et d’estimer les rendements de l’ancienneté dans l’entreprise.
Deux volets de la littérature s’opposent sur l’estimation de ces rendements : certaines études es-
timent que les rendements de l’ancienneté sont faibles voire négligeables ; d’autres en revanche
estiment de substantiels rendements de l’ancienneté1. De telles dissensions existent en raison
de la complexité de cette estimation : l’ancienneté comme l’expérience sont des variables en-
dogènes, car participation au marché du travail, mobilité et salaires résultent de décisions des
agents.
Les premiers articles à avoir traité de la mesure des rendements de l’ancienneté estiment
en coupe des équations de salaire en fonction de l’expérience et de l’ancienneté. Abraham and
Farber (1987) insistent sur le rôle de l’hétérogénéité inobservée et affirment que les salaires
n’augmentent que peu avec l’ancienneté. Ils montrent que les rendements de l’ancienneté
mesurés en coupe sont largement biaisés, du fait de la corrélation de l’ancienneté avec une vari-
able omise représentant la qualité du travailleur, de l’emploi ainsi que la qualité de la relation
employeur-employé. Pour ce faire, ils supposent que l’ancienneté observée à la date courante
représente la moitié de la durée totale d’occupation de l’emploi. A partir de cette hypothèse,
ils proposent deux méthodes : l’une repose sur l’utilisation de variables instrumentales2, l’autre
consiste à inclure la durée totale de l’emploi comme variable explicative supplémentaire du
logarithme des salaires. Mais cette durée totale dans l’emploi n’est pas observée, et doit être
simulée. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) utilisent aussi une approche instrumentale, à l’aide de la
différence entre l’ancienneté courante et la moyenne de l’ancienneté3, et concluent à la faible
valeur des rendements de l’ancienneté. Altonji et Williams (1997) aboutissent à des conclusions
similaires: ils reprennent les méthodes proposées par Altonji and Shakotko (1987) et par Topel
(1991), et modifient certains traitements des données. Ces résultats ne sont pas neutres en ter-
1Pour une revue de la littérature précise, voir Cahuc and Zylberberg (1996).
2L’instrument utilisé est la différence entre l’ancienneté courante et la moitié de la durée totale de l’emploi
3Ils supposent que l’effet employeur-employé ne dépend pas du temps passé dans l’entreprise
6mes de théorie économique : ils signifieraient que le capital humain est totalement transférable,
qu’il n’existe pas de coûts de déplacement, et enfin, que les entreprises ne diffèrent pas une
partie de la rémunération de leurs salariés dans le temps.
Topel (1991) adopte une approche légèrement différente en estimant les rendements de
l’ancienneté en deux étapes. Dans un premier temps, il estime la croissance des salaires des
personnes qui ne changent pas d’emploi. Ceci lui fournit une estimation de la somme des ren-
dements de l’expérience et de l’ancienneté. Dans un second temps, il estime la croissance des
salaires à partir des personnes qui débutent dans leur emploi: il obtient ainsi une estimation des
rendements de l’expérience. Cette procédure en deux temps lui fournit une borne inférieure des
rendements de l’ancienneté, qu’il estime substantiels.
Malgré les différences de méthodes et d’instruments utilisés, chacune des études précédem-
ment citées est confrontée d’une part, au problème de l’endogénéité de l’ancienneté et de
l’expérience, d’autre part, au problème de la prise en compte de l’hétérogénéité inobservée (à
la fois individuelle et spécifique à l’entreprise) et enfin, au problème de la mesure des variables
d’intérêt.
Plus récemment, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) exploitent l’exogénéité de certaines mobil-
ités, due à la fermeture d’entreprises non anticipée par leurs salariés. Ainsi ils estiment de façon
robuste les rendements de l’ancienneté spécifiques non seulement à l’entreprise mais aussi au
secteur. Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) ont une approche différente. Afin
de tenir compte de l’endogénéité de l’expérience et de l’ancienneté, ils modélisent à la fois la
participation, la mobilité et les salaires. L’ancienneté est donc une fonction des participations
et des mobilités passées, de même pour l’expérience. Afin de contrôler pour d’autres sources
de biais, ils intègrent des termes d’hétérogénéité individuelle inobservée dans chaque équation,
et ils estiment leur modèle en panel et non en coupe. Pour les Etats-Unis, ils concluent à
l’existence de forts rendements de l’ancienneté.
L’ensemble des études précédemment citées étudie le cas des Etats-Unis. Dans la première
partie de cette thèse4, je m’attacherai à étudier les rendements de l’ancienneté en France en
adoptant la méthodologie proposée dans Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006).
Ces rendements seront comparés à ceux obtenus pour les Etats-Unis, et une explication struc-
4Ce papier a été coécrit avec M. Buchinsky, D. Fougère, T. Kamionka et F. Kramarz.
7turelle des différences obtenues sera apportée à l’aide du modèle développé par Burdett and
Coles (2003).
Dans un deuxième temps5, afin de tenir compte non seulement de l’hétérogénéité individu-
elle mais aussi d’une possible hétérogénéité entreprise, le modèle de Buchinsky, Fougère, Kra-
marz, and Tchernis (2006) est étendu en incorporant des effets entreprises inobservés. Ces effets
permettent ainsi de capturer des politiques de rémunération différentes selon les entreprises.
Différence de salaires entre secteur public et secteur privé
Outre cette dépendance des salaires en fonction de l’ancienneté, essentielle afin
d’appréhender la mobilité et les profils de salaire au cours d’une carrière, est abordée dans
cette thèse la question de l’efficience du secteur public.
En raison de la part de l’emploi public dans l’emploi total (24.9% de l’emploi total en France
en 2000, 13.4% au Royaume-Uni, 15.2% aux Etats-Unis), de la différence de fonctionnement
entre les deux secteurs, et du poids des salaires de la fonction publique dans le budget de l’Etat
dans un contexte de hausse structurelle des dépenses publiques (retraites, santé...), l’intérêt pour
le secteur public va croissant. Se posent donc les questions des effectifs de la fonction publique
et celles de la rémunération de ses agents fonctionnaires. Un manque de fonctionnaires induirait
un service rendu de moindre qualité que ce soit au niveau de l’enseignement, des soins. . . Mais
un nombre trop important de fonctionnaires nuit à l’efficience du service public et alourdit in-
utilement les finances publiques. Enfin, compte tenu de la part de l’emploi public dans l’emploi
total, la politique salariale menée dans le secteur public peut affecter l’efficience du secteur
privé. Pour l’ensemble de ces raisons, il est essentiel d’évaluer et de comprendre les différences
de structure de salaires entre secteur public et secteur privé.
Quelle est la rémunération des fonctionnaires comparée à celles des salariés du secteur privé
? Si elles existent, à quoi sont dues les différences de rémunération constatées ?
Afin de répondre à cette question, il doit d’abord être décidé quels critères de comparai-
son retenir. Usuellement sont comparées les moyennes de salaires entre les deux secteurs, ou
les moyennes de salaires conditionnellement à certaines variables explicatives (diplôme, sexe,
expérience, nationalité). Mais cette comparaison des salaires peut-elle être réduite à une com-
paraison de moyennes ? Comme Belman and Heywood (2004) le soulignent, cette mesure est
5Ce papier a été coécrit avec T. Kamionka, F. Kramarz et C. Robert.
8trop réductrice. D’autres aspects de la distribution des salaires sont aussi à considérer, d’où
le développement des études utilisant les régressions quantiles afin de mesurer les différences
de rémunération entre secteurs public et privé le long de la distribution de salaire (Poterba and
Rueben (1994), Bargain and Melly (2008) and Disney and Gosling (1998)).
Par ailleurs, la décision de travailler et le secteur d’activité résultent du choix des agents. Les
premiers papiers s’intéressant aux différences de salaires entre le secteur public et le secteur
privé ne contrôlaient pas de la sélection des individus dans le secteur public. Or négliger
les effets de sélection induit une image faussée des différences salariales entre secteur pub-
lic et secteur privé (Goddeeris (1988), Venti (1987) and Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988)).
Les individus se répartissent de façon non aléatoire entre les deux secteurs (Roy (1951)) : on
peut penser qu’ils s’auto sélectionnent dans le secteur dont ils espèrent les meilleures perspec-
tives salariales. Les individus peuvent aussi, comme le soulignent Bellante and Link (1981),
rechercher une assurance plus grande dans le secteur public, donc accepter des salaires moin-
dres en contrepartie d’une meilleure protection (de l’emploi et de ce fait du salaire). Contrôler de
ce choix entre secteur public et secteur privé implique l’utilisation de variables qui expliquent le
choix de secteur mais qui sont exclues des équations de salaires. Dustman and Van Soest (1998)
soulignent l’influence des variables utilisées sur les résultats obtenus, en plus de l’influence de la
spécification du modèle et des hypothèses d’exogénéité faites sur le nombre d’heures travaillées,
le niveau d’éducation et l’expérience. Ils conseillent l’utilisation d’informations passées sur les
parents. Outre le choix de secteur existe un autre processus de sélection, celui de la partici-
pation au marché du travail. Très peu d’études contrôlent de l’endogénéité de la participation,
(Heitmueller (2006) pour l’Ecosse, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) pour le Royaume-Uni, et
Cappellari (2002) pour l’Italie).
Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse6 sont estimés les salaires contrefactuels des salariés
du secteur public s’ils travaillaient dans le secteur privé. A cette fin, et compte tenu des mises
en garde précédentes, sont estimées une équation de participation, une équation de choix de
secteur et enfin, une équation de salaire pour chacun des deux secteurs (dans l’esprit de Tunali,
1986). Extension de Heitmueller (2006) dans le cas de l’Ecosse, ou de Fougère and Pouget
(2003), le modèle est estimé sur des données de panel et non en coupe. Il intègre par ailleurs des
termes d’hétérogénéité individuelle inobservée, qui sont spécifiques à chaque équation. Compte
6Ce papier a été coécrit avec T. Kamionka.
9tenu de l’importance de la transmission du statut d’une génération à l’autre (Audier (2000) et
Fougère and Pouget (2003)), sont intégrées des variables de statut du père et de la mère comme
variables explicatives du choix de secteur. Enfin, afin de ne pas se restreindre au seul critère des
moyennes, la comparaison se fait sur les quantiles des deux distributions.
Les contrats courts, marche pied vers une relation durable ou outil de confinement
A l’opposé des agents fonctionnaires, tant leurs caractéristiques diffèrent, existe en France
une proportion de contrats de court terme sans cesse croissante. Dans la littérature économique,
ces contrats de court terme peuvent être considérés comme une première étape dans un proces-
sus d’intégration durable sur le marché du travail, ou bien comme une trappe à précarité. A
l’aide de l’hétérogénéité de la productivité des travailleurs, ou du pouvoir de négociation dans
un contexte d’information imparfaite (pour un synthèse détaillée sur la théorie insider-outsider,
voir Lindbeck and Snower (1986)) peut être expliquée la dualité du marché du travail. Certains
travailleurs seraient réduits à des relations de court terme en raison de leur faible productivité.
Le contrat servirait de signal de l’habileté des travailleurs : ainsi une alternance d’emplois de
court terme et de périodes de non-emploi seraient le signal d’une mauvaise productivité, les em-
ployeurs n’offriraient alors plus d’emploi durable (Katz (1986)). Mais l’existence de contrats
de court terme pourrait être en revanche le fait de l’utilisation simultanée d’un emploi surpro-
tégé et du travail temporaire (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) et Blanchard and Landier (2002)).
D’un autre côté, les contrats de court terme peuvent être considérés comme des opportunités
d’accumulation de capital humain général. Se succèderaient ainsi dans les premiers temps de
la vie professionnelle des contrats courts qui permettent non seulement de trouver un meilleur
appariement entreprise-salarié (Jovanovic (1979a)), mais aussi d’accéder à un meilleur salaire
(aux Etats-Unis, les jeunes occupent sept emplois différents dans les dix premières années de
leur vie active sur les dix en moyenne qu’ils occuperont sur l’ensemble de leur carrière, et ils
connaissent une augmentation de salaire substantielle pendant ces premières années - voir Topel
and Ward (1992)). Dans ce cas de figure, les contrats de court terme seraient plus une aide à
l’intégration durable sur le marché du travail.
Afin d’étudier les différentes trajectoires observées sur le marché du travail, plusieurs types
d’approche existent : modèles de durée, modèles de choix discrets. Les modèles de choix discret
expliquent le statut de l’individu sur le marché du travail en fonction de son passé (et notamment
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des statuts occupés par le passé). C’est le cas d’études comme celles de Card and Sullivan
(1988) ou Magnac (2000). Les modèles de durée quant à eux permettent de faire dépendre la
probabilité de passer d’un état à l’autre selon le temps passé dans l’état précédemment occupé
et de variables caractéristiques individuelles (Magnac and Robin (1994)). Un autre volet de la
littérature repose sur les modèles mover-stayer, initialement introduits par Blumen, Kogan, and
MacCarthy (1955) afin d’étudier la mobilité entre industries sur le marché du travail. Ce modèle
repose sur un mélange de chaînes de Markov qui permet de prendre en compte l’hétérogénéité
des dynamiques entre individus. Le modèle initial de Blumen, Kogan, and MacCarthy (1955)
suppose l’existence de deux types d’individus : des individus faiblement mobiles d’une part,
et des individus fortement mobiles d’autre part. Ces derniers seront dénommés " movers "
contrairement aux premiers dénommés " stayers ". Dans la version de Kamionka (1996), ce
modèle est étendu à quatre types afin de prendre en compte une hétérogénéité plus grande des
trajectoires individuelles et une spécificité du marché du travail français, à savoir la coexistence
de contrats de long terme et de contrats de court terme. Dans son modèle sont considérés quatre
états, les emplois de long terme, les emplois de court terme, le chômage et enfin l’inactivité
et quatre sous-chaînes de Markov : une première chaîne dégénérée typique des " stayers " en
emploi de long terme, une deuxième chaîne elle aussi dégénérée typique des " stayers " en
inactivité, et enfin deux chaînes de Markov, l’une de matrice de transition pleine caractéristique
des " movers " dits " secure " (ils peuvent accèder à un emploi de long terme) ; la dernière
restreinte des " movers " dits précaires car ils sont confinés à des épisodes d’emplois de court
terme, de chômage et d’inactivité. C’est cette approche que je vais développer dans un dernier
temps7. Le modèle de Kamionka (1996) n’intègre pas, si ce n’est par l’estimation sur des
sous groupes, de variables caractéristiques individuelles. Afin d’y remédier, sont introduits
des coefficients de mélange qui dépendent de caractéristiques individuelles afin de contrôler
au mieux de l’hétérogénéité observée. Ce modèle permet d’étudier si certaines caractéristiques
individuelles sont plus ou moins corrélées avec des parcours spécifiques sur le marché du travail,
à savoir des trajectoires dites précaires ou des trajectoires dites " secure ". En raison du postulat
fait sur la forme des matrices de transition des chaînes de markov, une étude de robustesse est
menée. Bien que cette partition de la population semble naturelle dans le cas français, une
approche à la Heckman and Singer (1984) a été menée, approche qui n’impose pas a priori la
7Ce papier a été coécrit avec E. Coudin et R. Rathelot.
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nature de ces types. Sont donc estimées des transitions à l’aide d’un logit multinomial (Magnac
(2000)) avec hétérogénéité inobservée (Brodaty (2007)).
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Résumé des résultats essentiels
Le premier papier conclut à la faiblesse des rendements de l’ancienneté en France quel
que soit le diplôme considéré à l’exception des diplômes du supérieur. Pour ces derniers, les
rendements de l’ancienneté estimés sont de l’ordre de 2.6%. Les rendements de l’expérience
sont bien plus élevés que ceux de l’ancienneté : de l’ordre de 5% pour les sans diplômes à 7.6%
pour les bacheliers. Les estimations obtenues dans ce premier papier sont comparables à celles
menées dans le papier de BFKT : les données et la méthode utilisée sont analogues. De ce fait,
les estimations obtenues peuvent être comparées et la différence la plus nette constatée entre
la France et les Etats-Unis concerne ces rendements de l’ancienneté. Aux Etats-Unis, ceux-ci
sont élevés (de l’ordre de 5%) et significativement différents de 0, contrairement à la France où,
exception faite des diplômés du supérieur, les rendements de l’ancienneté sont proches voire
non statistiquement différents de 0. Une des explications possibles serait la différence des taux
d’arrivée des offres entre les deux pays. Les simulations du modèle de Burdett and Coles (2003)
réalisées montrent que, pour un taux journalier d’arrivée des offres de l’ordre de 0.00158,
la pente du salaire est bien plus faible que celle obtenue avec un taux journalier d’arrivée
des offres de l’ordre de 0.005 (taux estimé pour les Etats-Unis). Le manque de dynamisme
du marché du travail français n’inciterait pas les entreprises à rémunérer l’ancienneté dans
l’entreprise : en effet, la probabilité que le salarié reçoive une offre alternative plus élevée est
faible en France. En revanche, aux Etats-Unis, les entreprises sont incitées à le faire si elles
souhaitent conserver leurs salariés. Les résultats du deuxième papier confirment les estimations
obtenues dans le premier. Malgré l’introduction d’une hétérogénéité entreprise inobservée, les
estimations des rendements de l’ancienneté en France restent faibles, à la fois pour les hommes
et pour les femmes, et quel que soit le niveau de diplôme considéré.
Quant au troisième papier qui traite de l’efficience du service public, plusieurs résultats sont
à souligner. Tout d’abord un modèle structurel simple confirme que l’attractivité du secteur pub-
lic augmente en cas de situation économique défavorable, ce qui est dans la lignée des résultats
de Fougère and Pouget (2003). Ce résultat se retrouve dans les estimations du modèle forme
réduite. Par ailleurs, une prime à l’emploi dans la fonction publique existe mais ceci n’est plus
vrai pour le haut de la distribution des salaires. Quant aux femmes, elles ont un avantage com-
8Les taux fournis ici ont été estimés par Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2004).
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paratif à travailler dans le secteur public quelle que soit leur position sur l’échelle des salaires.
A l’inverse, les hommes bénéficient d’une prime à l’emploi dans la fonction publique seulement
en bas de la distribution. Enfin, le troisième papier montre que les différences de structures des
salaires entre secteur public et secteur privé sont la combinaison de trois effets :
• la moyenne brute des logs de salaires qui est plus élevée dans le secteur public que dans
le secteur privé
• les rendements de certaines variables explicatives, comme le sexe ou le diplôme, qui
diffèrent entre les deux secteurs. Les différentiels hommes-femmes sont par exemple plus
forts dans le secteur privé que dans le secteur public, mais les diplômes sont généralement
mieux rémunérés dans le secteur privé.
• enfin, l’habilité inobservée des salariés du secteur public qui serait légèrement inférieure
s’ils travaillaient dans le secteur privé. Dans le cas des salariés du secteur privé, deux cas
de figures se présentent : une partie d’entre eux auraient une productivité inobservée bien
inférieure dans le secteur public, l’autre en revanche en aurait une légèrement supérieure.
Pour ces derniers ainsi que pour les salariés du secteur public, ceci pourrait être interprété
en terme de capital humain transférable.
Enfin, dans le quatrième papier, sont étudiées les trajectoires des 30-49 ans sur le marché du
travail. L’ensemble des estimations de ce quatrième papier repose sur un mélange de chaînes de
Markov dont les coefficients de mélange dépendent de caractéristiques observables. Deux de
ces chaînes de Markov sont dégénérées, la troisième est supposée de matrice de transition pleine
et la dernière, de matrice de transition contrainte (à savoir avec des 0 sur la première ligne et
la première colonne pour signifier l’impossibilité d’accès à des emplois stables). Les résultats
principaux obtenus à partir de ce modèle sont les suivants:
• La proportion de personnes confinées dans des trajectoires précaires, i.e. qui ne peuvent
pas accéder à un emploi stable de type contrats à durée indéterminée, est estimée et de
l’ordre de 5%. De simples statistiques descriptives qui ne prennent pas en compte la
partialité des observations fournissent une proportion de 13%.
• Par ailleurs, à l’équilibre, les personnes confinées dans des trajectoires précaires auront
trois à quatre fois plus de chance de se retrouver au chômage que des individus mobiles
non confinés dans ces trajectoires.
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• Enfin, les contraintes imposées sur les matrices de transition sont justifiées à posteri-
ori par une étude de robustesse n’imposant pas à priori la nature des types considérés.
L’estimation du modèle de Magnac (2000) avec une hétérogénéité inobservée du type
d’Heckman and Singer (1984) confirme l’existence de stayers en emploi stable et en in-
activité ainsi que celle de deux types de movers : des movers en situation difficile sur le
marché du travail avec de faibles probabilités d’accès à un emploi stable, et des movers
avec, en revanche, des probabilités élevées.
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Chapitre 1
The returns to seniority in France
(and Why they are lower than in the United States?)
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1. Introduction
In the past two decades, enormous progress has been made in the analysis of the wage structure.
However, there is still significant disagreement about wage growth, a key issue in labor eco-
nomics. In particular, the respective roles of general human capital, as measured by experience,
and firm-specific human capital, as measured by tenure, are still generally debated. In general,
experience and tenure increase simultaneously except when a worker moves from one firm to
another, or becomes unemployed. Hence, studying the nature of participation and firm-to-firm
mobility (or in short mobility), which, in turn, determine experience and seniority (or tenure),
respectively, should be central to the study of wages. This will allow us to better identify these
two components of human capital accumulation, which, in turn, will better serve us in assess-
ing the respective roles of general (transferable) human capital and specific (non-transferable)
human capital.
The role and relative importance of job tenure and experience on wage growth has been stud-
ied extensively. The results are generally mixed, especially for the U.S. Some authors concluded
that experience matters more than seniority in wage growth (e.g. Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
Altonji and Williams (1992) and Altonji and Williams (1997)), while others concluded that
both experience and tenure are important factors of wage growth (e.g. Topel (1991), Buchin-
sky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) BFKT, hereafter). Indeed, identifying the relative
roles of tenure and experience is a somewhat complex issue to study. In fact, it seems that
various studies uncovered a number of crucial difficulties and provided varying solutions that
potentially affect the ultimate estimates.1
Empirically, it is generally agreed that there exists a positive correlation between seniority
and wages. Several economic theories have offered some explanations for the interdependence
between wage growth and job tenure. First, the role of specific job tenure on the dynamics of
wages has been studied by various human capital theories, starting with the seminal work of
Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974). The central point of this theory is the increase in earnings
that stems from individual’s investment in human capital. The structure of wages can also be
described by job matching theory (Jovanovic (1979a), Miller (1984), and Jovanovic (1984)).
This theory attempts to provide explanations for both mobility of workers across firms and the
1Few such issues are: the definition of the variables, issues about the errors in measured seniority, the estimation
methods that are used, the methods controlling for unobserved heterogeneity components in the model, and the
exogeneity assumptions that are made.
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observed patterns of significant decreases in the job separation rate as job-tenure increases. The
key assumption for these types of models is that there exists a specific productivity level for
any worker-occupation match. While the worker’s wage depends on this productivity, it is, a
priori, unknown. Indeed, the specific human capital investment will be larger when the match
is less likely to be terminated (see Jovanovic (1979a)). Finally, a job matching model typically
predicts an increase in the worker’s wage with job seniority.
Alternatively, the dynamic of wage changes can be explained by deferred compensation
theories. The key element of these theories is the existence of a contract between the firm and
an employee, which is chosen so that the worker’s choice of effort and/or quit decision will
be optimal (see Salop and Salop (1976), or Lazear (1979), Lazear (1981) and Lazear (1999)).
These theories predict that workers starting in a firm will be paid below their marginal product,
whereas workers with long tenure in the firm will be paid above their marginal product.
More recently, equilibrium wage-tenure contracts have been shown to exist within a match-
ing model (see Burdett and Coles (2003) or Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) in a slightly different
context). At the equilibrium, firms post contracts that make wages increase with tenure. Some
of these models are able to characterize both workers’ mobility and the existing positive relation
between wage and tenure. For instance, the Burdett-Coles model allows the specificities of the
wage-tenure contract to depend heavily on workers’ preferences, as well as on labor market
characteristics such job offer arrival rate.
While the relation between wage growth and mobility (or job tenure) may result from (op-
timal) choices of the firm and/or the worker, it may also simply stem from spurious duration
dependence. Indeed, if there is a correlation between job seniority and a latent variable measur-
ing worker’s productivity, and if, in addition, more productive workers have higher wages, then
there will be positive correlation between wages and job seniority, even though wages do not
directly depend on job tenure (see, for instance Abraham and Farber (1987), Lillard and Willis
(1978), and Flinn (1986)). This latter point illustrates the vital importance of being able to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity components. Furthermore, it highlights the need to control
for the endogeneity of the mobility decisions, and consequently of measured job tenure.
Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) develop a model in which costs that are
induced by mobility generate state-dependence in the mobility decision, and similarly for the
participation decision (as has already been demonstrated by Hyslop (1999)). It is well-known
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in the literature that, due to the problems raised above, the usual Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS)
estimates of the returns to seniority will be biased. There are many ways to address this problem.
One solution is the use of the instrumental variables framework as this is done by Altonji and
Shakotko (1987). Alternatively, one can use panel data models that control for fixed effects
(e.g. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)). Finally, one can take a more direct approach
and jointly model the wages outcome, along with the mobility and participation decisions (e.g.
BFKT).
In this paper, we adopt the latter approach. More specifically, we control for both state-
dependence and (correlated) unobserved individual heterogeneity in the mobility and participa-
tion decisions. We also control for correlated unobserved individual heterogeneity in the wage
equation. We use a Bayesian framework, similar to that used in BFKT, using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedure that involve some Gibbs sampling steps combined with the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. As our model contains limited dependent endogenous variables
(i.e., participation and mobility), we also need to use some additional data augmentation steps.
We use data from the match of the French Déclaration Annuelle de Données Sociales
(DADS) panel, providing us with observations on wages for the years 1976 through 1995, with
the Echantillon Démographique Permanent (EDP) that provides time-variant and time-invariant
personal characteristics. Because we use the exact same specification as in BFKT and relatively
similar data sources, we place ourselves in a good position for comparing the returns to senior-
ity in France and in the U.S. For the U.S, the estimates of the returns to seniority appear to be
in line with those obtained by Topel (1991), and to a lesser extent with those of Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), and Altonji and Williams (1992), Altonji and Williams (1997). In complete
contrast, estimates obtained for France are much smaller than those obtained for the U.S. in any
of the studies reported in the literature. In fact, some of the returns to seniority in France are
virtually equal to zero. In comparison, the returns to experience are rather large and close to
those estimated by BFKT.
We proceed then with an attempt to understand the rationale for the enormous differences
between the U.S. and France. For this purpose, we make use of the equilibrium search model
with wage-contracts proposed by Burdett and Coles (2003). In this model, contracts differ in
the equilibrium rates of returns to tenure, i.e., the slope of the tenure profile. Elements that
determine these slopes include: job arrival rate (and hence workers’ propensity to move) and
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risk aversion. We show that, for all values of the relative risk aversion coefficient, the larger
the job arrival rate, the steeper the wage-tenure profile. Indeed, recent estimates show that the
job arrival rate for the unemployed is about 1.71 per year in the U.S., while it is only 0.56 per
year in France (Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2004)). Therefore, the returns to seniority may
directly reflect the patterns of mobility in the two countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the statistical model.
Section 3 explains the crucial parts of the estimation method employed here. Section 4 fol-
lows with description of the data sources. Section 5 provides the empirical results obtained for
France, while Section 6 contrasts these results with those obtained by BFKT for the U.S. We
also provide in this section a theoretical explanation of these differences supported by additional
simulations. Finally, Section 7 briefly concludes.
2. The Statistical Model
The main goal of our study is to examine the returns to experience and seniority in France. To
maximize comparability with previous research, and following BFKT, we posit a wage equation
that is similar to Topel (1991) or to Altonji and Shakotko (1987), to Altonji and Williams (1992)
or Altonji and Williams (1997). We differ from these authors by the way we deal with the ob-
vious endogeneity of the participation and mobility decisions, which, in turn, define experience
and tenure on the job. We follow here closely BFKT, extending on Hyslop (1999) (who focuses
only on participation) by directly modeling participation and firm-to-firm mobility. The eco-
nomic model that supports our approach is a structural dynamic choice model of firm-to-firm
worker’s mobility, with mobility costs. BFKT shows that under a set of plausible assumptions
on this cost structure, this model generates first-order state dependence for the participation and
mobility processes.
2.1. The structural model
In this section, we briefly summarize the structural model frow which the econometric model is
derived. The observed log wage equation for individual i in job j at time t is given by:
wit = w
∗
ijt1 (yit = 1) (2.1)
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w∗ijt = x
′
witδ0 + ǫijt (2.2)
ǫijt = J
W
ijt + αwi + ηit (2.3)
The function JWijt is the sum of all discontinuous jumps in one’s wage that resulted from
all job changes until date t (see equation 2.11). This function generalizes the match effect
introduced in the wage equation by either Topel or Altonji. Moreover it captures the initial
conditions specific to the individual at the start of a new job. It enables to control for the quality
of past matches, and to distinguish between displaced workers and workers who move directly
from one job to another. The term αwi is a person-specific correlated random effect, while ηit is
a contemporaneous idiosyncratic error term.
A worker employed in period t receives a wage offer from his current firm. Given this offer,
he decides either to quit or to stay at the end of period t. At the end of period t, he does not
know with certainty the wage a new firm will offer him but he can form an expectation. For
simplicity he receives with probability 1 an outside wage offer in the next period. He has no
research cost, but he incurs the cost cM at the beginning of period t+ 1 if he decides to move at
the end of period t (due to his social network reconstruction). A non-participant pays a cost γ1
at the beginning of period t to receive an offer during the period t. It is assumed cM > γ1 (see
Hardman and Ioannides (2004)).
Each individual is supposed to maximize his discounted present value of the infinite lifetime
intertemporally separable utility function under the period-by-period budget constraint:
Ut =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt(u(Cs, ys, Xs))
Ct = zt + wtyt − cMmt−1 − γ1(1− yt−1)
Ct denotes the consumption, zt the non-labor income, yt = 1 if the individual participates at t,
mt = 1 if the individual moves at the end of period t (i.e. between t and t+ 1).
By virtue of Bellman’s optimality, the value function at the beginning of period t, given past
participation and past mobility, is given by
Vt(yt−1, mt−1;Xt) = max
yt,mt
(u(ct, yt;Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(yt, mt;Xt+1)))
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When the individual does not participate at t− 1 i.e. yt−1 = 0 (and mt−1 = 0):
Vt(0, 0, Xt) = max
yt,mt
(
V 0t (0, 0, Xt), V
1
t (0, 0, Xt), V
2
t (0, 0, Xt)
)
with
V 0t (0, 0, Xt) = u(zt − γ1, 0, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(0, 0;Xt+1))
V 1t (0, 0, Xt) = u(zt − γ1 + wt, 1, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(1, 0;Xt+1))
V 2t (0, 0, Xt) = u(zt − γ1 + wt, 1, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(1, 1;Xt+1))
When the individual participates at t−1 (yt−1 = 1) and does not move at the end of period t−1
(mt−1 = 1)
Vt(1, 0, Xt) = max
yt,mt
(
V 0t (1, 0, Xt), V
1
t (1, 0, Xt), V
2
t (1, 0, Xt)
)
with
V 0t (1, 0, Xt) = u(zt, 0, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(0, 0;Xt+1))
V 1t (1, 0, Xt) = u(zt + wt, 1, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(1, 0;Xt+1))
V 2t (1, 0, Xt) = u(zt + wt, 1, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(1, 1;Xt+1))
When the individual participates at t − 1 (yt−1 = 1) and moves at the end of period t − 1
(mt−1 = 1)
Vt(1, 0, Xt) = max
yt,mt
(
V 0t (1, 0, Xt), V
1
t (1, 0, Xt), V
2
t (1, 0, Xt)
)
with
V 0t (1, 1, Xt) = u(zt − cM , 0, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(0, 0;Xt+1))
V 1t (1, 1, Xt) = u(zt + wt − cM , 1, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(1, 0;Xt+1))
V 2t (1, 1, Xt) = u(zt + wt − cM , 1, Xt) + βEt (Vt+1(1, 1;Xt+1))
Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) derive transitions from different reser-
vation wages. When the individual does not participate at t−1, there are two reservations wages
w∗01,t and w∗02,t implicitly defined by
V 0t (0, 0, Xt) = V
1
t (0, 0, Xt|w∗01,t) = V 2t (0, 0, Xt|w∗02,t) (2.4)
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For each period t, as in Burdett (1978a), it is assumed that
d
dw
V 2t (1, mt, Xt) ≤
d
dw
V 1t (1, mt, Xt) mt = 0, 1
Under this assumption, and using (2.4), if w∗01,t > w∗02,t, there exists a wage value, w∗03,t such
that
V 1t (0, 0, Xt|w∗03,t) = V 2t (0, 0, Xt|w∗03,t)
w ≤ w∗02,t, V 0t (0, 0, Xt|w) ≥ max
(
V 1t (0, 0, Xt|w), V 2t (0, 0, Xt|w)
)
w∗02,t ≤ w ≤ w∗03,t, V 2t (0, 0, Xt|w) ≥ V 1t (0, 0, Xt|w) ≥ V 0t (0, 0, Xt|w)
w∗03,t ≤ w, V 1t (0, 0, Xt|w) ≥ V 2t (0, 0, Xt|w) ≥ V 0t (0, 0, Xt|w)
Then the decision rule for a non-participant is:
1. If w∗02 < w∗01, either the individual stays non-employed if w < w∗02, or the individual
accepts the offer and will move to another firm in the next period if w∗02 < w < w∗03, or
he accepts the offer and will stay in the firm another period if w > w∗03
2. If w∗02 > w∗01, either the individual stays non-employed if w < w∗01, then the individual
accepts the offer and will stay in the firm another period if w > w∗01
When the individual participates at t− 1 and does not move at the end of period t− 1 (resp.
when he participates at t− 1 and moves at the end of period t− 1), the same reasoning applies
with w∗12, w∗11, w∗13 (resp. w∗22, w∗21, w∗23) instead of w∗02, w∗01, w∗03.
Under some conditions, using Taylor expansions and the concavity of u, Buchinsky,
Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) find2:
w∗11,t ≈ w∗01,t − γ11 w∗12,t ≈ w∗02,t − γ12 w∗13,t ≈ w∗03,t + γ13
w∗21,t ≈ w∗01,t − γ11 + γ21 w∗22,t ≈ w∗02,t − γ12 + γ22 w∗23,t ≈ w∗03,t + γ13 + γ23
Thus it can be derived for participation at date t denoted yt,
yt = 1
(
wt > w
∗
02,t(1− yt−1) + w∗12,tyt−1(1−mt−1) + w∗22,tyt−1mt−1
)
2For the specific conditions and detailed description see BFKT.
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= 1
(
wt > w
∗
02,t − γ12yt−1 + γ22yt−1mt−1
)
and for mobility at the end of period t denoted mt,
st = 1−mt = 1
(
wt > yt−1(1−mt−1)w∗13,t + yt−1mt−1w∗23,t + (1− yt−1)w∗03,t
)
= 1
(
wt > yt−1w
∗
13,t + γ23yt−1mt−1
)
Generally the reservation wages are intractable, thus they are arbitrarily approximated by
linear functions of the entire set of exogenous and predetermined covariates. Substituting the
expressions and using the equations 2.1 yields the following participation and mobility equa-
tions at period t:
yt = 1
(
a0J
W
it + x
′
ytβ0 + βyyt−1 + βmyt−1mt−1 + αy + ut > 0
)
mt = 1(yt−1 = 1, yt = 1)1
(
a1J
W
it + x
′
mtλ0 + λmyt−1mt−1 + αm + vt > 0
)
2.2. Specification of the General Model
Therefore, the statistical model that we estimate derive from this structural choice model of
participation and mobility, whereby the wage equation is estimated jointly with the participation
and mobility equations. The equations for participation, mobility, and log-wage are given,
respectively, by
yit = 1 (y
∗
it > 0) , where (2.5)
y∗it = γ
M mit−1 + γ
Y yit−1 +X
Y
it δ
Y + θY,Ii + vit,
mit = yit+1yit 1 (m
∗
it > 0) , where (2.6)
m∗it = γ mit−1 +X
M
it δ
M + θM,Ii + uit, and
wit = X
W
it δ
W + JWit + θ
W,I
i + ǫit, if yit = 1 (2.7)
for all years for which t > 1, for i = 1, ..., n.
yit is the usual indicator function. yit = 1 if the individual participates, 0 otherwise. The
quantity y∗it is the latent variable measuring the value of participation at time t. Similarly, m∗it
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is a latent variable measuring worker’s i value of moving between t and t + 1, and mit is an
indicator function, denoting whether or not the individual moved at the end of time t. Note that
by definition, observed mobility mit is equal to 0 when the individual does not participate at
time t. Finally, note that mit is not observed (censored) whenever a worker participates at date
t but does not participate at t+1. The variable wit denotes the logarithm of the hourly total real
labor costs.
The terms θY,I , θM,I , and θW,I denote the correlated random effects specific to the indi-
viduals, while u, v and ǫ are idiosyncratic error terms. In principle, there are J firms and N
individuals in the panel of length T , but our panel is unbalanced in the sense that we do not
observe all individuals in all time periods.
Note that because lagged mobility and lagged participation must be included in the partic-
ipation and mobility equations, one needs to control for the well-known initial conditions in
the first period. We follow Heckman (1981) and we add for t = 1 the following participation,
mobility, and wages equations, respectively
yi1 = 1
(
XYi1δ
Y
0 + α
Y,I
i + vi1 > 0
)
(2.8)
mi1 = yi11
(
XMi1 δ
M
0 + α
M,I
i + ui1 > 0
)
, and (2.9)
wi1 = X
W
i1 δ
W + θW,Ii + ǫi1 if yi1 = 1 (2.10)
The wage equation is standard for most of its components and includes, in particular, a
quadratic function of experience and seniority.3 It also includes the following individual char-
acteristics: gender, marital status, and if unmarried an indicator for living in couple, an indicator
for living in the Ile de France region (the Paris region), the département (roughly a U.S. county)
unemployment rate, an indicator for French nationality for the person as well as for his/her
parents, and cohort effects. We also include information on the job characteristics: an indica-
tor function for part-time work, and 14 indicators for the industry of the employing firm. In
addition we include a complete set of year dummy variables.
Finally, following the specification adopted in BFKT, we include the function JWit , that
captures the sum of all wage changes that resulted from job changes (i.e., moves between one
3BFKT also presents estimates with a quartic specification in both experience and seniority. This issue is
addressed further below.
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firm and another) prior to the current date t. This term allows us to control for discontinuous
jumps in one’s wage when he/she changes jobs. The jumps are allowed to differ depending on
the level of seniority and total labor market experience at the point in time when the individual
changes jobs. Specifically,
JWit = (φ
s
0 + φ
e
0ei0) di1 +
Kit∑
l=1
[
4∑
j=1
(
φj0 + φ
s
jstl−1 + φ
e
jetl−1
)
djitl
]
. (2.11)
Suppressing the i subscript, the variable d1tl equals 1 if the lth job lasted less than a year, and
equals 0 otherwise. Similarly, d2tl = 1 if the lth job lasted between 1 and 5 years, and equals 0
otherwise, d3tl = 1 if the lth job lasted between 5 and 10 years, and equals 0 otherwise, d4tl = 1
if the lth job lasted more than 10 years and equals 0 otherwise. The quantity Kit denotes the
number of job changes by the ith individual, up to time t (not including the individual’s first
sample year). If an individual changed jobs in his/her first sample then di1 = 1, otherwise
di1 = 0. The quantities et and st denote the experience and seniority in year t, respectively.4
Hence, at the start of a new job, two individuals with identical characteristics, but with different
career paths enter their new job with potentially different starting wages.
Turning now to the mobility equation, most of the variables that are included in the wage
equation are also present in the mobility equation with the exclusion of the JWit function. How-
ever, an indicator for the lagged mobility decision and indicators for having children between
the ages of 0 and 3, and for having children between the ages of 3 and 6 are included in the
mobility equation, but are not present in the wage equation.
The specification of the participation equation is very similar to that of the mobility equa-
tion. Nevertheless, because job-specific variables cannot be defined for workers who have no
job, seniority, the part-time status, and the employing industry, all present in the mobility equa-
tion, are excluded from the participation equation.
Finally, the initial mobility and participation equations are simplified versions of these equa-
tions, that is, all the variables that appear in the general participation and mobility equation are
also included in the corresponding initial conditions, except for the lagged dependent variables.
Note the specification above introduces multiple exclusion restrictions. For instance, the
4Note that this specification for the term JWit produces thirteen different regressors in the wage equation. These
regressors are: a dummy for job change in year 1, experience in year 0, the numbers of switches of jobs that lasted
less than one year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years; seniority at last job
change that lasted between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years; and experience at last
job change that lasted less than one year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years.
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industry affiliation is included in both wage and mobility equations but is excluded (for obvious
reasons) from the participation equation. Conversely, the children variables are not present in
the wage equation but are included in the two other equations. This restriction is often used
in empirical applications. Furthermore, following Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tcher-
nis (2006), the JWit function is included in the wage equation but not in the participation and
mobility equations. When the JWit function is included in the mobility and participation equa-
tions, its coefficients are non significantly different from zero. Therefore, we adopted a similar
specification to maximize comparability. Unfortunately, there appears to be no set of exclusion
restrictions that would guarantee convincing identification of the initial conditions equations,
except functional form (i.e., the normality assumptions).
2.3. Stochastic Assumptions
The vector of individual specific effects, including those from the initial condition equations, is
given by
θIi =
(
αY,Ii , α
M,I
i , θ
Y,I
i , θ
W,I
i , θ
M,I
i
)
θIi |ΣIi ∼i.i.d. a priori N
(
0, ΣIi
)
,
We assume that individuals are independent, but their various individual effects may not have
the same distribution. Namely, we assume that θIi follows the distribution given by
θIi ∼ N(f (xi1, ..., xiT ) , ΣIi ), where (2.12)
ΣIi = Di∆ρDi,
Di = diag (σyi, σmi, σwi) , and
{∆ρ}j,l = ρθIj ,θIl , for j, l = y,m,w.
Also, the function f (xi1, ..., xiT ) is potentially a function of all exogenous variables in all pe-
riod. The matrix ΣIi is indexed by i, since we also allow for σji to be heteroscedastic, i.e., to
depend on xyit, xmit, and xwit, respectively. That is,
σ2ji = exp (hj (xi1, ..., xiT )) , for j = y,m,w, (2.13)
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where the hj(·)’s are some real valued functions. The ultimate goal in doing so is to control for
the possible existence of heterogeneity in a parsimonious way. Hence, we base our estimation on
only the sample averages of the regressors’ vector, i.e. xji = (
∑T
i=1 xjit)/T for each individual.
We then use the first three principle components of x¯ji, as well as a constant term to approximate
hj (xi1, ..., xiT ) by5
ĥj(γj, xji1, ..., xjiT ) = pc
′
iγj , (2.14)
where pci is the vector containing the principal components. This significantly reduce the com-
putation burden. This is because the posterior distribution for γ = (γ′y, γ′m, γ′w)′ is difficult to
obtain and require the use of a Metropolis-Hastings step.
In addition, we assume that the individual specific effects are stochastically independent of
the idiosyncratic shocks, that is θIi ⊥ (vit, uit, ǫit).
Finally, for the idiosyncratic error terms we assume
vit
uit
ǫit
 ∼i.i.d. N


0
0
0
 ,

1 ρym ρywσ
ρym 1 ρwmσ
ρywσ σρwm σ
2

 .
This assumption of i.i.d. income innovations is used for convenience and for an easier im-
plementation. This is a simplistic assumption: several papers point out the need for modeling
the income innovations as the sum of a permanent and a stochastic components (see Bonhomme
and Robin (2008), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Guvenen (2007)). In these papers, the stochas-
tic component presents persistence over time (first-order Markov or MA process...) unlike the
assumption made above.6
It is worthwhile noting that the specification of the joint distribution of the person specific
effects has direct implications for the correlation between the regressors and the corresponding
random effects. To see this, consider an individual with seniority level sit = s. Note that sit can
be written as:
5The γj terms are estimated separately in a factor analysis of individual data. The variables that enter this
analysis are the sex, the year of birth, the region where the individual lives (Ile de France versus other regions), the
number of children, the marital status, the part-time status, and the unemployment rate in the department of work.
The first three principle components account for over 90% of the total variance of xji, so that there is almost no
loss of information by doing so.
6This assumption must have no influence on the consistency of the estimation but rather on its efficiency. This
is based on a reasoning on the only wage equation: the residual mean, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity,
equal to zero is a sufficient condition to ensure convergence.
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sit = (sit−1 + 1)1 (mi,t−1 = 0, yit = 1) .
This equation can be expanded by recursion to the individual’s entry year into the firm. Since
the seniority level of those currently employed depends on the sequence of past participation
and mobility indicators, it must also be correlated with the person-specific effect of the wage
equation θW,Ii . This, in turn, is correlated with θ
M,I
i and θ
Y,I
i , the person-specific effects in the
mobility and participation equations, respectively. Similarly, experience and the JW function
are also correlated with θW,Ii . Given that lagged values of participation and mobility, as well
as the seniority level appear in both the participation and mobility equations, it follows that
the regressors in these two equations are also correlated, albeit in a complex fashion, with the
corresponding person-specific effects, namely θM,Ii and θ
Y,I
i , respectively.
This reasoning also applies to the idiosyncratic error terms. Therefore, the individual spe-
cific effect and the idiosyncratic error term in the wage equation are both correlated with the
experience and seniority variables through the correlation of the individual effects and idiosyn-
cratic error terms across our system of equations. Putting it differently the system of equations
specified here allows for correlated random effects.
3. Estimation
As in Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006), we adopt a Bayesian method. The
estimates provided are given by the mean of the posterior distribution of the various parameters.
We construct the posterior distribution via the use of a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
procedure, where in each iteration we draw from the posterior distribution of these parame-
ters conditional on the data. We do so, because the computation of the analytical form for
posterior distribution is intractable. Specifically, we use a combination of the Gibbs Sampling
algorithm, augmented by Metropolis-Hastings whenever needed, (for example when drawing
the correlation coefficients), to obtain draws from this posterior distribution. Below we briefly
explain the implementation of the MCMC for our problem. For a more detailed description see
Appendix A.
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3.1. Principles of the Gibbs Sampler
Given a parameter set and the data, the Gibbs sampler relies on the recursive and repeated com-
putations of the conditional distribution of each parameter, conditional on all other parameters,
and conditional on the data. We need to specify a prior density for each parameter. Recall that,
when prior independence is assumed between ϕ and P(ϕ), the conditional posterior distribution
for a subset of parameter vector ϕ satisfies:
p(ϕ|P(ϕ), data) ∝ p(data|P(ϕ), ϕ)π(ϕ),
where P denotes the vector containing all parameters of the model, P(ϕ) denotes all other para-
meters, except for ϕ, and π(ϕ) is the prior density of ϕ.
The Gibbs Sampler allows for an easy treatment of the latent variables through the so-called
data augmentation procedure (Tanner and Wong (1987), Albert and Chib (1993)). Therefore,
completion of censored observations becomes possible. In particular, we can never observe the
latent variables m∗it and y∗it, and the wage wit is observed only if the ith individual works at time
t. Censored or unobserved data are simply “augmented ”, that is, we compute m∗it and y∗it based
on (2.5)+(2.6), conditional on all the parameters and on the observed data.
Finally, the Gibbs Sampler procedure does not involve optimization algorithms. Sequential
simulations of the conditional densities are the only computations required. There is somewhat
of a complication in this procedure when the densities have no natural conjugate (i.e., when the
prior and the posterior do not belong to the same family). In these cases we use the standard
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Specifically, in this case we cannot directly draw from the true
conditional distribution. Hence, we draw the parameters using another distribution (the proposal
distribution) and we use a rejection method in order to decide whether or not to keep that draw.
In our estimation, we need to resort to the Metropolis-Hastings step when drawing elements for
the variance-covariance matrix.
3.2. Application to our Problem
In order to use Bayes’ rule, we first need to specify the full conditional likelihood, that is,
the density of all variables, observed and augmented, namely y, w,m,m∗ and y∗, given all
parameters (the parameters of interest as well as the set of augmented parameters). We thus
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have to properly define the parameter set and to properly “augment ”our data.
The full parameter set is given by
(
δY0 , δ
M
0 ; δ
Y , γM , γY ; δM , γ; δW ; σ2, ρyw, ρym, ρwm; γ¯; η
)
,
so that for P we have
P = (δY0 , δM0 ; δY , γM , γY ; δM , γ; δW ; σ2, ρyw, ρym, ρwm; γ¯; η; θI) ,
where γ¯ = (γ′1, . . . , γ′5)′ and η = (η1, . . . , η10)′.
When specifying the relevant set of variables corresponding to each period, special care
needs to be given for the (censored) mobility variable. There are four cases depending on the
values of the couple (yit−1, yit). For a given individual i we define Xt, the completed set of
endogenous variables as:
Xt = ytyt−1X
11
t + yt−1(1− yt)X10t + yt(1− yt−1)X01t + (1− yt)(1− yt−1)X00t ,
where
X11t =
(
y∗t , yt, wt, m
∗
t−1, mt−1
)
,
X10t =
(
y∗t , yt, m
∗
t−1
)
,
X01t = (y
∗
t , yt, wt) , and
X00t = (y
∗
t , yt) .
For the initial year we similarly define
X1 = y1X
1
1 + (1− y1)X01 ,
X11 = (y
∗
1, y1, w1) , and
X01 = (y
∗
1, y1) .
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The contribution of the ith individual to the conditional likelihood function is given then by7
L(X iT |P) =
(
T∏
t=2
l(Xit|P,Fi,t−1)
)
l(Xi1),
where X i,t = (Xi1, ..., Xit), Fi,t−1 = X i,t−1, and
l(Xit|P,Fi,t−1) = l(X11it |P,Fi,t−1)yi,t−1yit l(X10it |P,Fi,t−1)yi,t−1(1−yit)
l(X01it |P,Fi,t−1)(1−yi,t−1)yit l(X00it |P,Fi,t−1)
(1−yi,t−1)(1−yit)
.
Thus, the full conditional likelihood is given by
L(XT |P) =
(
1
V w
)PNi=1PTt=1 yit
2
(
1
V m
)PNi=1PT−1t=1 yit
2
×
N∏
i=1
(1 (y∗i1 > 0))
yi1 (1 (y∗i1 ≤ 0))1−yi1 exp
{
−1
2
(y∗i1 −my∗i1)2
}
exp
{
− yi1
2V w
(wi1 −Mwi1)2
}
×
T∏
t=2
(1 (y∗it > 0))
yit (1 (y∗it ≤ 0))1−yit exp
{
−1
2
(y∗it −my∗it)2
}
exp
{
− yit
2V w
(wit −Mwit )2
}
×
((
1
(
m∗i,t−1 > 0
))mi,t−1 (
1
(
[m∗i,t−1 ≤ 0
))1−mi,t−1)yi,t−1yit exp{−yi,t−1
2V m
(m∗i,t−1 −Mmi,t−1)2
}
,
where, because of the normal residuals, we have
V w = σ2(1− ρ2yw),
V m =
1− ρ2yw − ρ2ym − ρ2wm + 2ρywρymρwm
1− ρ2yw
,
Mmit = mm∗it +
ρy,m − ρw,mρy,w
1− ρ2y,w︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(y∗it −my∗it) +
ρw,m − ρy,mρy,w
σ(1− ρ2y,w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
(wit −mwit),
Mwit = mwit + σρy,w(y
∗
it −my∗it),
7Even though our notations do not make this explicit, all our computations allow for an individual-specific entry
and exit date in the panel, that is, an unbalanced panel.
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and the residuals’ correlations are parameterized by:
θ = (θyw, θym, θwm)
′ , ρyw = cos(θyw), ρym = cos(θym), and
ρwm = cos(θyw) cos(θym)− sin(θyw) sin(θym) cos(θwm).
Finally, prior distributions are needed, we define them as follows:
δY0 ∼ N (mδY0 , vδY0 ), δ
M
0 ∼ N (mδM0 , vδM0 ), δ
Y ∼ N (mδY , vδY ), δW ∼ N (mδW , vδW ),
δM ∼ N (mδM , vδM ), γY ∼ N (mγY , vγY ), γM ∼ N (mγM , vγM ), γ ∼ N (mγ, vγ),
σ2 ∼ Inverse gamma(v
2
,
d
2
),
θ ∼ iidU [0, π]
ηj ∼ iidU [0, π] for j = 1...10, and
γj ∼ iidN (mγj , vγj ) for j = 1...5.
Based on these prior distributions and the full conditional likelihood, all posterior densities
can be evaluated (for a more detailed description see Appendix A). The prior distributions are
key elements for computing the posterior distribution. We adopt here conjugate, generally zero-
mean, but very diffuse priors, reflecting our lack of knowledge about the possible values of the
parameters.
4. The Data
The data on workers come from two sources, the Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales
(DADS) and the Echantillon Démographique Permanent (EDP) that are matched together. Our
first source, the DADS, is an administrative file based on mandatory reports of employees’
earnings by French employers to the Fiscal Administration. Hence, it matches information
on workers and on their employing firm. This data set is longitudinal and covers the period
1976-1995 for all workers employed in the private and semi-public sector who were born in
October of an even year. Finally, for all workers born in the first four days of October of an
even year, information from the EDP is also available. The EDP comprises various censuses
and demographic information. These sources are presented in more detail in the following
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paragraphs.
The DADS Data Set:
Our main data source is the DADS, a large collection of matched employer-employee infor-
mation collected by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE)
and maintained in the Division des Revenus. The data are based upon mandatory employer re-
ports of the gross earnings of each employee subject to French payroll taxes. These taxes apply
to all “declared” employees and to all self-employed persons, essentially all employed persons
in the economy.
The Division des Revenus prepares an extract of the DADS for scientific analysis, covering
all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered
years, with civil servants excluded.8 Our extract covers the period from 1976 through 1995, with
1981, 1983, and 1990 excluded because the underlying administrative data were not sampled in
those years. Starting in 1976, the Division des Revenus kept information on the employing firm
using the newly created SIREN number from the SIRENE system9. However, before this date,
there was no available identifier of the employing firm. Each observation of the initial data set
corresponds to a unique individual-year-establishment combination. Each observation in this
initial DADS file includes an identifier that corresponds to the employee (called ID below), an
identifier that corresponds to the establishment (SIRET), and an identifier that corresponds to
the parent enterprize of the establishment (SIREN). For each individual, we have information
on the number of days during the calendar year the individual worked in the establishment and
the full-time/part-time status of the employee. In addition we also have information on the
individual’s sex, date and place of birth, occupation, total net nominal earnings during the year
and annualized net nominal earnings during the year, as well as the location and industry of the
employing establishment. The resulting data set has 13,770,082 observations.
The Echantillon Démographique Permanent:
The Division of Etudes Démographiques at INSEE maintains a large longitudinal data set
containing information on many socio-demographic variables of French individuals. All indi-
viduals born in the first four days of the month of October of an even year are included in this
8Individuals employed in the civil service move almost exclusively to other positions within the civil service.
Thus the exclusion of civil servants should not affect our estimation of a worker’s market wage equation. For
greater details see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).
9The SIRENE system is a directory identifying all French firms and their corresponding establishments.
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sample. All questionnaires for these individuals from the 1968, 1975, 1982, and 1990 censuses
are gathered into the EDP. The exhaustive long-forms of the various censuses were entered un-
der electronic form only for this fraction of the population living in France (1/4 or 1/5 of the
population, depending on the date). The Division des Etudes Démographiques had to find all
the censuses questionnaires for these individuals. The INSEE regional agencies were in charge
of this task. The usual socio-demographic variables are available in the EDP.10
For every individual, education, measured as the highest degree, and the age at the end
of school are collected. Since the categories differ in the three censuses, we first created
eight education groups (identical to those used in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
namely: (1) No terminal degree; (2) Elementary School; (3) Junior High School; (4) High
School; (5) Vocational-Technical School (basic); (6) Vocational Technical School (advanced);
(7) Technical College and Undergraduate University; and (8) Graduate School and Other Post-
Secondary Education. Other variables that are regularly collected are: nationality (including
possible naturalization to French citizenship), country of birth, year of arrival in France, marital
status, number of children, employment status (wage-earner in the private sector, civil servant,
self-employed, unemployed, inactive, apprentice), spouse’s employment status, information on
the equipment of the house or apartment, type of city, location of the residence (region and
département).11 In some of the censuses, data on parents’ education and social status were
collected as well.
In addition to the Census information, all French town-halls in charge of Civil Status regis-
ters and ceremonies transmit information to INSEE for the same individuals. This information
includes any birth, death, wedding, and divorce involving an individual of the EDP. For each of
the above events, additional information on the dates, as well as the occupation of the persons
concerned, are collected. Finally, both censuses and civil status information contain the person
identifier (ID) of the individual, so the two sources of data can be merged.
Creation of the Matched Data File:
Based on the person identifier, identical in the two datasets (EDP and DADS), it is possible
to create a file containing approximately one tenth of the original 1/25th of the population born
in October of an even year, i.e., those born in the first four days of that month. Notice that
10It is important to note that no earnings or income variables have ever been asked in the French censuses.
11A French “département” corresponds roughly to a county in the U.S. Several départements form a region
which is an administrative division.
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we do not have wages of the civil-servants (even though the census information allows us to
determine whether a person is a civil-servant), or the income of self-employed individuals. The
individual-level information also contains the employing firm identifier, the so-called SIREN
number, that allows us to follow workers from firm to firm and compute the seniority variable.
This final data set has approximately 1.5 million observations.
Some descriptive statistics
To be completed
5. The Empirical Results
Below we present the estimation results, which are organized as follows. Table 3 presents the
estimation results for the wage equation for each of the four education groups. Table 5 presents
the estimation results for the participation equation, by education groups, while Table 6 does
the same for the inter-firm mobility equation. Table 8 presents the estimates of the variance-
covariance matrices for the individual-specific effects (across the five equations) and for the
idiosyncratic terms (across the three main equations).12
Tables 9 through 11 in the next section provide a detailed comparison between the results
obtained for the U.S. and those obtained for France. Since we have essentially estimated the
same model as was estimated by BFKT, we are able to compare parameter estimates for high
school dropouts and college graduates in both countries. Table 9 presents estimates for the
college graduates in the U.S. and France. Table 10 presents similar estimates for high school
dropouts. Table 11 compares the marginal and cumulative returns to experience and seniority
at various points of the life cycle for these two groups. Finally, Table 12 presents estimates
using two other methods that have been previously used in the literature—a simple OLS and
IV method—of the returns to seniority and of the cumulative returns to seniority, for the two
groups and in the two countries.
5.1. A brief summary of main results
Wage equation: Whatever the degree, returns to seniority are small, even non-significant for
high-school graduates. College graduates stand in sharp contrast since their returns to seniority
12Descriptive Statistics are presented in Appendix B, table 1
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are large, equal to 2.64%. Even though, returns to experience are the biggest whatever the
subgroup: from 5.04% for high school dropouts to 7.64% for high school graduates. Moreover
the timing of mobility in one’s career matters for every degree, but the estimates for the JW
function differ between subgroups.
The gender wage gap is higher than usually estimated. This may be due to different reasons:
first, mobility and participation processes are supposed to be identical for both men and women
(except for a gender dummy). The gender dummy in the wage equation hence may capture
gender differences in career paths (Le Minez and Roux (2002)) and it may overestimate the
gender wage gap. Furthermore, occupation is not controlled for, since this variable is not avail-
able in the data. But the structure of men and women occupations and job qualifications differ
even when degree is controlled for (Meurs and Ponthieux (2006)). Finally, papers usually study
the gender wage gap by the means of cross-sectional data, and they do not take into account
the endogeneity of tenure and experience and the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. These
may be the reasons why the gender dummy is higher than what is usually obtained using cross
sectional data. Worth to be pointed out are the higher gender wage gaps that are also estimated
using the method proposed by Altonji (greater than 30%). Another way to proceed in order to
circumvent this issue would be to estimate the model separately for men and women.
As far as the cohort effects are concerned, in the private sector, the mean real wage increased
by more than 4% a year from the beginning of the fifties to the end of the seventies (Bayet and
Demailly (1996)). Since it dropped down to 0.5% a year. This may explain the estimation of
cohort effects13 in the wage equation.
Participation-employment equation: the family variables are in line with the economic the-
ory: the presence of young children, as well as to be married, lower the probability to partici-
pate. But due to a stronger attachment to the labor force, children have marginally no effect on
participation for college graduates. Furthermore, whatever the degree, lagged participation and
mobility favor participation, and young cohorts are more likely to be employed than older ones.
Mobility equation: for college graduates and high-school dropouts, the level of experience
is largely irrelevant. In contrast, the effect of seniority is strong and negative for all education
groups. More senior workers tend to move less. But for vocational and high-school degrees, the
effect of experience on mobility, as well as the effect of tenure, is large and negative.
13The youngest cohort (born after 1970) is the reference.
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Individual specific effects: the correlations between the various person-specific components
are highly significant and large. Since higher participation rates imply faster accumulation of
labor market experience, the estimates of ρy,w imply that, all other things equal, high-wage
workers tend to be more experienced workers. High-mobility workers also tend to be low-wage
workers and low-participation workers (ραy,αm and ραm,αw are large and negative). High-wage
workers have higher seniority than low-wage workers, they tend to be more immobile.
5.2. Certificat d’Etudes Primaires Holders (High School Dropouts)
In France, apart from those quitting the education system without any degree, the Certificat
d’Etudes Primaires (CEP, hereafter) holders are those leaving the system with the lowest possi-
ble level of education.14 They are essentially comparable to High School dropouts in the United
States.
Wage Equation:
The results for this group are presented in the first four columns of Table 3. In line 4 of the
table we clearly see that the return to seniority is small, only less than 0.3% per year in the first
few years (when the linear term is the dominating term). In contrast, the return to experience is
almost twenty times larger than the return to tenure.
However, the results of Table 3 also show that the timing of mobility in one’s career matters.
First, time spent in a firm makes a significant difference as this is indicated from the coefficient
estimates in lines 33–36. Moves after relatively short spells are rewarded. There is a 5% increase
for change that takes place in less than one year on a job and 10% if the job last between two
to five years. However, the part induced by the level of seniority (lines 37–39) is negative.
In particular, a move after a two-year spell on a job is better compensated than moves after a
five-year spell. The overall jump after 5 years is essentially zero. In comparison, a job spell of
between 6 to 10 years of seniority carries neither a penalty nor a reward. For jobs that last more
than ten years, workers lose almost 2% per year of seniority (line 39). Finally, there is also the
component of wage jump due to experience (lines 40–43). Moves early in one’s work life have
a small negative impact on wage gains. In contrast, moves that occur later in one’s career, e.g.
after 10 years of experience, add 0.6% for every year of experience, for a total of more than
14There is a possibility of some confusion, although relatively small, between not having education and missing
response to the question about education in the various censuses.
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6% for experience above 10 years. Overall, the loss of earning can be substantial, especially for
people who spend long spells in one firm. For example, displaced workers who spent their entire
career, of say 20 years, in a single firm face on average a wage loss of about 15% in their new
firm (i.e., from lines 36, 39, and 43 we have 100 [1− exp {.054− .0167 · 20 + .006 · 20}] =
85.2%). It is important to note though, that mobility is very low in France, as Table 1 clearly
indicates: an average CEP worker moves only once over the entire period. However, mobility
across firms is not evenly distributed over the population. Hence, benefits of voluntary mobility,
as well as difficulties that stem from involuntary moves, are confined to a relatively very small
fraction of the workers’ population.
Table 3 provides additional facts worthy of notice. Confirming results by Abowd, Kramarz,
Lengerman, and Roux (2005), inter-industry wage differences for CEP workers are compressed
relatively to the groups with higher levels of education. This is clearly one of the consequences
of minimum wage policies in France, because many workers in this group are at the very bottom
of the overall wage distribution.
Participation and Mobility Equations:
The first four columns of Tables 5 and 6 present the estimates for the participation and
mobility equations, respectively, for the CEP workers. Most of the results are not surprising
and are on the order of magnitude that one might expect. For example, having young children
lowers the probability of participation significantly, as well as the probability of a move. Also,
experience and seniority have an enormous effect on the mobility decision. Individuals with
higher experience and tenure are a lot less likely to move.
Also of major interest are the coefficients on the lagged mobility and lagged participation.
In contrast with most previous analyses (Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Altonji and Williams
(1992), Altonji and Williams (1997) and Topel (1991)), we are able to distinguish between
state-dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Not surprisingly, past participation and past
mobility favors participation. However, lagged mobility has virtually no impact on the mobility
decision. The results in BFKT for the mobility decision imply that a move is optimal only
every few years. Hence, a move in the previous period is associated with lower mobility in the
period immediately after (see also the France-U.S. comparison of Table 10). This lack of state-
dependence in the current results is obviously a reflection of the French labor market institutions
where some workers often go from one short-term contract to another, especially for the CEP
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group. Unfortunately, as already mentioned above, our data sources provide no information on
the nature of the contract, so we cannot examine this point any further.
Stochastic Components:
The first four columns of Table 8 present estimates of variance-covariance components for
the CEP group. The individual specific effects for the five-equation model are presented in the
first panel, while the results for the residual terms of the three main equations are provided in
the second panel. The results clearly show that in terms of the individual specific effects, those
who participate more also tend to be high-wage workers. Non-participation (non-employment)
and mobility are negatively correlated in terms of individual effects but the corresponding idio-
syncratic components are positively correlated. Consequently, we find that high mobility work-
ers tend to be low-employment workers. However, temporary positive shock on mobility (as
measured by large draw of the idiosyncratic term) “enhances” participation. Finally, both the
idiosyncratic terms and the individual specific effects in the mobility and wage equations are
negatively correlated. This implies that high-wage workers tend to be relatively immobile.
It is important to note that most parameters in Table 8 are quite large in absolute terms and
are highly significant. This exemplifies the need for the joint estimation adopted here. Joint
estimation of these equations clearly has a strong effect on the estimated returns to seniority
and experience. Neglecting to control for the joint simultaneous effects would therefore lead to
severe bias in the estimated returns to seniority and experience.
5.3. CAP-BEP Holders (Vocational Technical School, basic)
One element that distinguishes the education systems in Continental Europe from that in the
U.S., and especially in France and Germany, is the existence of a well-developed apprentice-
ship training. Indeed, this feature is well-known for Germany but it is also quite important in
France. Students who qualify for the Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (CAP) or the Brevet
d’Enseignement Professionnel (BEP) have to spend part of their education in firms, and the rest
within schools where they are taught both general and vocational subjects. There is no real
analog to this system in the U.S.
Wage Equation:
The returns to seniority coefficient, presented in Table 3 (columns 5-8), for workers with
vocational/technical education are slightly negative and barely significant. The estimates for the
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parameters that correspond to the JW function (lines 33-43) are somewhat different from those
obtained for the high school dropouts. Focusing on the two components related to seniority, in
lines 33-36, we see that a move after one year in a job brings with it an average increase in wages
of about 3%. Between 2 and 5 years this increase amounts to almost 20%, while moves after 6
to 10 years on a job correspond to an average increase of over 16%. However, the coefficients
on the seniority level are all negative (lines 37-39), so the overall jump is much smaller. For
example, an individual with 8 years of seniority has an increase of 20% − 8 · .2% = 4%.
Furthermore, for those who have long tenure on the job, say 15 years, there is a significant
loss associated with moving from one firm to another, which amounts to approximately−6%−
15 · 1.8% = −33%. However, this severe decline is compensated somewhat because of an
increase that stems from having more experience. Therefore, for an individual who also has 15
years of experience the overall change in wage is −6% − 15 · 1.8% + 15 · 0.9% = −19.5%.
Clearly, relative to the changes observed for the high school dropouts, the losses incurred by the
CAP-BEP workers are larger and more significant.
In terms of the return to experience, the experience profile for the CAP-BEP workers is
steeper than that observed for the CEP workers, as is apparent from the results reported in lines
2-3 of the table. That is, the CAP-BEP workers tend to accumulate human capital on the job,
which is more general and transferable across firms, while the CEP workers gain more firm-
specific human capital. Nevertheless, for both groups general human capital is far more impor-
tant than firm-specific human capital as is demonstrated by the magnitude of the coefficient that
relates to experience and seniority.
Participation and Mobility Equations:
As one might expect, the estimated coefficients for the participation and the mobility equa-
tions are quite similar to those obtained for the CEP group. In particular, lagged mobility has
no significant effect on current mobility. While for the CAP-BEP group longer experience has
a more significant effect on the participation decision (see lines 2-3), and lagged participation
has a smaller effect. That is, state-dependence is stronger for the less skilled group. The effect
of seniority on mobility is virtually the same for the two groups. That is, longer seniority on the
job significantly reduces the likelihood of a move.
Stochastic Components:
As Table 8 indicates, the results for main effects for the CAP-BEP group are again quite
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similar to those obtained for the high school dropout group. In particular, as for the previous
group, high-wage workers tend to participate more and they are also a lot less likely to move.
5.4. Baccalauréat Holders (High-School Graduates)
In order to qualify for a high school degree in France a student has to pass a national exam,
called the Baccalauréat. It is a “passport” to higher education, even though not all holders of
the Baccalauréat choose to pursue post-secondary education. There are some individuals who
choose to attend a university, but never complete the requirement toward a specific degree. We
include all these individual in the Baccalauréat Holders group, that is, this group includes all
workers who received their Baccalauréat and, in addition, may have had some college education.
The results for this group are presented in columns 9-12 of Tables 3 through 8.
Wage Equation:
The results for this group, presented again in Table 3, display some substantial differences
relative to the other two groups discussed above. First, the return to experience is much larger,
and, in fact, it is the largest of all groups. However, the return to seniority is, essentially,
zero. The estimates for the parameters embedded in the JW function are quite similar to those
previously observed, especially for workers in the the CAP-BEP group. While moves after short
spells seems to induce wage increase (see line 33), they also carry some losses of 3.4% per year
of seniority (line 37). The overall average change for a worker with 3 years of seniority is hence
12.8%− 3 · 3.4% = 2.4%. Moves after relatively long employment spells in firms entail large
wage losses. For example moves that lasted more than 5 years carry with them a loss of about
1.5% per year of seniority. It can also be seen that the level of experience has very little effect
on the initial jump when moving to a new firm, and the effect is usually negative (lines 40-43).
Participation and Mobility Equations:
The results obtained for this group (presented in Tables 5 and 6 are largely consistent with
those obtained for the lower education groups discussed above. Nevertheless, the dependence
of mobility on lagged mobility becomes marginally negative. This result is consistent with
results previously obtained for the U.S., which are discussed below. Also, workers are less
mobile the larger their experience and seniority levels, and more pronouncedly so for the high
school graduate than for the two lower education groups. Moreover, longer experience has
a more significant effect on the participation decision (see lines 2-3) than for the two lower
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education groups, while lagged participation has a smaller effect. That is, more highly educated
workers have a stronger attachment to the labor force. However, state-dependence is a much
less significant factor than for the less educated workers.
Stochastic Components:
As was previously observed for the lower education groups, we see that high-wage workers
also tend to be high-participation workers. Nevertheless, in contrast to the other two groups,
high-wage workers are only marginally low-mobility workers. Indeed, Table 1 in Appendix B
shows that mobility for Baccalauréat holders is the highest among all four education groups,
whereas the levels of tenure and experience are the lowest. Part of the reason for these results
is that this group contains a disproportionately large number of relatively young individuals. In
contrast, the CEP group, for example, includes a relatively large fraction of mature individuals
who have, on average, significantly lower levels of education.
5.5. University and Grandes Ecoles Graduates
An important feature that distinguishes the French education system from other European ed-
ucation systems, as well as from the American system, is the existence of a very selective set
of educational institutions, known as Grandes Ecoles, that work in parallel with Universities.
The system intends to provide master degrees, mostly in engineering and in business. Unlike
the regular university system, the Grandes Ecoles system is very selective and only a relatively
small fraction of the relevant population is admitted to the various programs. We include in this
group all graduates from both regular universities, as well as graduate from the Grandes Ecoles
system, and, for simplicity, we refer to this group as the college graduate group. The results for
this education group are provided in the last four columns of Tables 3 through 8.
Wage Equation:
Interestingly, the results for the group of graduates stand in sharp contrast with those ob-
tained for all other education groups. The returns to experience are quite large as for the other
groups. However, there is a striking difference in the return to seniority, which is large and
significant for the college graduate group. The return to seniority is about 2.6% per year of
tenure, with very little curvature. Nevertheless, the return to seniority is small relative to the
return experience, namely only one half that of the return to experience.
Lines 33–43 also indicate that the JW function for the college graduates is quite different
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from that for the other groups. In general, moves are associated with some loss that is attributed
to general experience (see lines 40-43), but it is compensated by a large positive contribution of
seniority. For example, a move after a very short employment spell in a firm (up to one year)
is associated with an average increase in wages at the new firm of over 18% (line 33). A job
change after a spell of 2 to 5 years carries with it an average increase of 5.3%, with an additional
increase of over 3% per year of seniority at the time of the move. For a spell lasting between 6
and 10 years the wage increase is even larger and amounts to 17.3%, with an additional increase
of close to 1% per year of seniority. A sizeable increase is also evident for larger spells of over
10 years. Clearly, for this highly educated group, seniority is well compensated for.
There are some other additional results worth noting for this group. First, working part-time
entails much bigger losses for individuals in this group than for individuals in all other groups.
Furthermore, there are sizeable and significant inter-industry wage differences (see lines 30-40).
These results are largely consistent with those obtained by Abowd, Kramarz, Lengerman, and
Roux (2005). In France minimum wages compress the bottom part of the wage distribution, and
wage inequality is confined mostly to the upper part of the distribution, relevant indeed for this
college-educated group. Finally, in contrast to all other education groups, it seems that foreign
born are being discriminated against relative to their French counterparts (see line 12). While
it might be true, in general, that having a higher education allows one to find a job more easily,
the wages paid to college graduates who are foreign born is on average 7.5% lower than that
paid to French born individuals.
Participation and Mobility Equations:
Similar to the results for the other education groups, lagged mobility seems to have no effect
on current mobility. Moreover, experience has virtually no effect on the likelihood of a move.
Less experienced workers are no more likely to move than their more experienced counterparts.
One possible explanation for this is that while the individuals in this group are not compensated
for their level of experience (see the results for the JW function) they are well compensated
for their seniority , which, in turn, has a significant, yet very small, negative effect on mobility.
These results seem to indicate that career paths for engineers and other professionals entail job
changes at all ages. Furthermore, in contrast to all other groups, participation choices are only
marginally affected by having young children. This might simply indicate that individuals in
this group have a stronger attachment to the labor force and hence they choose to acquire much
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higher levels of education for which they are well compensated.
Stochastic Components:
Similar to what has already been found above for the other educational groups, we find
that high-participation individuals are also high-wage individuals. In addition, for the most
highly educated workers, we also find that high-wage workers are also low-mobility workers.
Also, individuals that are faced with a positive idiosyncratic wage shock tend to be faced with
a negative mobility shock. These correlation are similar to those obtained for the other groups.
However, this is the only group for which a move entails a jump in wages, compensating them
for their seniority.
6. A Comparison with the United States
In this section, we compare our results with those obtained previously by BFKT for the U.S. us-
ing very similar model specification. The model was estimated for three education groups: High
school dropouts, high school graduates, and college graduates, using an extract from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1976-1992. Some variables included in BFKT
were not available in the panel that we use here (e.g. race, family unearned income, number of
years of education, residence in a SMSA)15, but for the most part very similar definitions were
used, especially for the main variables of interest, namely seniority and experience.16
6.1. Comparison of Selected Parameters
We present here a comparison of the estimates for a subset of the parameters that are most
important. Estimates for the college graduate group are presented in Table 9, while estimates
for high school dropouts are presented in Table 10. In each table, the first four columns provide
the results for the U.S., while the last four columns report the results for France.
The first and most significant difference between the two studies is in the estimated re-
turns to seniority. They are large and significant in the U.S.: The linear component is around
15Hence the specification of the three equations differ by race, family unearned income, number of years of
education, and residence in a SMSA.
16Unfortunately, we cannot use administrative data sources for the United States even though they exist (LEHD
program) since their access is restricted. And, on the French side, there is no equivalent of the PSID, i.e. a survey
that follows individuals within households for a sufficient period of time. At this stage, it is impossible to assess
the implications of these constraints.
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5% per year for both low and high-education groups. In contrast, these returns are insignifi-
cant for all the lower educational groups in France. For the college graduates they are around
2.6%, a lot smaller than for their American counterparts. We also see that the returns to expe-
rience are larger in France than they are in the U.S. for the high school dropouts. For the the
college-educated workers the return to experience are very similar in both countries. Overall,
the combined returns to experiences and seniority are much larger in the U.S. than in France for
both groups.
To meaningfully compare wage changes that are associated with a firm-to-firm move we
concentrate our discussion on the estimated components of the JW functions. Some major
differences stand out. First, the coefficient on the number of job to job switches appears to
indicate that for both education groups, job changes are better compensated in the U.S. than
they are in France. For example, for the college-educated workers, who move to a new job
from jobs that lasted more than 10 years receive a 60% ((exp {.4717} − 1) ∗ 100) increase in
wages in their next job. In comparison, the equivalent premium in France is only 6%. This
phenomenon is even more pronounced for the high school dropouts: while French workers lose
a substantial fraction of their wage after a long tenure in a firm, their American counterparts
gain a substantial amount.
Other results on wages are worth noting as well. Inter-industry wage differentials are very
small in France for the less educated individuals, but are somewhat more spread for the college
graduates. In contrast, the U.S. inter-industry wage differentials are quite large for all education
groups (see Table 3 for France, and Table 5 of BFKT for the United States).
There are also significant differences in the mobility processes for the two countries. The
mobility process in the U.S. exhibits negative lagged dependence. That is, a worker who just
moved is less likely to move in the next period. For France, lagged mobility has virtually no
effect at all on current mobility. However, in the U.S., as well as in France, workers tend to
move early in a job, as is demonstrated by the negative coefficient on seniority in the mobility
equation.
Finally, the comparison of the variance-covariance matrices of individual effects and of the
variance-covariance matrices of idiosyncratic effects across the two countries confirms previous
findings. First, the U.S. data source (the PSID), because it is a survey, captures initial conditions
much better than the French data source (the DADS-EDP), which is largely based on adminis-
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trative data. More precisely, since individuals are directly interviewed in the PSID, much better
data on personal characteristics can be obtained. In France, because the data is administrative,
some variables are not available and personal characteristics are likely to be measured with
some error. For instance, civil-status and nationality variables come from different sources that
can be sometimes contradictory, even though the wage measures and seniority measures are
clearly of much better quality in the DADS. In addition, no measure of family income, and very
little information on the spouse characteristics, are available in France. Also, imputations of
seniority have to be performed in year 1976 for the French data.17 Consequently, the correla-
tions between the random terms of the initial condition equations and the other equations are
generally weaker for France.
Second, concentrating on the correlation between individual specific effects in the three
main equations, several facts stand out. In both countries high-wage workers also tend to
be high-participation workers. Moreover, high-mobility individuals tend also to be low-wage
workers in both countries, but with a much stronger effect in the U.S. (especially for the college
graduate workers). This signifies the different roles played by mobility in the two countries as
far as wage growth is concerned. France is a country with very low mobility, while mobility
across firms is quite common in the U.S. Finally, high-participation workers also tend to be
low-mobility, and here again the effect is much stronger in the United States.
6.2. The Returns to Experience and Seniority
To summarize the overall impact of the results presented above, Table 11 presents the estimated
cumulative and marginal returns to experience, as well as the cumulative and marginal returns
to seniority in the U.S. and France at various points in the life cycle.18 The cumulative returns
to experience are large for both countries, with larger returns in France for both education
groups. In complete contrast, the cumulative returns to tenure are much larger in the U.S. For
high school dropouts we see that there is absolutely no return to seniority in France. This is
somewhat different for the college graduates, even though the cumulative returns to seniority in
17In practice, the conditional expectation of seniority is obtained using the “structure des salaires” survey, see
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for more details.
18In all panels, the specifications include a quadratic function of experience and seniority in the wage equation.
For the U.S., BFKT compares the estimates with those obtained based on a quartic specification of experience and
education. Estimates of the cumulative returns to experience and seniority are very similar. Hence, we resort here
to a comparison based on the quadratic version only.
47
France are less than half what they are in the U.S.
Note that for the high school dropouts the cumulative return to seniority at 5 years of se-
niority is almost 27% in the U.S., while in France it is statistically not different from zero. At
15 years of seniority the cumulative return in the U.S. rises to 39%, while in France it remains
unchanged. That is, the marginal returns to seniority, at all levels of seniority, are virtually zero
in France and hence the cumulative returns remain zeros.
The situation for the college graduate is less pronounced, but as indicated above, the cumu-
lative returns in the U.S. are more than twice as large as those in France. For example, at 5 years
of experience the return in the U.S. is almost 24%, while in France it is barely 12%. Similarly,
at 15 years of seniority the return in the U.S. is 64%, while in France it is a mere 31%. These
differences are mitigated somewhat when one takes into account the return to experiences, but
the overall growth of wages in the U.S. that stems from both experience and seniority is still
much larger in the U.S. than it is in France.
6.3. Robustness and Specification Checks
We tested various specifications to assess the robustness of the results obtained here. In par-
ticular, we examined whether the differences between the U.S. and France stem from inherent
differences in the data extracts used for the two countries.
Particular attention was given to investigating to what extent the results obtained here are
induced by the specific method employed in this paper. Specifically we examine how the results
changed relative to those previously obtained in the literature. To do that we use the methods
used by Altonji and Williams (1992). We first estimated a wage regression using a simple
OLS regression. Then, we estimated the exact same equation using Altonji and Williams’s
methodology (specifically the method they label as IV1). The estimation was carried out for
both data sets—the PSID for the U.S. and the DADS-EDP for France. The results are reported
in Table 12. The top panel of the table presents the IV estimates, while the bottom panel presents
the OLS estimates.
First, the OLS estimates of the returns to seniority in France are somewhat smaller than
those obtained from our model for the college graduate group. For the high school dropouts
they are essentially the same as those obtained by our model, namely zero. For France, the IV
method yields point estimates of the returns to seniority that are lower and insignificant. That
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is, all estimation methods indicate that the returns to seniority in France are quite small, and in
most cases are not significantly different from zero. The result for the returns to seniority in the
U.S. are strikingly different. The returns to seniority are larger in all specifications than those
obtained for France. For both levels of education, the IV method yields the lowest returns to
seniority (see the linear tenure effect, but most importantly, the cumulative returns). The OLS
estimates for the linear term are slightly larger than those estimated by the IV method. The
cumulative returns to seniority have a clear order: The IV method yields the lowest returns. Our
estimation method, based on a system of equations, yields the largest, while the OLS estimates
are exactly in between, for both groups and both countries.19
To summarize, all tests show that the returns to seniority and experience are biased when
endogeneity is not accounted for. Irrespective of the method used to correct for this endogeneity,
the returns to seniority are much larger in the U.S. than in France, and more so for the least
educated individuals, who are also most likely to face higher unemployment rates.
6.4. Are the Returns to Seniority an “Incentive Device”?
A natural question arising from the above comparison of the U.S. and France can be formulated
as follows: Are the different features that seem to prevail in the two countries related? Do these
features lead to lower returns to seniority in France than in the U.S.?
The results presented above indicate that there is relatively low job-to-job mobility in
France20, while there is relatively high job-to-job mobility in the U.S. In addition the risk of
unemployment in France is significantly higher than that faced by the American workers. Can
these institutional differences lead to the observed differences in the returns to seniority in the
two countries?
In this section, we show that these features are indeed part of a global system and are, hence,
tightly connected. We use an equilibrium search model with wage-tenure contracts to examine
this question. The properties of the wage profiles implied by the model at the stationary equi-
librium are contracted using the respective differential characteristics of the two labor markets,
namely the U.S. and France.
19BFKT also presents estimates of the returns to experience and seniority without introducing the JW func-
tion. Cumulative returns most often decrease when JW is excluded. Similar estimates for France for high school
dropouts and college graduates (not included here for brevity) show a similar pattern: The linear component of the
return to seniority is roughly equal to zero for the former group and equal to about 1% for the latter group.
20Mobility increases with education and is much larger for the more recent cohorts.
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It turns out that the labor market characteristics that have significant explanatory power are
(1) the unemployment rate and (2) the job arrival rate. The unemployment rate in France has
always been larger than that in the U.S. For example, OECD data indicate that the unemploy-
ment rates in March of 2004 were 9.4% and 5.7%, for France and the U.S., respectively. It is
also been estimated in the literature that the job offer arrival rate in the U.S. is larger that that in
most European countries. For example, Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2004) use a job search
model to provide such estimates. Using the PSID for the U.S. they estimate the job arrival rate
to be 1.71 per annum. Similar estimates for several European countries (using the ECHP, for
1994-2001) provide an estimate of 0.56 per annum.
The job search model we employ here has been introduced recently by Burdett and Coles
(2003). The most important feature for us in this model is the fact that it generates a unique
equilibrium wage-tenure contract. We show below that this wage-tenure contract is such that
the slope of tenure in the wage function is an increasing function of the job offer arrival rate.
That is, the return to seniority increases when the mobility rate of workers in the economy
increases.
We start by summarizing the important aspects of the model. The model is a continuous time
model in which individuals are risk adverse. Let λ denote the job offers arrival rate and let δ be
the arrival rate of new workers into the labor force and the outflow rate of workers from the labor
market. Let p denote the instantaneous revenue received by firms for each worker employed and
let b be the instantaneous benefit received by each unemployed worker (p > b > 0). Let u (·)
denote the instantaneous utility, which is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave. Also,
there is no recall of workers.
Burdett and Coles show that under certain assumptions the implied equilibrium is unique.
Also, the optimal wage-tenure contract selected by the firm offering the lower starting wage
satisfies
dw
d t
=
δ√
p− w2
p− w
u′(w)
∫ w2
w
u′(s)√
p− s d s, (6.15)
with the initial condition w(0) = w1 and where w1, w2 are such that
(
δ
λ+ δ
)2
=
p− w2
p− w1 , (6.16)
u(w1) = u(b)−
√
p− w1
2
∫ w2
w1
u′(s)√
p− s d s, (6.17)
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where [w1, w2] is the support of the distribution of wages paid by the firms (w1 < b and w2 < p).
Assume now that the utility function is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of the form
u(w) = w1−σ/ (1− σ), where σ > 0. Burdett and Coles (2003) show that the optimal wage-
tenure contract, namely the baseline salary contract, is such that there exists a tenure level such
that from that level onward the baseline salary contract is identical to the contract offered by a
high-wage firm with a higher entry wage. That is,
d2w
d t2
=
(
dw
d t
)2
1
p− w
[σ p
w
− (σ + 1)
]
− δ
√
p− w√
p− w2
dw
d t
, (6.18)
with the initial conditions w(0) = w1 and
dw(0)
d t
=
δ√
p− w2
p− w1
u′(w1)
∫ w2
w1
u′(s)√
p− s d s. (6.19)
The differential equation (6.18) is highly non-linear and has to be solved numerically. This
can be done by assigning some values for the parameter vector (λ, δ, σ, p), and solving the
model numerically (e.g. using the procedure NDSolve of Mathematica).
In order to study the shape of the wage-tenure contract curve and its sensitivity with respect
to the values of the job offers arrival rate, we used the same parameter values as Burdett and
Coles (see section 5.2 in their paper). We, set p = 5, δ = 5.5.10−5 and b = 4.6. For each
value of the relative risk aversion coefficient (σ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1.4), we solve the system of
equations (6.18)–(6.19) numerically for a set a values of the job offer arrival rates. The results
are depicted in Figure 1 for σ = 0.2, in Figure 3 for σ = 0.4, in Figure 5 for σ = 0.8, and in
Figure 7 for σ = 1.4 for a range of λ. The figures present the wage contract profiles for the
first 10 years of seniority. For all values of the relative risk aversion coefficient, we note that the
wage profiles are steeper, especially in the first year, when the job offers arrival rates is larger.
The values of the job offer arrival rates (per year) estimated by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and
Robin (2004) correspond to the values λ = 0.005 for the U.S., and λ = 0.001 for France
(job offer arrival rate per day). Regardless of the particular value of the relative risk aversion
parameter, the equilibrium wage-tenure contract curves are such that there are larger returns to
seniority for the high-mobility country, namely the U.S., than the low mobility country, namely
France.
Two points are worth noting. First, we take—as firms appear to be doing—institutions that
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affect mobility as given. For example, the housing market in the U.S. is a lot more developed
than in France (because of strong regulations and transaction costs in the latter country). Also,
subsidies and government interventions preventing firms from going bankrupt seem to be more
prevalent in France, dampening the forces of “creative destruction” in this country. Conse-
quently, French firms face a workforce that is mostly stable with little incentives to move, even
after an involuntary separation. Second, as a recent paper by Wasmer (2003) argues, it is more
likely that French firms will invest in firm-specific human capital for this exact reason. In con-
trast, American firms face a workforce that is very mobile. Therefore, these firms should rely
on general human capital.
Does this mean that the return to seniority should be larger in France than in the U.S.? Or,
putting it differently: Should French firms pay for something they get “by construction” due to
strong institutional forces? It seems that there is somewhat of a misconception that has plagued
some of the research in this area in recent years. The model discussed here provides a useful
tool for the empirical results we obtained in this paper. That is, the optimal return to tenure
when individuals are mobile should be larger than when there are not.
7. Conclusion
A central tenet of many theories in labor economics states that compensation should rise with
seniority. Nevertheless, there has been much disagreement about the empirical support for
this general claim, especially in papers that use data from the U.S. Part of the reason that the
empirical research has not lead to a conclusive answer is because of the vast disagreement about
the proper method for assessing these theories (see, among others, Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
and Topel (1991) for the United States and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for France).
In this paper we reinvestigate the relations between wages, participation, and firm-to-firm
mobility in France. We contrast the result with those obtained in the BFKT analysis that re-
examined the return to seniority in the U.S., using the same data source as that used by Topel
(1991), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and Altonji and Williams (1992).
We start with a structural model and estimate the return to seniority in a model in which
participation, mobility and wages are jointly determined. We include both state-dependence
parameters, as well as unobserved correlated individual specific effects in all the model’s equa-
tions. To estimate this complex structure, we use a state of the art Bayesian MCMC technique.
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The model is estimated using French longitudinal data sources for the period 1976-1995 for
four separate education groups.
The results indicate that the returns to seniority are virtually zero, and potentially negative
for the low education groups. In contrast, the return for the college graduates group is positive
and significant, i.e., 2.5% per year of seniority.
We provide a detailed comparison with results previously obtained for the U.S. in BFKT, us-
ing the exact same specification used here, and an identical estimation method. The comparison
shows that while the returns to seniority are much lower in France than in the U.S., the returns
to experience are very close. Furthermore, we find that in both countries there is a significant
impact on the estimated returns to seniority when one controls for wage changes when switch-
ing from one firm to another (as is summarized by the JW function introduced here). Hence,
we conclude that there is strong evidence that controlling for the individual’s career path and
past mobility are essential for proper estimation of the return to seniority.
Additional results show that OLS estimates of the cumulative returns to seniority are lower
than those obtained from the system of equations. Furthermore, the same results demonstrate
that instrumental variables estimation, following Altonji and Williams (1992), give the smallest
cumulative returns to seniority among all methods used. This is true for both the U.S. and for
France. Finally, a comparison between the two countries shows that regardless of the technique
used the returns to seniority are lower in France—a low firm-to-firm mobility country—than in
the United States—a high firm-to-firm mobility country.
One interpretation of these results is that the returns to seniority are directly related to pat-
terns of mobility. We discuss this aspect using a theoretical framework borrowed from Burdett
and Coles (2003). The model clearly indicates that rewarding seniority is likely to play the role
of an incentive device designed to counter excessive mobility.
Consequently, the modeling approach adopted here, of jointly estimating the participation,
mobility decision along with the wage outcome has non-trivial consequences that may vary
across countries. In particular, labor market institutions, state regulations, and other state factors
affecting the local economy are likely to have far-reaching effects on the participation, and most
importantly the mobility process. This, in turn, is very likely to affect the estimated return to
seniority.
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A. Appendix A
A.1. Mobility equation
Parameter γ : The parameter γ enters mmit∗ for t = 2, ..., T − 1
mmit∗ = γmit−1 +X
M
it δ
M +ΩIi θ
M,I .
With ΩIi is a row vector (1 × N) equal to (0..01000...0) where the unique 1 is located at the ith
position. The term in the full conditional likelihood that contains this parameter is given by
N∏
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T−1∏
t=2
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(
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)
where
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, and
Ait = m
∗
it −Mmit + γmit−1
= m∗it −XMit δM −ΩIi θI,M − a(y∗it −my∗it)− b(wit −mwit).
Collecting the squared and crossed terms gives
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i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
A˜i
2,T−1
.
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Parameter δM : We proceed in the same way as for the parameter γ discussed above, to get
V
post,−1
δM
= V prior,−1
δM
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi
2,T−1
)′
X˜Mi
2,T−1
, and
V
post,−1
δM
M
post
δM
= V prior,−1
δM
M
prior
δM
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi
2,T−1
)′
A˜i
2,T−1
,
where
Ait = m
∗
it −Mmit + δMXMit
= m∗it − γmit−1 −ΩIi θI,M − a(y∗it −my∗it)− b(wit −mwit).
A.2. Wage equation
Parameter δW : Note that we have to take into account that the parameter δW enters both mwit , for
t = 1...T , as well as Mmit , for t = 1...T − 1 . The corresponding terms in the full conditional likelihood
are given by
N∏
i=1
exp
(
− 1
2V w
T∑
t=1
yit(wit −Mwit )2
)
exp
(
− 1
2V m
T−1∑
t=1
yit(m
∗
it −Mmit )2
)
=
N∏
i=1
exp
(
− 1
2V w
T∑
t=1
yit(Ait −XWit δW )2
)
exp
(
− 1
2V m
T−1∑
t=1
yit(Bit + bX
W
it δ
W )2
)
,
where
wit −Mwit = Ait −XWit δW , and
m∗it −Mmit = Bit + bXWit δW ,
which is equivalent to
Ait = wit −ΩIi θI,W − ρy,wσ(y∗it −my∗it)), and
Bit = m
∗
it −mm∗it − a(y∗it −my∗it)− b(wit −ΩIi θI,W ).
Using analogous notation to the ones used above we have
V
post,−1
δW
= V prior,−1
δW
+
1
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T
)′
X˜Wi
1,T
+
b2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T−1
)′
X˜Wi
1,T−1
, and
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V
post,−1
δW
M
post
δW
= V prior,−1
δW
M
prior
δW
+
1
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T
)′
A˜i
1,T − b
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T−1
)′
B˜i
1,T−1
.
A.3. Participation equation
Parameter γY : We have to take into account that γY enters both my∗it for t = 2...T ,M
w
it for t = 2...T
and Mmit for t = 2...T − 1 . The corresponding terms in the full conditional likelihood are
N∏
i=1
exp
(
−1
2
T∑
t=2
(y∗it −my∗it)2 −
1
2V w
T∑
t=2
yit(wit −Mwit )2 −
1
2V m
T−1∑
t=2
yit(m
∗
it −Mmit )2
)
=
N∏
i=1
exp
(
−1
2
T∑
t=2
(Ait − γY Lyit)2 − 1
2V w
T∑
t=2
yit(Bit + ρy,wσγ
Y Lyit)
2− 1
2V m
T−1∑
t=2
yit(Cit+aγ
Y Lyit)
2,
where
y∗it −my∗it = Ait − γY Lyit,
wit −Mwit = Bit + ρy,wσγY Lyit, and
m∗it −Mmit = Cit + aγY Lyit,
which is equivalent to
Ait = y
∗
it − γMLmit −XYit δY −ΩIi θI,Y ,
Bit = wit −mwit − ρy,wσAit, and
Cit = m
∗
it −mm∗it − b(wit −mwit)− aAit.
Using analogous notation to the notations used above, we have
V
post,−1
γY
= V prior,−1
γY
+
N∑
i=1
(
Ly2,T
i
)′
Ly2,T
i
+
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T
)′
L˜y
i
2,T
+
a2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T−1
)′
L˜y
i
2,T−1
, and
V
post,−1
γY
M
post
γY
= V prior,−1
γY
M
prior
γY
+
N∑
i=1
(
Ly2,T
i
)′
A
2,T
i −
ρy,wσ
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T
)′
B˜i
2,T
− a
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T−1
)′
C˜i
2,T−1
.
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Parameter γM : We proceed in a similar fashion with the parameter γM , to get
V
post,−1
γM
= V prior,−1
γM
+
N∑
i=1
(
Lm
2,T
i
)′
Lm
2,T
i
+
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T
)′
L˜mi
2,T
+
a2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
L˜mi
2,T−1
,
V
post,−1
γM
M
post
γM
= V prior,−1
γM
M
prior
γM
+
N∑
i=1
(
Lm
2,T
i
)′
A
2,T
i , and
−ρy,wσ
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T
)′
B˜i
2,T − a
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
C˜i
2,T−1
,
where
Ait = y
∗
it − γY Lyit −XYit δY −ΩIi θI,Y ,
Bit = wit −mwit − ρy,wσ (Ait) , and
Cit = m
∗
it −mm∗it − b(wit −mwit)− a (Ait) .
Parameter δY : We proceed the same way and we get
V
post,−1
δY
= V prior,−1
δY
+
N∑
i=1
(
XYi
2,T
)′
XYi
2,T
+
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T
)′
X˜Yi
2,T
+
a2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T−1
)′
X˜Yi
2,T−1
V
post,−1
δY
M
post
δY
= V prior,−1
δY
M
prior
δY
+
N∑
i=1
(
XYi
2,T
)′
A
2,T
i
−ρy,wσ
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T
)′
B˜i
2,T − a
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T−1
)′
C˜i
2,T−1
where
Ait = y
∗
it − γY Lyit − γMLmit −ΩIi θI,Y ,
Bit = wit −mwit − ρy,wσ (Ait) ,
Cit = m
∗
it −mm∗it − b(wit −mwit)− a (Ait) .
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A.4. Initial equations
Parameter δM0 : Similarly, for the parameter δM0 , which enters only m∗i1 we have
V
post,−1
δM0
= V prior,−1
δM0
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi1
)′
X˜Mi1 , and
V
post,−1
δM0
M
post
δM0
= V prior,−1
δM0
M
prior
δM0
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi1
)′
A˜i1,
where
Ai1 = m
∗
i1 −ΩIi αI,M − a(y∗i1 −my∗i1)− b(wi1 −mwi1).
Parameter δY0 : We proceed the same way for δY0 and get
V
post,−1
δY0
= V prior,−1
δY0
+
N∑
i=1
XYi1
′
XYi1 +
(
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
+
a2
V m
)
N∑
i=1
X˜Yi1
′
X˜Yi1 , and
V
post,−1
δY0
M
post
δY0
= V prior,−1
δY0
M
prior
δY0
+
N∑
i=1
XYi1
′
Ai −
N∑
i=1
X˜Yi1
′ (ρy,wσ
V w
B˜i +
a
V m
C˜i
)
,
where
Ai = y
∗
i1 −ΩEi αI,Y ,
Bi = wi1 −mwi1 − ρy,wσAi, and
Ci = m
∗
i1 −mm∗i1 − b(wi1 −mwi1)− aAi.
A.5. Latent variables
Latent participation y∗it : several cases are possible here for y∗it , depending on whether yit = 1 or
yit = 0 .
1. For t = 1...T − 1 we have the following:
(a.) If yit = 1 , then
y∗it ∼ NT R+(MApost, V Apost),
V Apost,−1MApost
= (
σρv,ǫ
V w
− ab
V m
)(wit −mwit) +
a
V m
(m∗it −mm∗it) + (
σ2ρ2v,ǫ
V w
+
a2
V m
+ 1)my∗it ,
V Apost =
1
1 + a
2
Vm
+
σ2ρ2v,ǫ
V w
.
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(b.) If yit = 0 , then
y∗it ∼ NT R−(my∗it , 1).
2. For t = T we have the following:
(a.) If yiT = 1 , then
y∗iT ∼ NT R+(MApost, 1− ρ2v,ǫ),
MApost = (1− ρ2v,ǫ)
(
my∗
iT
(1 +
σ2ρ2v,ǫ
V w
) +
σρv,ǫ
V w
(wiT −mwiT )
)
.
(b.) If yiT = 0 , then
y∗iT ∼ NT R−(my∗iT , 1).
Latent mobility m∗it : Two conditions must be checked: First, t = 1...T − 1 , and second, it must be
that yit = 1 . When these two conditions are met, we distinguish between several different cases:
1. If yit+1 = 0 , then
m∗it ∼ N (Mmit , V m) and mit = I(m∗it > 0).
2. If yit+1 = 1 , then: (a.) If mit = 1 , then
m∗it ∼ NT R+(Mmit , V m).
(b.) If mit = 0 , then
m∗it ∼ NT R−(Mmit , V m).
A.6. Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals
Because the prior distribution is not conjugate (i.e., the posterior distribution does not belong to the same
family of distributions as the prior), we have to resort to the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Variance-Covariance Matrices of Individual Effects ΣIi |(...); z; y,w :
The parameters ηj , j = 1...10 and γj , j = 1...5 do not enter the full conditional likelihood. They
only enter the prior distributions. Let us denote by p the parameter we are interested in among the ηj ,
j = 1...10 and γj , j = 1...5 . Then,
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l(p|(−p), θI) = l(θI |p)pi0(p)
= pi0(p)
N∏
i=1
l(θIi |ΣIi (p))
∝ pi0(p)
N∏
i=1
1√
det(ΣIi (p))
exp
(
−1
2
θIi
′
Σ
I,−1
i (p)θ
I
i
)
.
We face non-conjugate distributions therefore we use the independent Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
with the prior distribution as the instrumental distribution.
A.7. Individual effects
The likelihood terms that include θI are given by
N∏
i=1
exp
(
−1
2
(y∗i1 −my∗i1)2
)
exp
(
− yi1
2V w
(wi1 −Mwi1)2
)
×
T∏
t=2
exp
(
−1
2
(y∗it −my∗it)2
)
exp
(
− yit
2V w
(wit −Mwit )2
)
exp
(
−yit−1
2V m
(m∗it−1 −Mmit−1)2
)
,
where
Mmit = mm∗it + a(y
∗
it −my∗it) + b(wit −mwit), and
Mwit = mwit + σρv,ε(y
∗
it −my∗it).
The following notations are useful:
1. In the first term:
(y∗i1 −my∗i1)2 = (Ai1 −ΩIi αI,Y )2,
Ai1 = y
∗
i1 −XYi1δY0 .
2. In the second term:
yi1(wi1 −Mwi1)2 = yi1(Bi1 −ΩIi θI,W + ρv,εσΩIi αI,Y )2,
Bi1 = wi1 −XWi1δw − ρv,εσ(y∗i1 −XYi1δY0 ),
B˜i1 = yi1Bi1,
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Ω˜Ii1 = yi1Ω
I
i .
3. In the third term:
(y∗it −my∗it)2 = (Cit −ΩIi θY,I)2,
Cit = y
∗
it −XYitδY − γY yit−1 − γMmit−1.
4. In the fourth term:
yit(wit −Mwit)2 = yit(Dit −ΩIi θW,I + ρv,εσΩIi θY,I)2,
Dit = wit −XWitδw − ρv,εσCit,
D˜it = yitDit,
Ω˜Iit = yitΩ
I
i .
5. In the fifth term:
For t > 1 :
yit(m
∗
it −Mm∗it)2 = yit(Fit +ΩIi (−θM,I + aθY,I + bθW,I))2,
Fit = m
∗
it − γmit−1 −XMitδM − aCit − b(wit −XWitδw,
F˜it = yitFit.
For t = 1 :
yi1(m
∗
i1 −Mm∗i1)2 = yi1(Gi1 +ΩIi (−αM,I + aαY,I + bθW,I))2,
Gi1 = m
∗
i1 −XMi1δM0 − aAi1 − b(wi1 −XWi1δw),
G˜i1 = yi1Gi1.
The posterior distribution satisfies then:
l(θE|...) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
θI
′
DI,−1θI
)
× exp
(
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(Ai1 −ΩIi αY,I)2 −
1
2V w
∑
i
(
B˜i1 − Ω˜Ii1(θW,I − ρv,εσαY,I)
)2)
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× exp
(
−1
2
∑
i
T∑
t=2
(Cit −ΩIi θY,I)2 −
1
2V w
∑
i
T∑
t=2
(
D˜it − Ω˜Iit(θW,I − ρv,εσθY,I)
)2)
× exp
(
− 1
2V m
∑
i
(G˜i1 + Ω˜
I
i1(−αM,I + aαY,I + bθW,I))2
)
× exp
(
− 1
2V m
∑
i
T−1∑
t=2
(
F˜it + Ω˜
I
it(−θM,I + aθY,I + bθW,I)
)2)
.
We define several projection operators. Let P1 = (IJ , 0J , 0J , 0J , 0J ) , so that P1θI = αI,Y , and
similarly, define P2, ..., P5 , so that P2θI = αI,M , P3θI = θI,Y , P4θI = θI,W , and P5θI = θI,M
. We also denote:
E1 =
n∑
i=1
ΩI′i Ω
I
i , E˜1 =
n∑
i=1
Ω˜Ii1
′
Ω˜Ii1,
E2T =
n∑
i=1
ΩI′i Ω
I
i , E˜2T =
n∑
i=1
Ω˜Ii
′
Ω˜Ii , and
E˜2,T−1 =
n∑
i=1
˜
Ω
I,2,T−1
i
′
˜
Ω
I,2,T−1
i .
Now we can write for the variance-covariance matrix:
V −1 = DE,−10
+

E1
+(
ρ2v,εσ
2
V w
+ a
2
Vm
)E˜1
− a
Vm
E˜1 0 T41 0
− a
Vm
E˜1
1
Vm
E˜1 0 T42 0
0 0
E2T +
ρ2v,εσ
2
V w
E˜2,T
+ a
2
Vm
E˜2,T−1
T43 T53
(−ρv,εσ
V w
+ ab
Vm
)E˜1 − bVm E˜1
−ρv,εσ
V w
E˜2T
+ ab
Vm
E˜2T−1
E˜1(
1
V w
+ b
2
Vm
)
+ 1
V w
E˜2T +
b2
Vm
E˜2T−1
T54
0 0 − a
Vm
E˜2T−1 − bVm E˜2T−1 1Vm E˜2T−1

.
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for the posterior mean we have

∑n
i=1 Ω
I
i
′
Ai1 − ρv,εσV w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i1
′
B˜i1 − aVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i1
′
G˜i1
1
Vm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i1
′
G˜i1∑n
i=1 Ω
I
i
′
Ci − ρv,εσV w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i
′
D˜i − aVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
iT−1
′
F˜ iT−1
1
V w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i1
′
B˜i1 +
1
V w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i
′
D˜i − bVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
i1
′
G˜i1 − bVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
iT−1
′
F˜ iT−1
1
Vm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
I
iT−1
′
F˜ iT−1

.
B. Results
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
No. Variable HS Dropouts Vocational HS HS Grad. College Graduates
(CEP) (CAP-BEP) (Baccalauréat)
Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev
1. Participation 0.5045 0.5000 0.5860 0.4926 0.4604 0.4984 0.4700 0.4991
2. Log wage 4.0874 0.8093 4.1991 0.7463 4.1573 0.9801 4.7006 1.1599
3. Mobility 0.0752 0.2637 0.0938 0.2916 0.1232 0.3287 0.0952 0.2935
4. Tenure 7.6476 7.8048 5.9895 6.9210 4.1165 6.1718 6.2467 7.7694
5. Experience 24.7733 11.4711 17.4464 10.7499 11.7819 9.9945 15.7837 9.6285
6. Lives in couple 0.0648 0.2461 0.0613 0.2399 0.0661 0.2484 0.0551 0.2281
7. Married 0.6347 0.4815 0.5650 0.4958 0.3540 0.4782 0.5706 0.4950
8. Children between 0 and 3 0.0863 0.2809 0.1317 0.3381 0.1019 0.3025 0.1225 0.3279
9. Children between 3 and 6 0.0898 0.2859 0.1142 0.3180 0.0749 0.2633 0.1096 0.3125
10, Number of Children 1.3196 1.3771 1.0712 1.2158 0.5873 0.9889 0.9830 1.4218
11. Live in Ile de France 0.1196 0.3245 0.1124 0.3160 0.1531 0.3600 0.2088 0.4064
12. Live in Paris 0.1182 0.3228 0.1120 0.3153 0.1532 0.3602 0.2707 0.4443
13. Live in a town 0.2033 0.4024 0.2167 0.4120 0.2417 0.4281 0.2251 0.4176
14. Live in rural area 0.6785 0.4670 0.6714 0.4697 0.6051 0.4888 0.5043 0.5000
15. Part-time 0.1846 0.3880 0.1528 0.3598 0.2394 0.4267 0.2137 0.4100
16. Local unemp. rate 8.1940 3.6354 8.3736 3.4322 8.2858 3.5824 8.9162 2.7771
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
No. Variable HS Dropouts Vocational HS HS Grad. College Graduates
(CEP) (CAP-BEP) (Baccalauréat)
Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev
17. Agriculture 0.0424 0.2016 0.0379 0.1909 0.0216 0.1454 0.0130 0.1133
18. Energy 0.0095 0.0969 0.0164 0.1272 0.0117 0.1076 0.0219 0.1463
19. Intermediate goods 0.1007 0.3009 0.0960 0.2946 0.0489 0.2157 0.0634 0.2436
20. Equipment goods 0.1122 0.3157 0.1305 0.3368 0.0691 0.2536 0.1277 0.3337
21. Consumption goods 0.1127 0.3162 0.0741 0.2620 0.0551 0.2281 0.0555 0.2289
22. Construction 0.0884 0.2840 0.1159 0.3201 0.0387 0.1930 0.0357 0.1856
23. Retail and wholesale 0.1611 0.3676 0.1436 0.3507 0.1554 0.3623 0.0939 0.2917
24. Transport 0.0606 0.2385 0.0629 0.2428 0.0699 0.2550 0.0531 0.2242
25. Market services 0.2083 0.4061 0.2222 0.4158 0.3082 0.4617 0.3383 0.4731
26. Insurance 0.0079 0.0886 0.0080 0.0893 0.0197 0.1390 0.0156 0.1238
27. Banking and Finance 0.0155 0.1234 0.0213 0.1445 0.0558 0.2296 0.0452 0.2077
28. Non-market services 0.0748 0.2630 0.0661 0.2484 0.1396 0.3466 0.1306 0.3370
29. Born before 1929 0.2380 0.4258 0.0540 0.2261 0.0452 0.2078 0.0956 0.2941
30. Born between 1930 and 1939 0.2132 0.4096 0.1215 0.3268 0.0480 0.2137 0.1314 0.3378
31. Born between 1940 and 1949 0.2290 0.4202 0.2013 0.4010 0.1048 0.3063 0.2867 0.4522
32. Born between 1950 and 1959 0.2329 0.4227 0.3084 0.4618 0.2123 0.4089 0.3266 0.4690
33. Born between 1960 and 1969 0.0646 0.2459 0.2758 0.4469 0.4476 0.4973 0.1580 0.3648
34. Born after 1970 0.0222 0.1475 0.0390 0.1935 0.1421 0.3492 0.0017 0.0417
Number of Observations 32,596 12,405 34,071 7,579
Notes: Source is the DADS-EDP from 1976 through 1996.
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Table 3: Wage equation
No. Variable High School Dropouts (CEP) Vocational HS (CAP-BEP) HS Grad. (Baccalauréat) College Graduates
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Job characteristics:
1. Constant 2.3537 0.057 2.150 2.634 2.5619 0.052 2.352 2.738 2.7754 0.050 2.594 2.949 2.5562 0.061 2.324 2.782
2. Experience 0.0504 0.004 0.037 0.066 0.0590 0.003 0.046 0.070 0.0764 0.005 0.059 0.096 0.0537 0.004 0.041 0.067
3. Exper. sq. -0.0005 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.0006 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.0009 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0008 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
4. Seniority 0.0027 0.003 -0.009 0.014 -0.0046 0.003 -0.015 0.006 -0.0062 0.005 -0.024 0.010 0.0264 0.003 0.016 0.038
5. Sen. sq. -0.0002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.0001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
6. Part-time -0.5199 0.012 -0.563 -0.472 -0.4432 0.011 -0.481 -0.404 -0.6559 0.013 -0.706 -0.600 -0.8207 0.015 -0.882 -0.768
Individual and family characteristics:
7. Male 0.5242 0.035 0.382 0.643 0.4111 0.034 0.268 0.304 0.3811 0.038 0.258 0.518 0.5480 0.040 0.404 0.713
8. Married -0.0059 0.014 -0.057 0.046 0.0216 0.012 -0.023 0.000 -0.0070 0.018 -0.070 0.060 0.1960 0.022 0.112 0.288
9. Couple 0.0101 0.019 -0.060 0.094 -0.0078 0.017 -0.073 0.071 -0.0106 0.025 -0.121 0.090 0.0178 0.023 -0.062 0.102
10, Ile de France 0.0787 0.023 -0.005 0.169 0.0668 0.021 -0.018 0.066 0.1022 0.024 0.020 0.190 0.1358 0.020 0.067 0.207
11. Unemp. rate 0.0055 0.095 -0.357 0.361 0.1361 0.094 -0.255 0.487 0.1902 0.096 -0.147 0.552 0.1523 0.095 -0.232 0.521
Non-French nationality:
12. Own 0.0764 0.040 -0.057 0.207 0.0550 0.045 -0.088 0.214 0.0240 0.045 -0.140 0.187 -0.0752 0.034 -0.185 0.069
13. Father 0.1064 0.083 -0.184 0.500 0.0460 0.071 -0.195 0.375 0.0856 0.069 -0.167 0.329 -0.0183 0.069 -0.344 0.237
14. Mother 0.1250 0.079 -0.174 0.483 0.0176 0.072 -0.229 0.306 -0.0010 0.061 -0.240 0.230 0.0551 0.064 -0.217 0.282
Cohort effects (born between):
15. <1929 0.0873 0.067 -0.173 0.405 0.0047 0.075 -0.256 0.281 -0.0284 0.084 -0.364 0.289 0.3720 0.068 0.118 0.635
16. 1930–1939 0.2579 0.057 0.054 0.484 0.2006 0.062 -0.051 0.432 -0.0411 0.075 -0.330 0.224 0.4487 0.060 0.205 0.686
17. 1940–1949 0.5079 0.054 0.2975 0.7440 0.3587 0.053 0.1463 0.5545 0.1396 0.059 -0.063 0.356 0.5208 0.052 0.326 0.725
18. 1950–1959 0.6393 0.053 0.4305 0.8285 0.5828 0.048 0.4076 0.7567 0.3839 0.052 0.216 0.591 0.6085 0.052 0.416 0.821
19. 1960–1969 0.4583 0.068 0.1732 0.7463 0.6027 0.051 0.4159 0.7751 0.4775 0.045 0.297 0.721 0.5722 0.061 0.332 0.819
Notes: Data sources are DADS-EDP from 1976 to 1996. The number of observations for the four education groups are 32,596, 12,405, 34,071, and 7,579, respectively.
Estimation by Gibbs Sampling. 80,000 iterations for the first group with a burn-in equal to 65,000; 80,000 iterations and 70,000 for the second group; 60,000 iterations and 50,000
for the two last groups. The equation also includes (unreported) year indicators.
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Table 4: Wage Equation (Continued)
No. Variable High School Dropouts (CEP) Vocational HS (CAP-BEP) HS Grad. (Baccalauréat) College Graduates
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Industry:
20. Energy 0.1153 0.065 -0.152 0.356 0.0099 0.058 -0.187 0.225 0.1294 0.068 -0.110 0.374 0.2386 0.054 0.029 0.453
21. Intermediate 0.1317 0.031 0.020 0.256 0.1856 0.027 0.092 0.279 0.2055 0.040 0.026 0.366 0.1364 0.035 -0.028 0.282
22. Equipment 0.1827 0.031 0.072 0.323 0.1455 0.027 0.049 0.255 0.2490 0.037 0.113 0.394 0.2274 0.033 0.110 0.363
23. Consumption 0.1411 0.030 0.028 0.251 0.1452 0.028 0.027 0.264 0.1865 0.038 0.015 0.335 0.1349 0.035 0.004 0.253
24. Construction 0.0647 0.032 -0.057 0.198 0.1537 0.027 0.051 0.240 0.2773 0.044 0.124 0.434 0.1341 0.042 -0.033 0.277
25 Retail/Whole 0.0954 0.026 -0.020 0.182 0.0608 0.024 -0.039 0.151 0.1758 0.031 0.065 0.308 0.1664 0.031 0.047 0.283
26. Transport 0.1018 0.035 -0.037 0.239 0.0697 0.032 -0.054 0.193 0.1812 0.040 0.013 0.333 0.1363 0.038 -0.017 0.273
27. Services 0.0171 0.025 -0.086 0.103 0.0114 0.023 -0.084 0.107 0.1637 0.028 0.052 0.272 0.0777 0.027 -0.028 0.191
28. Insurance 0.1034 0.074 -0.182 0.374 -0.0232 0.062 -0.242 0.196 0.2501 0.051 0.056 0.439 0.1614 0.056 -0.043 0.354
29. Financial 0.2026 0.061 -0.074 0.425 0.1510 0.054 -0.045 0.364 0.2712 0.043 0.112 0.441 0.2214 0.043 0.061 0.392
30. Oth. serv. -0.0573 0.030 -0.184 0.061 -0.0902 0.028 -0.191 0.025 -0.1539 0.033 -0.281 -0.022 -0.3711 0.032 -0.489 -0.221
Job switch in first year:
31. 1st year 0.1077 0.065 -0.119 0.364 0.0154 0.065 -0.238 0.231 0.0401 0.069 -0.198 0.301 0.1441 0.074 -0.201 0.386
32. Exp at t− 1 -0.0049 0.003 -0.018 0.007 -0.0083 0.005 -0.026 0.008 -0.0059 0.007 -0.031 0.019 -0.0030 0.008 -0.035 0.027
Constant of job switch that lasted:
33. Up to 1 year 0.0529 0.015 -0.005 0.107 0.0301 0.010 -0.007 0.065 0.0451 0.013 -0.011 0.095 0.1829 0.015 0.120 0.238
34. 2 to 5 years 0.0985 0.030 -0.025 0.201 0.1967 0.024 0.107 0.294 0.1283 0.033 0.002 0.248 0.0529 0.030 -0.070 0.179
35. 6 to 10 years -0.0164 0.067 -0.255 0.228 0.1635 0.059 -0.060 0.399 -0.0217 0.081 -0.304 0.270 0.1731 0.071 -0.109 0.424
36. 10+ years 0.0585 0.051 -0.141 0.249 -0.0619 0.048 -0.242 0.135 0.0851 0.072 -0.183 0.399 0.0582 0.053 -0.164 0.280
Coefficient on lagged seniority for job that lasted:
37. 2 to 5 years -0.0242 0.009 -0.060 0.015 -0.0316 0.008 -0.063 -0.003 -0.0344 0.012 -0.075 0.012 0.0308 0.010 -0.008 0.068
38. 6 to 10 years -0.0025 0.009 -0.036 0.033 -0.0199 0.008 -0.054 0.014 -0.0156 0.013 -0.064 0.034 0.0079 0.010 -0.029 0.046
39. 10+ years -0.0167 0.004 -0.034 -0.002 -0.0180 0.005 -0.037 -0.001 -0.0145 0.008 -0.051 0.014 0.0189 0.004 0.000 0.036
Coefficient on lagged experience for job that lasted:
40. Up to 1 year -0.0055 0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.0029 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.0059 0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.0095 0.001 -0.014 -0.005
41. 2 to 5 years -0.0031 0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.0070 0.001 -0.011 -0.003 -0.0036 0.002 -0.012 0.004 -0.0039 0.001 -0.009 0.002
42. 6 to 10 years 0.0016 0.002 -0.005 0.009 -0.0106 0.002 -0.018 -0.003 0.0003 0.004 -0.014 0.014 -0.0096 0.002 -0.018 -0.001
43. 10+ years 0.0060 0.002 -0.002 0.014 0.0094 0.002 0.001 0.019 -0.0011 0.004 -0.020 0.015 -0.0082 0.003 -0.020 0.002
Notes: See Table 3 for details.
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Table 5: Participation Equation
High School Dropouts (CEP) Vocational HS (CAP-BEP) HS Grad. (Baccalauréat) College Graduates
No. Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Job characteristics:
1. Constant -1.2059 0.226 -2.046 -0.308 -1.1824 0.227 -2.150 -0.376 -0.8397 0.224 -1.685 0.024 -0.8050 0.230 -1.685 0.101
2. Experience 0.2211 0.005 0.203 0.239 0.3273 0.005 0.309 0.348 0.4304 0.006 0.409 0.452 0.1777 0.005 0.158 0.196
3. Exp. squared -0.0040 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.0061 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.0088 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.0040 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
4. Unemp. rate 7.4407 0.286 6.337 8.561 8.6314 0.340 7.359 9.950 6.4389 0.280 5.466 7.410 6.4504 0.511 4.397 8.307
Lagged dependent variables:
5. Mobility 0.2041 0.025 0.101 0.295 0.2081 0.024 0.125 0.293 0.2450 0.023 0.132 0.334 0.2665 0.026 0.176 0.350
6. Participation 0.5192 0.009 0.485 0.556 0.3961 0.009 0.360 0.430 0.2600 0.009 0.224 0.292 0.3414 0.010 0.307 0.375
Individual and family characteristics
7. Male 0.3000 0.040 0.168 0.441 0.2096 0.041 0.061 -0.073 -0.0796 0.000 -0.222 0.043 0.3530 0.045 0.199 0.518
8. Children 0–3 -0.3319 0.031 -0.443 -0.222 -0.1685 0.027 -0.277 -0.185 -0.2517 0.031 -0.374 -0.125 0.1060 0.032 -0.031 0.217
9. Children 4–6 -0.3387 0.029 -0.439 -0.234 -0.2828 0.027 -0.403 0.134 -0.4096 0.035 -0.534 -0.266 -0.0304 0.031 -0.153 0.084
10. Couple -0.0546 0.036 -0.187 0.085 -0.0060 0.041 -0.172 -0.127 -0.2256 0.042 -0.432 -0.031 0.0499 0.046 -0.138 0.206
11. Married -0.1070 0.025 -0.195 -0.013 -0.2155 0.027 -0.314 -0.336 -0.2101 0.030 -0.320 -0.110 0.1099 0.037 -0.015 0.228
12. Ile de France 0.0659 0.033 -0.054 0.188 0.1177 0.037 0.000 0.251 0.0109 0.025 -0.085 0.102 6.0465 0.186 5.409 6.547
Non-French nationality:
13. Own -0.3225 0.045 -0.502 -0.157 -0.5103 0.055 -0.721 -0.336 -0.2459 0.052 -0.421 -0.040 -0.2613 0.043 -0.407 -0.121
14. Father 0.2813 0.173 -0.276 0.915 0.2403 0.115 -0.132 0.689 0.0532 0.098 -0.323 0.381 0.1492 0.130 -0.273 0.572
15. Mother -0.0161 0.144 -0.588 0.472 0.0175 0.123 -0.381 0.463 -0.1245 0.081 -0.392 0.204 -0.1337 0.120 -0.560 0.249
Cohort effects:
16. <1929 -2.4810 0.059 -2.750 -2.229 -3.3449 0.113 -3.758 -2.962 -3.0419 0.117 -3.464 -2.637 -2.5581 0.093 -2.918 -2.215
17. 1930–1939 -2.2575 0.068 -2.508 -2.023 -3.1446 0.084 -3.455 -2.866 -3.9734 0.111 -4.394 -3.621 -2.5230 0.086 -2.883 -2.167
18. 1940–1949 -1.9738 0.072 -2.228 -1.723 -2.9346 0.078 -3.226 -2.681 -3.7966 0.083 -4.104 -3.513 -2.3254 0.070 -2.608 -2.082
19. 1950–1959 -1.3127 0.065 -1.568 -1.041 -1.7896 0.059 -1.996 -1.579 -1.9638 0.055 -2.190 -1.785 -1.9746 0.062 -2.205 -1.762
20. 1960–1969 -0.4090 0.090 -0.730 -0.048 -0.6373 0.050 -0.812 -0.466 -0.8580 0.037 -0.995 -0.730 -1.4472 0.071 -1.719 -1.184
Notes: See Table 3 for details.
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Table 6: Mobility Equation
No. Variable High School Dropouts (CEP) Vocational HS (CAP-BEP) HS Grad. (Baccalauréat) College Graduates
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Job characteristics:
1. Constant -0.9936 0.319 -2.061 0.144 -1.0834 0.277 -2.107 -0.113 -0.5756 0.271 -1.557 0.449 -1.0982 0.425 -2.596 0.495
2. Experience -0.0119 0.012 -0.058 0.034 -0.0344 0.011 -0.083 0.003 -0.0557 0.014 -0.098 -0.010 -0.0072 0.009 -0.037 0.024
3. Exp. squared 0.0001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.0013 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.0003 0.000 -0.001 0.001
4. Seniority -0.0315 0.009 -0.060 0.002 -0.0315 0.008 -0.060 0.001 -0.0335 0.012 -0.078 0.021 -0.0197 0.008 -0.046 0.005
5. Sen. squared 0.0018 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.0017 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.0017 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.0010 0.000 0.000 0.002
6. Unemp. rate 0.4218 0.741 -2.102 3.242 0.3087 0.684 -2.264 2.868 -0.1282 0.684 -2.794 2.409 0.0516 0.697 -2.874 2.900
7. Part-time 0.4738 0.045 0.291 0.648 0.6054 0.039 0.443 0.755 0.4737 0.039 0.318 0.645 0.4497 0.041 0.308 0.600
Lagged dependent variables:
8. Mobility 0.0150 0.051 -0.175 0.223 0.0477 0.040 -0.102 0.190 -0.0638 0.046 -0.241 0.098 -0.0161 0.043 -0.194 0.141
Individual and family characteristics
9. Male 0.2164 0.058 0.010 0.448 0.1942 0.057 -0.005 0.392 0.1455 0.056 -0.033 0.309 0.0932 0.061 -0.162 0.310
10. Children 0–3 -0.3319 0.031 -0.443 0.207 -0.0116 0.044 -0.158 0.143 -0.0512 0.059 -0.249 0.222 0.0042 0.049 -0.166 0.177
11. Children 4–6 -0.3387 0.029 -0.439 0.155 -0.0724 0.045 -0.267 0.089 -0.1150 0.069 -0.383 0.114 -0.0832 0.047 -0.274 0.097
12. Married -0.1400 0.051 -0.313 0.088 -0.0989 0.070 -0.348 0.128 -0.2122 0.077 -0.492 0.053 -0.1520 0.056 -0.343 0.062
13. Couple -0.0055 0.076 -0.315 0.283 -0.1666 0.045 -0.321 0.006 -0.2443 0.055 -0.437 -0.057 0.0116 0.078 -0.286 0.315
14. Ile de France 0.1744 0.069 -0.074 0.407 0.0931 0.062 -0.107 0.325 0.1122 0.061 -0.134 0.362 0.2268 0.050 0.023 0.426
Non-French Nationality:
15. Own 0.1540 0.067 -0.066 0.391 0.0313 0.080 -0.212 0.311 0.0035 0.077 -0.254 0.251 -0.0358 0.058 -0.235 0.180
16. Father 0.0417 0.220 -0.824 0.887 0.0291 0.132 -0.438 0.509 -0.0410 0.132 -0.507 0.420 0.0162 0.157 -0.554 0.581
17. Mother 0.2582 0.208 -0.432 1.070 -0.1501 0.145 -0.683 0.335 0.1056 0.105 -0.256 0.495 0.0848 0.147 -0.421 0.706
Cohort effects:
18. <1929 -1.2194 0.327 -2.518 -0.026 -0.9357 0.302 -1.997 0.099 -1.9495 0.372 -3.292 -0.631 -0.9637 0.387 -2.364 0.503
19. 1930–1939 -1.1365 0.286 -2.168 0.122 -0.7139 0.233 -1.608 0.097 -1.1395 0.264 -2.004 -0.230 -0.6508 0.373 -1.896 0.810
20. 1940–1949 -0.7240 0.247 -1.570 0.359 -0.4582 0.187 -1.263 0.208 -0.9366 0.182 -1.530 -0.349 -0.3260 0.365 -1.613 0.916
21. 1950–1959 -0.6070 0.217 -1.411 0.252 -0.2721 0.150 -1.004 0.239 -0.5250 0.123 -0.959 -0.083 0.0686 0.363 -1.149 1.304
22. 1960–1969 -0.4095 0.218 -1.199 0.393 -0.2520 0.132 -0.734 0.253 -0.2829 0.086 -0.617 0.032 0.4750 0.368 -0.688 1.730
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Table 7: Mobility Equation (Continued)
No. Variable High School Dropouts (CEP) Vocational HS (CAP-BEP) HS Grad. (Baccalauréat) College Graduates
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Industry:
23. Energy -0.0565 0.737 -3.066 2.255 -1.2534 0.247 -2.250 -0.447 -1.1784 0.297 -2.186 -0.098 -0.7395 0.192 -1.453 -0.074
24. Intermediate -0.3374 0.319 -1.640 0.955 -0.1361 0.099 -0.491 0.201 -0.0747 0.143 -0.589 0.515 -0.3868 0.126 -0.854 0.072
25. Equipment 0.3442 0.313 -0.764 1.538 -0.2215 0.098 -0.573 0.125 -0.0281 0.135 -0.536 0.480 -0.4903 0.123 -1.000 -0.067
26. Consumption 0.5253 0.295 -0.517 1.738 0.0385 0.102 -0.327 0.386 -0.0535 0.136 -0.590 0.520 -0.4103 0.133 -0.989 0.100
27. Construction 0.0887 0.297 -1.230 1.227 0.2799 0.092 -0.051 0.648 0.2324 0.147 -0.436 0.725 -0.1671 0.144 -0.664 0.374
28. Retail/Whole 0.3397 0.274 -0.727 1.302 0.0454 0.089 -0.286 0.372 0.1300 0.121 -0.272 0.576 -0.4348 0.123 -1.071 0.011
29. Transport 0.4488 0.380 -1.129 1.949 -0.2613 0.107 -0.655 0.112 -0.3924 0.143 -0.924 0.171 -0.7423 0.143 -1.307 -0.220
30. Services 0.5872 0.275 -0.525 1.617 0.1569 0.086 -0.123 0.501 0.1053 0.114 -0.348 0.529 -0.4290 0.113 -0.989 -0.006
31. Insurance 0.6985 0.576 -1.345 3.295 -0.0065 0.230 -0.825 0.830 -0.0588 0.174 -0.892 0.583 -0.3698 0.200 -1.073 0.500
32. Financial -0.7652 0.821 -4.565 2.069 -0.5870 0.186 -1.271 0.087 -0.2091 0.141 -0.744 0.349 -0.6057 0.147 -1.136 -0.108
33. Oth. serv. 0.0160 0.470 -2.190 1.745 -0.3484 0.109 -0.723 0.112 -0.2473 0.125 -0.719 0.182 -0.5744 0.124 -1.170 -0.098
Notes: See Table 3 for details.
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Table 8: Elements of Variance Covariance Matrices
No. Variable High School Dropouts (CEP) Vocational HS (CAP-BEP) HS Grad. (Baccalauréat) College Graduates
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Individual specific effects:
1. ρy0m0 0.0254 0.025 -0.047 0.077 -0.0143 0.023 -0.068 0.040 0.0397 0.024 -0.008 0.098 0.0214 0.014 -0.017 0.067
2. ρy0y 0.1458 0.029 0.074 0.200 0.1238 0.023 0.073 0.182 0.1199 0.033 0.050 0.195 0.1364 0.019 0.085 0.183
3. ρy0w 0.0596 0.036 -0.007 0.149 -0.0120 0.021 -0.057 0.036 0.0576 0.033 0.002 0.128 0.0525 0.019 0.009 0.103
4. ρy0m 0.0206 0.019 -0.041 0.063 -0.0261 0.016 -0.059 0.026 0.0422 0.037 -0.021 0.129 -0.0311 0.018 -0.066 0.010
5. ρm0y 0.0087 0.023 -0.065 0.055 -0.0025 0.034 -0.069 0.054 0.0245 0.023 -0.030 0.072 -0.0033 0.035 -0.078 0.060
6. ρm0w 0.0407 0.030 -0.008 0.138 0.0202 0.029 -0.043 0.088 -0.0168 0.036 -0.120 0.041 0.0045 0.011 -0.028 0.035
7. ρm0m -0.0312 0.024 -0.087 0.028 0.0155 0.020 -0.035 0.060 -0.0154 0.016 -0.054 0.023 -0.0091 0.017 -0.049 0.029
8. ρyw 0.2538 0.037 0.174 0.327 0.1260 0.021 0.077 0.174 0.2068 0.022 0.149 0.250 0.1773 0.020 0.124 0.219
9. ρym -0.0677 0.019 -0.129 -0.024 -0.1013 0.017 -0.160 -0.060 -0.0643 0.020 -0.111 -0.009 -0.0287 0.020 -0.071 0.023
10. ρwm -0.1578 0.028 -0.219 -0.103 -0.1897 0.037 -0.244 -0.088 -0.0275 0.018 -0.081 0.012 -0.0629 0.021 -0.110 -0.009
Idiosyncratic terms:
11. σ2 0.2669 0.002 0.259 0.277 0.2653 0.002 0.257 0.274 0.3964 0.004 0.383 0.413 0.3728 0.004 0.364 0.387
12. ρwm -0.0595 0.013 -0.109 0.000 -0.0574 0.011 -0.103 0.000 -0.0553 0.014 -0.117 0.000 -0.0835 0.013 -0.135 0.000
13. ρym 0.1455 0.057 -0.030 0.359 0.1097 0.054 -0.092 0.254 0.0383 0.050 -0.119 0.201 0.2026 0.050 -0.043 0.343
14. ρyw 0.0171 0.016 -0.044 0.068 -0.0099 0.016 -0.071 0.054 0.0161 0.020 -0.051 0.079 0.0373 0.022 -0.057 0.114
Notes: See Table 3 for details.
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Table 9: Comparison of the United States and France, College Graduates
No. Variable College Graduates, U.S. College Graduates, France
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Wage equation
Main characteristics:
1. Experience 0.0580 0.0032 0.0518 0.0643 0.0537 0.0035 0.0410 0.0667
2. Exp. squared -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0005
3. Seniority 0.0518 0.0029 0.0460 0.0576 0.0264 0.0027 0.0157 0.0375
4. Sen. squared -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0001
Constant of job switch that lasted:
5. Up to 1 year 0.2240 0.0172 0.1905 0.2572 0.1829 0.0150 0.1198 0.2384
6. 2 to 5 years 0.1648 0.0189 0.1274 0.2018 0.0529 0.0300 -0.0704 0.1786
7. 6 to 10 years 0.3231 0.0683 0.1861 0.4572 0.1731 0.0708 -0.1087 0.4239
8. 10+ years 0.4717 0.0869 0.3031 0.6425 0.0582 0.0530 -0.1644 0.2796
Coefficient on lagged seniority for job that lasted:
9. 2 to 5 years 0.0567 0.0070 0.0432 0.0709 0.0308 0.0102 -0.0080 0.0678
10. 6 to 10 years 0.0111 0.0097 -0.0079 0.0303 0.0079 0.0101 -0.0290 0.0457
11. 10+ years 0.0062 0.0055 -0.0050 0.0166 0.0189 0.0042 0.0004 0.0357
Coefficient on lagged experience for job that lasted:
12. Up to 1 year -0.0071 0.0016 -0.0102 -0.0040 -0.0095 0.0012 -0.0135 -0.0045
13. 2 to 5 years -0.0058 0.0016 -0.0090 -0.0027 -0.0039 0.0014 -0.0094 0.0015
14. 6 to 10 years -0.0025 0.0025 -0.0073 0.0024 -0.0096 0.0024 -0.0181 -0.0013
15. 10+ years -0.0026 0.0033 -0.0090 0.0036 -0.0082 0.0027 -0.0196 0.0018
Participation equation
16. Lagged mobility 0.3336 0.1646 0.0111 0.6274 0.2665 0.0255 0.1764 0.3501
17. Lagged participation 2.0046 0.0944 1.8178 2.1978 0.3414 0.0095 0.3067 0.3748
Mobility equation
18. Seniority -0.0878 0.0074 -0.1024 -0.0734 -0.0197 0.0080 -0.0462 0.0049
19. Sen. squared 0.0020 0.0003 0.0015 0.0026 0.0010 0.0003 0.0000 0.0022
20. Lagged mobility -0.9019 0.0552 -1.0133 -0.7953 -0.0161 0.0432 -0.1940 0.1412
Variance-covariance elements
Individual effects:
21. ρy0m0 0.8040 0.0556 0.7024 0.9005 0.0214 0.0136 -0.0165 0.0674
22. ρy0y 0.5716 0.0286 0.5190 0.6224 0.1364 0.0187 0.0852 0.1834
23. ρy0w 0.1335 0.0757 0.0169 0.2714 0.0525 0.0194 0.0087 0.1025
24. ρy0m -0.6044 0.0773 -0.7595 -0.4892 -0.0311 0.0179 -0.0659 0.0101
25. ρm0y 0.2896 0.0429 0.2268 0.3845 -0.0033 0.0353 -0.0775 0.0595
26. ρm0w -0.1450 0.0884 -0.2586 0.0403 0.0045 0.0110 -0.0278 0.0346
27. ρm0m -0.4234 0.0789 -0.5691 -0.2668 -0.0091 0.0173 -0.0491 0.0292
28. ρyw 0.2174 0.0553 0.1066 0.3017 0.1773 0.0200 0.1243 0.2185
29. ρym -0.5061 0.0656 -0.6172 -0.3874 -0.0287 0.0200 -0.0707 0.0231
30. ρwm -0.5352 0.0590 -0.6371 -0.4131 -0.0629 0.0214 -0.1099 -0.0089
Idiosyncratic terms:
31. σ2 0.2062 0.0023 0.2016 0.2104 0.3728 0.0035 0.3640 0.3869
32. ρyw 0.0013 -0.0111 0.0075 0.0161 -0.0835 0.0134 -0.1350 0.0000
33. ρym -0.0005 0.0113 -0.0217 0.0188 0.2026 0.0499 -0.0427 0.3431
34. ρwm -0.0496 0.0124 -0.0672 -0.0205 0.0373 0.0222 -0.0571 0.1140
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Table 10: Comparison of the United States and France, High School Dropouts
No. Variable High School Dropouts, U.S. High School Dropouts, France
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Wage equation
Main characteristics:
1. Experience 0.0283 0.0027 0.0229 0.0334 0.0504 0.0035 0.0372 0.0658
2. Exp. squared -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0003
3. Seniority 0.0517 0.0034 0.0455 0.0580 0.0027 0.0030 -0.0091 0.0143
4. Sen. squared -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0000
Constant of job switch that lasted:
5. Up to 1 year 0.0923 0.0144 0.0635 0.1203 0.0529 0.0146 -0.0051 0.1067
6. 2 to 5 years 0.0958 0.0219 0.0526 0.1386 0.0985 0.0298 -0.0245 0.2012
7. 6 to 10 years 0.1229 0.1027 -0.0569 0.3076 -0.0164 0.0667 -0.2545 0.2278
8. 10+ years 0.2457 0.1078 0.0474 0.4606 0.0585 0.0509 -0.1409 0.2493
Coefficient on lagged seniority for job that lasted:
9. 2 to 5 years 0.0293 0.0084 0.0127 0.0456 -0.0242 0.0093 -0.0603 0.0147
10. 6 to 10 years 0.0213 0.0109 0.0003 0.0422 -0.0025 0.0090 -0.0357 0.0327
11. 10+ years 0.0350 0.0053 0.0238 0.0444 -0.0167 0.0043 -0.0341 -0.0015
Coefficient on lagged experience for job that lasted:
12. Up to 1 year 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0015 0.0033 -0.0055 0.0008 -0.0082 -0.0023
13. 2 to 5 years -0.0007 0.0016 -0.0038 0.0024 -0.0031 0.0010 -0.0071 0.0005
14. 6 to 10 years 0.0007 0.0030 -0.0049 0.0060 0.0016 0.0018 -0.0053 0.0085
15. 10+ years -0.0090 0.0029 -0.0150 -0.0035 0.0060 0.0021 -0.0017 0.0139
Participation equation
16. Lagged mobility 0.5295 0.1258 0.3043 0.7836 0.2041 0.0249 0.1008 0.2945
17. Lagged participation 1.7349 0.0660 1.5999 1.8530 0.5192 0.0090 0.4845 0.5557
Mobility equation
18. Seniority -0.0812 0.0115 -0.1007 -0.0605 -0.0315 0.0089 -0.0603 0.0018
19. Sen. squared 0.0018 0.0003 0.0011 0.0024 0.0018 0.0004 0.0003 0.0032
20. Lagged mobility -0.7190 0.0738 -0.8544 -0.5807 0.0150 0.0509 -0.1753 0.2228
Variance-covariance elements
Individual effects:
21. ρy0m0 -0.1020 0.1146 -0.2589 0.1067 0.0254 0.0245 -0.0472 0.0771
22. ρy0y 0.7548 0.0566 0.6525 0.8747 0.1458 0.0285 0.0742 0.2000
23. ρy0w 0.3447 0.0351 0.2732 0.4142 0.0596 0.0357 -0.0066 0.1485
24. ρy0m 0.0278 0.2007 -0.2908 0.2281 0.0206 0.0193 -0.0414 0.0632
25. ρm0y 0.1972 0.0746 0.0260 0.2971 0.0087 0.0229 -0.0653 0.0545
26. ρm0w 0.0646 0.0505 -0.0061 0.1794 0.0407 0.0301 -0.0079 0.1382
27. ρm0m -0.0573 0.1666 -0.2619 0.2194 -0.0312 0.0236 -0.0865 0.0281
28. ρyw 0.2958 0.0282 0.2292 0.3560 0.2538 0.0369 0.1737 0.3272
29. ρym -0.2100 0.1053 -0.3832 -0.0429 -0.0677 0.0185 -0.1291 -0.0241
30. ρwm -0.2744 0.0799 -0.4083 -0.1348 -0.1578 0.0282 -0.2188 -0.1027
Idiosyncratic terms:
31. σ2 0.2448 0.0064 0.2331 0.2539 0.2669 0.0024 0.2591 0.2765
32. ρyw -0.0055 0.0074 -0.0185 0.0072 -0.0595 0.0133 -0.1085 0.0000
33. ρym 0.0029 0.0077 -0.0117 0.0160 0.1455 0.0573 -0.0299 0.3588
34. ρwm -0.0346 0.0072 -0.0497 -0.0183 0.0171 0.0160 -0.0436 0.0677
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Table 11: Cumulative and Marginal Returns to Experience and Seniority for the United States
and France
Cumulative Marginal
Country and Group Years Years
5 10 15 5 10 15
Panel A: Return to Experience
United States:
1. High school dropouts 0.101 0.246 0.472 2.661 1.959 1.256
(0.005) (0.012) (0.022) (0.286) (0.248) (0.215)
2. College graduates 0.256 0.446 0.567 4.455 3.109 1.763
(0.015) (0.029) (0.040) (0.285) (0.253) (0.231)
France:
3. High school dropouts 0.240 0.458 0.652 4.575 4.112 3.648
(0.017) (0.031) (0.045) (0.314) (0.285) (0.265)
4. College graduates 0.249 0.459 0.630 4.587 3.808 3.030
(0.016) (0.030) (0.042) (0.303) (0.263) (0.241)
Panel B: Return to Seniority
United States:
5. High school dropouts 0.266 0.347 0.392 4.721 4.314 3.906
(0.029) (0.040) (0.050) (0.216) (0.169) (0.156)
6. College graduates 0.236 0.449 0.637 4.485 4.001 3.517
(0.014) (0.025) (0.034) (0.247) (0.209) (0.205)
France:
7. High school dropouts 0.006 -0.002 -0.025 -0.021 -0.307 -0.594
(0.014) (0.027) (0.039) (0.269) (0.257) (0.267)
8. College graduates 0.122 0.225 0.307 2.245 1.849 1.453
(0.012) (0.023) (0.031) (0.225) (0.199) (0.207)
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Table 12: Comparison of Alternative Estimates of the Return to Seniority
United States France
High school College High school College
dropouts graduates dropouts graduates
Instrumental variable (Altonji-Williams):
Linear tenure 0.046 0.037 -0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Linear experience 0.055 0.058 0.036 0.051
(0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004)
Cumulative returns to tenure:
2 years 0.062 0.043 -0.008 -0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
5 years 0.112 0.078 -0.020 -0.005
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
10 years 0.131 0.092 -0.042 -0.013
(0.019) (0.015) (0.029) (0.035)
15 years 0.131 0.090 -0.064 -0.022
(0.018) (0.016) (0.046) (0.056)
20 years 0.146 0.099 -0.088 -0.034
(0.019) (0.020) (0.066) (0.080)
Ordinary least-squares:
Linear tenure 0.058 0.040 0.001 0.021
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Linear experience 0.059 0.059 0.037 0.039
(0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Cumulative returns to tenure:
2 years 0.099 0.068 0.003 0.041
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
5 years 0.197 0.136 0.013 0.096
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
10 years 0.273 0.189 0.042 0.171
(0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.026)
15 years 0.300 0.208 0.087 0.226
(0.017) (0.015) (0.032) (0.041)
20 years 0.328 0.223 0.147 0.260
(0.017) (0.018) (0.046) (0.059)
Our model:
Linear tenure 0.052 0.052 0.003 0.026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Linear experience 0.028 0.058 0.050 0.054
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
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C. Simulations
Figure 1. Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 0.2
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Figure 2. Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 0.2
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Figure 3. Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 0.4
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Figure 4. Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 0.4
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Figure 5. Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 0.8
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Figure 6. Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 0.8
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Figure 7. Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 1.4
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Figure 8. Log of Wage Profile as a function of Tenure (in days) and σ = 1.4
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
Tenure in days
W
ag
es
Log of Wage profile as a fonction of Tenure (in days) with Sigma=1.4
lambda=0.0001
lambda=0.0005
lambda=0.0009
lambda=0.0015
lambda=0.002
lambda=0.005
lambda=0.01
France 
US 
83
.
Chapitre 2
Job Mobility and Wages with Worker and Firm Heterogeneity
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1. Introduction
The relation existing between wage growth, experience and job seniority has been the subject of
multiple studies. Some find that seniority matters (most notably Topel (1991)). Others tend to
show that experience is more important (most notably Altonji, in Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
Altonji and Williams (1992) and Altonji and Williams (1997)). However, all such analysis have
shown the extreme importance of the quality of the data used to characterize this relation, the
definition of the variables, the identification hypotheses, and the estimation methods that are
used.
The nature and magnitude of the effects of experience and job tenure are directly related to
the role of general - transferable - and specific - non transferable - human capital (see Mincer
(1974) and Mincer and Jovanovic (1979)). Unfortunately, the empirical measurement of the
various components of wage growth is extremely difficult. Identification problems abound.
In particular, experience, job seniority and time increase simultaneously except when workers
move between firms or do not participate. If one focuses only on workers constantly present on
the labor market, more so if one restricts attention to those with at least two observations for a
given job, non-parametric identification is impossible. Hence, all observations should be used.
But then, mobility and participation become even more central determinants of wages. Workers
choose to stay in a firm or move. Workers choose to participate or not. As a consequence of
this selectivity, seniority and experience have to be modeled. Topel and Ward (1992) is such an
attempt for young workers. More recently, Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006)
explicitly model these variables together with wage. These authors (BFKT, hereafter) concur
with Topel (1991) in finding that, indeed, returns to seniority are large, at least in the United
States.
Decisions presiding to movements of workers between firms are driven by myriads of rea-
sons. Some are firm-based; others are person-based. For instance, it is often noted that job mo-
bility decreases with job seniority. Explanations for this behavior are multiple. Economists and
econometricians have summarized these reasons by invoking the so-called unobserved hetero-
geneity. For instance, matching theories assume that there exists an idiosyncratic (ex-ante un-
observed) component in a worker-firm pair productivity (Jovanovic (1979b) and Miller (1984)).
This may explain why some workers move quickly between occupations whereas others stay
for long periods of time in the same job (see Blumen, Kogan, and MacCarthy (1955)). Others
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see job tenure as the reflection of accumulation of job-specific human capital. These stories
can be viewed as complementary (see Mincer and Jovanovic (1979)). A common feature of
these theories is the central role of both workers and firm’s contributions to productivity. On the
empirical side, only a few studies have considered this mixed source of heterogeneity (see Flinn
(1986), Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Kramarz, 2003). Unfortunately, the first two
papers do not treat seniority or experience as endogenous variables whereas the last one con-
siders that seniority is endogenous but not experience. An interesting attempt, though, is BFKT
who jointly estimate a wage, a seniority, and a participation equation with duration-dependence
and unobserved worker-heterogeneity (following a line initiated by Lillard and Willis (1978)).
As mentioned above, these authors find that, in the United-States, returns to seniority are large
whereas returns to experience tend to be smaller than what other authors have found (albeit these
papers did not consider experience as endogenous). Results for France stand in sharp contrast
with those found for the United-States. More precisely, both authors that have used matched
employer-employee data sources Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Kramarz (2003)
find that returns to seniority are small (less than 1% per year). In addition, the former provide
evidence of heterogeneous returns across firms some being even negative. This last result is
confirmed by the latter where instrumented returns to seniority are zero and often negative in
the manufacturing industries.
Because we believe that both firm and workers decisions matter, our estimating model incor-
porates both firm and worker heterogeneity components. Following BFKT, these unobserved
effects are treated as random. We consider, in each equation of the model, an unobserved het-
erogeneity term specific to the firm and an unobserved component specific to the worker. These
terms are correlated across equations, allowing, for instance, low-wage workers to be highly
mobile. Hence, in our approach both person and firm effects are potentially correlated to ex-
perience and seniority; they are correlated random effects. The model is estimated, following
again Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) or Geweke and Keane (2000), by
MCMC techniques. We use the Gibbs sampler with Metropolis-Hastings steps and data aug-
mentation (see Robert and Casella (1999), and Chibb (1996)). In presence of firm and worker
heterogeneity, data augmentation is useful because the likelihood function is not separable any
more (in contrast to Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006) or Geweke and Keane
(2000)) because workers move from firm to firm and each firm potentially employs multiple
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workers in the sample.
One of our data sources, the DADS (see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)), matches
longitudinal information on workers and on their employing firms. The DADS spans years 1976
to 1995 and covers all workers employed in France in the private and semi-public sectors and
born in October of an even year. Because this administrative data set does not provide us with
person-level information, we match it with the EDP(échantillon démographique permanent)
that contains variables from the Censuses and the Civil Status registers for all workers born
in the first four days of October. Our analysis data set contains approximately 1.5 million
observations.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 includes
a description of the estimation procedure. Section 4 contains a detailed description of the data
set we use. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Statistical model
2.1. Some definitions
This model extends BFKT to incorporate the firm dimension. In addition to an unobserved
person heterogeneity, we include unobserved firm heterogeneity as well as a match (associating
a worker and a firm) equation.
Therefore, our statistical model consists of four equations (plus two initial conditions): a
simple random matching equation, a participation equation, a wage equation and finally, an
inter-firm mobility equation.
Even though our data are quite extensive and precise, they have some limitations that bear
consequences on our modeling strategy. First, we only have wage information for those who are
employed in a private or semi-public firm. Hence, no wage data are available for those employed
in the public sector or the self-employed. Therefore, we define a participant as someone for
whom wage data are available. This also implies that unemployed workers are considered non-
participants. Indeed, participation here means employment in the private and semi-public sector.
Defining mobility is apparently simpler. When an individual participates in two consecutive
periods, mobility is easily defined as not working in the same firm at those two dates. However,
when an individual participates at t but not at t + 1, mobility is censored: we do not observe
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if the individual was laid off or if he quit his firm. No information allows to distinguish these
cases.
Finally, since we do not observe job offers issued by firms, our matching equation takes
a very simple form where offers are generated randomly. Given the simplistic nature of this
equation, it is legitimate to wonder why we included it altogether. We need this equation since
our participation equation includes a current firm effect. Therefore, we need to generate firm
offers for the non-participants since we do not observe the exact job offer they received.
2.2. Specification of the General Model
Following Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006), and the structural interpreta-
tion they develop, our participation equation and our inter-firm mobility equation include state-
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. But, as mentioned above, a firm-specific unobserved
heterogeneity component is added to the person-specific term. The wage equation follows
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) by including a person and a firm-specific effect.
Inter-firm mobility at date t depends on the realized mobility at date t − 1, and similarly
for participation that depends on past participation and mobility. Hence, we include initial
conditions, modeled following Heckman (1981).
This yields the following system of equations:
Initial Conditions
zi1 ∼ U1,...,J (2.1)
yi1 = I
(
XYi1δ
Y
0 + α
Y,E
zi1
+ vi1 > 0
) (2.2)
wi1 = yi1
(
XWi1 δ
W + θW,Ezi1 + θ
W,I
i + ǫi1
)
(2.3)
mi1 = yi1I
(
XMi1 δ
M
0 + α
M,E
zi1
+ ui1 > 0
) (2.4)
Main Equations
∀t > 1, zit = yit−1 ((1−mit−1)zit−1 +mit−1η˜it) + (1− yit−1)η (2.5)
η ∼ U1,...,J η˜it ∼ U(1,...,J)−(zit−1) (2.6)
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∀t > 1, yit = I
γMmit−1 + γY yit−1 +XYit δY + θY,Ezit + θY,Ii + vit︸ ︷︷ ︸
y∗it
> 0
(2.7)
∀t > 1, wit = yit
(
XWit δ
W + θW,Ezit + θ
W,I
i + ǫit
)
(2.8)
∀t > 1, mit = yit.I
γmit−1 +XMit δM + θM,Ezit + θM,Ii + uit︸ ︷︷ ︸
m∗it
> 0
 (2.9)
The variable zit denotes the latent identifier of the firm and J(i, t) denotes the realized iden-
tifier of the firm at which worker i is employed at date t. Therefore, J(i, t) = zit if individual i
participates at date t.
yit and mit denote, respectively, participation and mobility, as previously defined. yit is an
indicator function, which is equal to 1 if the individual i participates at date t and 0 otherwise.
Because m∗it measures worker’s i propensity to move between t and t + 1, the quantity mit is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is mobile between time t and time t + 1 and it
is equal to 0 otherwise. The observed mobility mit is equal to 0 when the individual does not
participate at time t or at time t + 1. When the worker changes firm from time t to time t + 1,
the mobility is set to 1.
The variable wit denotes the logarithm of the hourly total labor costs. The variables X are
the observable time-varying as well as the time-invariant characteristics for individuals at the
different dates.
θI and θE denote the random effects specific to, respectively, individuals and firms in each
equation. u, v and ǫ are the error terms. There are J firms and N individuals in the panel of
length T . Notice that our panel is unbalanced. All stochastic assumptions are described now.
2.3. Stochastic Assumptions
In order to specify our stochastic assumptions for the person and firm-effects, let us first rewrite
our system of equations as:
∀t > 1, zit = yit−1 ((1−mit−1)zit−1 +mit−1η˜it) + (1− yit−1)η
89
∀t > 1, yit = I
γMmit−1 + γY yit−1 +XYit δY +ΩEzitθY,E +ΩIitθY,I + vit > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
y∗it

∀t > 1, wit = yit
(
XWit δ
W +ΩEzitθ
W,E +ΩIitθ
W,I + ǫit
)
∀t > 1, mit = yit.I
γmit−1 +XMit δM +ΩEzitθM,E +ΩIitθM,I + uit︸ ︷︷ ︸
m∗it
> 0

ΩEit is a design matrix (firm effects) for the couple (i, t). Hence, it is a 1×J matrix composed
of J − 1 zeros and of a 1 at column zi,t. Similarly, ΩIit is a 1 × N matrix composed of N − 1
zeros and of a 1 at column i.
Our model includes two dimensions of heterogeneity. This double dimension crucially af-
fects the statistical structure of the likelihood function. The presence of these firm effects makes
the likelihood non-separable (person by person). Indeed, two individuals employed at the same
firm, not necessarily at the same date, are not independent any more.
The next equations present our stochastic assumptions for the person and firm effects:
θE =
(
αY,E, αM,E, θY,E, θW,E, θM,E
)
of dimension [5J, 1]
θI =
(
θY,I , θW,I , θM,I
)
of dimension [3N, 1]
Moreover,
θE|ΣE ∼ N (0, DE0 ) (2.10)
θI |ΣI ∼ N (0, DI0) (2.11)
DE0 = Σ
E ⊗ IJ (2.12)
DI0 = Σ
I ⊗ IN (2.13)
ΣE (resp. ΣI) is a symmetric positive definite matrix [5, 5] (resp. [3, 3]) with mean zero.
Notice that these assumptions imply that correlations between the wage, the mobility, and the
participation equations come from both person and firm heterogeneity (in addition to that com-
ing from the idiosyncratic error terms). Furthermore, our assumptions exclude explicit correla-
tion between different firms (for instance, we could have considered a non-zero correlation of
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the firm effects within an industry, a non-tractable assumption). Notice though that we could
have included in the wage equation, for instance, the lagged firm effects of those firms at which
a worker was employed in her career. This is difficult, but feasible in our framework.
Finally, we assume that the idiosyncratic error terms follow:

vit
ǫit
uit
 ∼iid N


0
0
0
 ,

1 ρywσ ρym
ρywσ σ
2 ρwmσ
ρym σρwm 1

 (2.14)
3. Estimation
Several difficulties have to be overcome to estimate our model. As explained above, firm effects
make the likelihood highly non-separable : two individuals working in the same firm at different
dates are correlated, so are two couples (i, t1) and (i, t2) such that J(i, t1) = J(i, t2). Given the
size of our problem, maximum likelihood, simulated or not, is not feasible in this case.
However, notice that, conditional on firm effects, the likelihood becomes separable, individ-
ual by individual. Hence, the Gibbs Sampler is a natural way to estimate our model. Indeed,
given a sample and unknown parameters, this technique is based on the evaluation of the con-
ditional densities. And, conditional on all unknown parameters (including the random effects),
the full conditional likelihood is easily written, with all integrals disappearing.
3.1. Principles of the Gibbs Sampler
Given a parameter set and data, the Gibbs sampler relies on the recursive and repeated computa-
tion of the conditional distribution of each parameter, conditional on all others and conditional
on the data. We thus need to specify a prior density for each parameter. Then, the conditional
distribution satisfies:
l(p|P(p), data) ∝ l(data|P)π(p)
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where p is a given parameter, P(p) denotes all other parameters, and π(p) is the prior density of
p.
In addition to increased separability, the Gibbs Sampler allows an easy treatment of latent
variables through the so-called data augmentation procedure. Therefore, completion of the
censored observations becomes possible. In particular, in our model, we do not observe job
offers for the non-participants. Similarly, we do not observe latent variables m∗it, y∗it. Censored
or unobserved data are simply "augmented".
Finally, the Gibbs Sampler procedure does not involve optimization algorithms. Simula-
tion of conditional densities is the only computation required. Notice however that when the
densities have no conjugate, we use the standard Hasting-Metropolis algorithm.
3.2. Application
In order to use Bayes’ rule, we first write the full conditional likelihood. Once the parameter set
has been properly defined, we are left with variables that must be "augmented".
The parameter set is the following:
(
δY0 , δ
M
0 ; δ
Y , γM , γY ; δM , γ; δW ; σ2, ρyw, ρym, ρwm;Σ
E;ΣI
) (3.15)
and P denotes:
P = (δY0 , δM0 ; δY , γM , γY ; δM , γ; δW ; σ2, ρyw, ρym, ρwm;ΣE;ΣI ; θE; θI) (3.16)
When completing the data, special care is needed for mobility, a censored variable. Four
cases must be distinguished depending of the values of (yit−1, yit). Completion must be different
conditional on these values. For a given individual i and conditional on both parameters and
random effects, we have:
Xt = ytyt−1X
11
t + yt−1(1− yt)X10t + yt(1− yt−1)X01t + (1− yt)(1− yt−1)X00t
X11t =
(
y∗t , yt, wt, m
∗
t−1, mt−1, zt
)
X10t =
(
y∗t , yt, m
∗
t−1, zt
)
X01t = (y
∗
t , yt, zt, wt)
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X00t = (y
∗
t , yt, zt)
X1 = y1X
1
1 + (1− y1)X01
X11 = (y
∗
1, y1, w1, z1)
X01 = (y
∗
1, y1, z1)
Notice also that we do not need to complete the mobility equation at date T 1. For a given
individual i,
L(X iT |P) =
(
T∏
t=2
l(Xit|P,Fi,t−1)
)
l(Xi1)
X iT = (Xi1, ..., XiT )
Fi,t−1 =
(
X it−1
)
with:
l(Xit|P,Fi,t−1) = (l(X11it |P,Fi,t−1))yit−1yit(l(X10it |P,Fi,t−1))yit−1(1−yit)
(l(X01it |P,Fi,t−1))(1−yit−1)yit(l(Xit|P,Fi,t−1))
(1−yit−1)(1−yit)
Thus, the full conditional likelihood writes as:
L(XT |P) =
(
1
V w
)PNi=1PTt=1 yit
2
(
1
V m
)PNi=1PT−1t=1 yit
2
N∏
i=1
lP1(zi1)(Iy∗i1>0)
yi1(Iy∗i1≤0)
1−yi1 exp
(
−1
2
(y∗i1 −my∗i1)2
)
exp
(
− yi1
2V w
(wi1 −Mwi1)2
)
T∏
t=2
(
δ1−mit−1zit−1 l
mit−1
ηit
(zit)
)yit−1
lη(zit)
1−yit−1(Iy∗it≤0)
1−yit(Iy∗it>0)
yit exp
(
−1
2
(y∗it −my∗it)2
)
exp
(
− yit
2V w
(w∗it −Mwit )2
)(
(Im∗it−1≤0)
1−mit−1(Im∗it−1>0)
mit−1
)yit−1yit
exp
(
−yit−1
2V m
(m∗it−1 −Mmit−1)2
)
1Even though our notations do not make this explicit, all our computations allow for an individual-specific entry
and exit in the panel.
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with:
V w = σ2(1− ρ2yw)
V m =
1− ρ2yw − ρ2ym − ρ2wm + 2ρywρymρwm
1− ρ2yw
Mmit = mm∗it +
ρy,m − ρw,mρy,w
1− ρ2y,w︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(y∗it −my∗it) +
ρw,m − ρy,mρy,w
σ(1− ρ2y,w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
(wit −mwit)
Mwit = mwit + σρy,w(y
∗
it −my∗it)
and the following spherical coordinates:
θ =

θyw
θym
θwm
 (3.17)

ρyw
ρym
ρwm
 =

cos(θyw)
cos(θym)
cos(θyw) cos(θym)− sin(θyw) sin(θym) cos(θwm)
 (3.18)
Finally, we define the various prior distributions as follows:
δY0 ∼ N (mδY0 , vδY0 ) δ
M
0 ∼ N (mδM0 , vδM0 )
δY ∼ N (mδY , vδY ) γY ∼ N (mγY , vγY )
γM ∼ N (mγM , vγM ) δW ∼ N (mδW , vδW )
δM ∼ N (mδM , vδM ) γ ∼ N (mγ , vγ)
σ2 ∼ IG(v
2
,
d
2
) θ ∼iid U [0, π]
ΣE ∼ IW(ρE, RE) ΣI ∼ IW(ρI , RI)
Based on these priors and the full conditional likelihood, all posterior densities can be eval-
uated (details can be found in Appendix A). The Gibbs Sampler can be applied using data
94
sources that we describe in some detail now.
4. Data
The data on workers come from two data sources, the Déclarations Annuelles de Données So-
ciales (DADS) and the Echantillon Démographique Permanent (EDP) that are matched. Our
first source, the DADS (Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales), is an administrative file
based on mandatory reports of employees’ earnings by French employers to the Fiscal adminis-
tration. Hence, it matches information on workers and on their employing firm. This dataset is
longitudinal and covers the period 1976-1995 for all workers employed in the private and semi-
public sector and born in October of an even year. Finally, for all workers born in the first four
days of October of an even year, information from the EDP (Échantillon Démographique Per-
manent) is also available. The EDP comprises various Censuses and demographic information.
These sources are presented in more detail in the following paragraphs.
The DADS data set: Our main data source is the DADS, a large collection of matched
employer-employee information collected by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques) and maintained in the Division des revenus. The data are based upon
mandatory employer reports of the gross earnings of each employee subject to French payroll
taxes. These taxes apply to all “declared” employees and to all self-employed persons, essen-
tially all employed persons in the economy.
The Division des revenus prepares an extract of the DADS for scientific analysis, covering
all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered
years, with civil servants excluded.2 Our extract runs from 1976 through 1995, with 1981,
1983, and 1990 excluded because the underlying administrative data were not sampled in those
years. Starting in 1976, the division revenus kept information on the employing firm using
the newly created SIREN number from the SIRENE system. However, before this date, there
was no available identifier of the employing firm. Each observation of the initial dataset corre-
sponds to a unique individual-year-establishment combination. The observation in this initial
DADS file includes an identifier that corresponds to the employee (called ID below) and an
identifier that corresponds to the establishment (SIRET) and an identifier that corresponds to
2Meron (1988) shows that individuals employed in the civil service move almost exclusively to other positions
within the civil service. Thus the exclusion of civil servants should not affect our estimation of a worker’s market
wage equation.
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the parent enterprise of the establishment (SIREN). For each observation, we have information
on the number of days during the calendar year the individual worked in the establishment and
the full-time/part-time status of the employee. For each observation, in addition to the variables
mentioned above, we have information on the individual’s sex, date and place of birth, occupa-
tion, total net nominal earnings during the year and annualized net nominal earnings during the
year for the individual, as well as the location and industry of the employing establishment. The
resulting data set has 13,770,082 observations.
The Echantillon Démographique Permanent: The division of Etudes Démographiques
at INSEE maintains a large longitudinal dataset containing information on many sociodemo-
graphic variables of all French individual. All individuals born in the first four days of the
month of October of an even year are included in this sample. All questionaires for these in-
dividuals from the 1968, 1975, 1982, and 1990 Censuses are gathered into the EDP. Since the
exhaustive long-forms of the various Censuses were entered under electronic form only for a
fraction of the population leaving in France (1/4 or 1/5 depending on the date), the division des
Etudes Démographiques had to find all the Censuses questionaires for these individuals. The
INSEE regional agencies were in charge of this task. But, not all information from these forms
were entered. The most important sociodemographic variables are however available.3
For every individual, education measured as the highest diploma and the age at the end of
school are collected. Since the categories differ in the three Censuses, we first created eight
education groups (identical to those used in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)) that can
be aggregated in three education groups, labeled low-, medium-, and high-education. The fol-
lowing other variables are collected: nationality (including possible naturalization to French
citizenship), country of birth, year of arrival in France, marital status, number of kids, em-
ployment status (wage-earner in the private sector, civil servant, self-employed, unemployed,
inactive, apprentice), spouse’s employment status, information on the equipment of the house
or apartment, type of city, location of the residence (region and department). At some of the
Censuses, data on the parents education or social status are collected.
In addition to the Census information, all French town-halls in charge of Civil Status reg-
isters and ceremonies transmit information to INSEE for the same individuals. Indeed, any
birth, death, wedding, and divorce involving an individual of the EDP is recorded. For each of
3Notice that no earnings or income variables have ever been asked in the French Censuses.
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the above events, additional information on the date as well as the occupation of the persons
concerned by the events are collected.
Finally, both Censuses and Civil Status information contain the person identifier (ID) of the
individual.
Creation of the Matched Data File: Based on the person identifier, identical in the two
datasets (EDP and DADS), it is possible to create a file containing approximately one tenth of
the original 1/25th of the population born in October of an even year, i.e. those born in the first
four days of the month. Notice that we do not have wages of the civil-servants (even though
Census information allows us to know if someone has been or has become one), or the income
of self-employed individuals. Then, this individual-level information contains the employing
firm identifier, the so-called SIREN number, that allows us to follow workers from firm to firm
as well as knowing employees’ co-workers at any date. This final data set has approximately
1.5 million observations.
5. Results
5.1. Women with a Vocational-Technical Degree (Basic, CAP - BEP)
The results are presented in tables 1 to 7. The table 1 contains the results for the participation
equation. Table 2 provide results for the mobility equation. Table 3 provides the results for
the wage equation. Tables 4 and 5 contain the results for the initial participation and mobility
equations respectively. Table 6 is dedicated to the presentations of the estimation results for
variance-covariance matrices elements. In addition figure 1 depicts the marginal posterior dis-
tribution for the return to experience and job seniority and the marginal posterior distributions
of experience, seniority, experience squared and seniority squared in the mobility and in the
participation equations for this group.
From tables 1, 2 and 3, time effect is not statistically significant for participation and mobil-
ity decisions but this is a relevant variable for the wage equation (for individuals born between
1940 and 1969). The cohort effect dummy variables have negative effect on participation. When
we control for other individual characteristics and firm unobserved heterogeneity, wages are
higher for the youngest cohorts (individuals born between 1950 and 1970). Moreover, partici-
pation is decreasing with age (for individuals born before 1970).
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Lagged value of experience has a significant and positive impact on participation and wages
but, for this group, the effect of experience is not significant for the mobility decision. Lagged
value of job tenure, as expected, has a positive effect on wage but is not relevant for mobility.
This result is rather surprising because it is often noted that mobility decreases with job tenure. It
is an important result. This indicates that the accumulation of job-specific human capital has no
significant impact on the decisions to move between firms. This result shows that the mobility
decisions are mainly governed by the impact of the observed and unobserved components of the
individual contribution to the productivity in the line of matching theories (Jovanovic (1979b)
and Miller (1984)). In other words, unobserved productivity components induce a spurious
duration dependence.
The results indicate that the presence of young children have an impact on the participation
decision but has no significant impact on mobility decisions and wage. This result for the
participation decision may reflect in part women preferences and may be the consequence of
the costs associated to daycare of young children. As expected the marriage has no significant
effect on the distribution of wages. The marriage is not a relevant variable for the participation
decision for this group of individuals. However, marriage has a positive effect on the mobility
decision. Couples of workers may encounter difficulties to find jobs located in the same place.
This explain why they are more mobiles.
Being French has a positive and significant effect on the participation probability, but there
is no impact of the nationality on the mobility decision and the conditional distribution of wage.
The individuals who live in the region around Paris and in Paris, have a greater probability
to participate and more important wages. This can be explained by the importance of the wage
offer arrival rate in this region of France. Consequently, workers should have greater reservation
wages in the corresponding region. In addition, the effect of part time work on the mobility
decision is negative and significant. This result indicates that women who choose part time
work have a weaker search intensity. The impact of the unemployment rate is positive on the
participation decision. This indicates that the individuals who are participating in a period of
high unemployment rate are more likely to stay employee rather than, for instance, try to become
self-employed. This is compatible with the existence of weaker exit rate from unemployment.
The lagged mobility has a positive and significant impact on the participation decision and
on mobility. Moreover, the lagged value of participation has a positive effect on participation.
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We can then conclude that participation and mobility decisions are characterized by signifi-
cant state dependence. This result allows us to extend to mobility the conclusions obtained by
Hyslop (1999) for the participation decisions of married women. Moreover, the women with a
vocational-technical school who moved the past year have a greater probability to leave the jobs
they currently occupy.
Table 4 provides the results for the wage equation. Given the observed and unobserved
characteristics of the workers, given the unobserved component specific to the firm, the impact
of experience is relatively important on the distribution of wage. This result is similar with
the findings of Altonji and Williams (1992) and Altonji and Williams (1997) but not consistent
with the results of Topel (1991) and Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2006). We
can show using the estimation results that 10 years of experience for a women with a vocational-
technical school (CAP, BEP) increases her earnings by 40.78%4. On the other side, 10 years of
job tenure for a women belonging to the same group, increases her wages by 16.30%5. These
results are slightly different from the ones obtained by Bushinsky et al. for the United States
who report, for instance for high school dropout, that 10 years of job seniority increases wages
by 59.5%. Altonji and Williams (1997) find a 10 years return to seniority approximately equal
to 11% whereas Topel (1991) finds a 10 years return to job seniority approximately equal to
24.45%. Consequently, our results are in line of those of Altonji and Williams (1997).
Figure 1 shows that the return to experience are more important than the return to job se-
niority for a similar level of experience and seniority.
Table 6 reports the posterior mean of the elements of variance covariance matrices in our
model. The correlation between the residual term relative to wage and mobility is positive
and significantly different from zero. Consequently, high wage workers are more likely to
be highly mobile. The correlation between participation and wage is positive and significant.
The correlation between mobility and participation is not significant. However, the correlation
between the corresponding individual effects is negative. Consequently, the individuals who are
more likely to participate are also the ones who are less likely to be mobile.
4More precisely, we have (exp(0.4020-0.0600)-1)*100 = (exp(0.342)-1)*100 = 40.78%.
5In this case, we obtain for job seniority that (exp(0.1810-0.0300)-1)*100 = (exp(0.151)-1)*100 = 16.30%.
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5.2. Men with a Vocational Technical degree
Table 12 provides the results for the wage equation. Once again, given the observed and unob-
served characteristics of the workers and firms, the impact of experience is relatively important
on the distribution of wage. Using the posterior moment estimation we find that 10 years of ex-
perience for a men with a vocational technical (CAP, BEP) increases his earnings by 32.45%6.
On the other side, 10 years of job tenure for a women belonging to the same group, increases
her wages by 7.79%7. Our results, for this group of men, are in line of those of Altonji and
Williams (1997).
5.3. Women with Technical College and Undergraduate University (BTS,
DEUG)
The results for the group of women are presented in tables 15 to 21. The table 15 contains
the results for the participation equation. Table 16 provides results for the mobility equation.
Table 17 includes the corresponding results for the wage equation. Tables 18 and 19 contain
the results for the initial participation and mobility equations respectively. Table 20 is dedicated
to the presentations of the estimation results for variance-covariance matrices elements. Figure
2 depicts the marginal posterior distribution for the return to experience and job seniority and
the marginal posterior distributions of experience, seniority, experience squared and seniority
squared in the mobility equation for this group.
Time effect is generally not statistically significant for participation decisions and mobility
equations. The parameters associated to some time effects are significantly different from zero
and positive. The cohort effect dummy variables have negative effect on participation. Partici-
pation is more important for the most recent cohorts (for individuals born before 1970). Cohort
effect is generally non significant on the mobility decision but has a positive and significant
impact on wage for the youngest cohorts (individuals born form 1940 to 1969).
Lagged value of experience has positive impact on participation and wages. Lagged value of
experience is not significant for the mobility decision. Lagged value of job tenure, as expected,
has a positive effect on wages. Moreover, the lagged value of job seniority is not relevant for the
mobility decision. This results is similar to the one obtained for other age groups (see section
6More precisely, we have (exp(0.341-0.06)-1)*100 = (exp(0.281)-1)*100 = 32.45%.
7In this case, we obtain for job seniority that (exp(0.075-0)-1)*100 = (exp(0.075)-1)*100 = 7.79%.
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relative to woman with a vocational-technical school).
The presence of a young children (0 to 2 years old) has, as expected, a negative impact on
the participation decision but has no significant impact on mobility decision and wages. The
presence of older children has, however, no effect on participation decision. Marriage has a
positive effect on participation, mobility and wage. This result for the wage equation is rather
surprising. This can be explained by the following argument: the individuals who are married
are likely to have a higher non labor income, higher reservation wage and higher accepted wage.
This effect is particularly important for the corresponding group of women.
Being French has no significant effect on the three equations. The individuals who live in
the region around Paris and in Paris, have a greater probability to participate and more important
wages. This result can be interpreted relatively to job offer opportunities (see section relative
to woman with a vocational-technical school). The effect of part time work on the mobility
decision is negative and significant. This result indicates, once again, that women who choose
part time work have a weaker search intensity.
The lagged mobility has a positive and significant impact on the participation decision and
on mobility. The lagged value of participation has a positive effect on participation attesting
the presence of a state dependence associated to the corresponding equation. Moreover, lagged
mobility has not significant effect on the mobility decision.
Table 17 provides the results for the wage equation. Once again, given the observed and
unobserved characteristics of the workers and firms, the impact of experience is relatively im-
portant on the distribution of wage. Using the posterior moment estimation we find that 10 years
of experience for a women with a Technical college or Undergraduate University (BTS, DEUG)
increases her earnings by 59.84%8. On the other side, 10 years of job tenure for a women
belonging to the same group, increases her wages by 23.86%9. Our results, for this group of
women, are in line of those of Altonji and Williams (1997).
Figure 2 shows that the return to experience is more important than the return to job seniority
for a similar level of experience and seniority.
Table 20 reports the posterior mean of the elements of variance covariance matrices in our
model. The correlation between the residual term relative to wage and mobility is positive and
significantly different from zero. So, high wage workers are highly mobiles. The correlation
8More precisely, we have (exp(0.529-0.06)-1)*100 = (exp(0.469)-1)*100 = 59.84%.
9In this case, we obtain for job seniority that (exp(0.244-0.03)-1)*100 = (exp(0.214)-1)*100 = 23.86%.
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between participation and wage is positive and significant. The correlation between mobility
and participation is negative but not significant. The correlation between the individual effects
relative to participation and wage is positive. The correlation between the individual effects
relative to participation and mobility is negative but not statistically significant.
5.4. Men with a Technical College or a Undergraduate University degree
(BTS, DEUG)
Table 24 provides the results for the wage equation. Once again, given the observed and unob-
served characteristics of the workers and firms, the impact of experience is relatively important
on the distribution of wage. Using the posterior moment estimation we find that 10 years of ex-
perience for a men with a vocational technical (CAP, BEP) increases her earnings by 44.77%10.
On the other side, 10 years of job tenure for a women belonging to the same group, increases
her wages by 11.52%11. Our results, for this group of men, are in line of those of Altonji and
Williams (1997).
6. Conclusion
In this paper we model jointly participation, wages and the mobility decision in order to compare
returns of wage to seniority and to experience. The model incorporates both worker and firm
heterogeneity components. These unobserved firm-specific and worker-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity terms are treated as random effects and they are correlated across the equations of
the model. The initial conditions are modeled. Correlations are permitted between residuals
terms across the equations. There is no analytic expression for the likelihood function of the
model under our assumptions because each individual can move between firms and a given
firm can hire several workers. Consequently, we have chosen to use a Monte Carlo Markov
Chain technique (MCMC) in order to estimate the model. We use data augmentation in or-
der to obtain a conditional expression of the likelihood function with respect to the generated
values of the firm-specific and worker-specific heterogeneity components at each step of the
algorithm. Posterior estimates of the parameters are obtained using a Gibbs Sampling algo-
rithm with Hastings-Metropolis steps (see, for instance, Robert and Casella (1999)). The Gibbs
10More precisely, we have (exp(0.430-0.06)-1)*100 = (exp(0.370)-1)*100 = 44.77%.
11In this case, we obtain for job seniority that (exp(0.129-0.02)-1)*100 = (exp(0.1090)-1)*100 = 11.52%.
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Sampler, as we applied it, is a very practical estimation method. Our data sources match very
complete longitudinal informations on workers and their employing firms in France. Our re-
sults are similar to Altonji and Williams’s conclusions. Indeed, in France, for the period 1976 to
1995, returns to experience are greater than returns to seniority. For instance, for men, with an
undergraduate university degree, returns of wage to 10 years of experience are estimated equal
to 52.81% whereas returns of wage to 10 years of seniority are estimated equal to 11.52%. It is
important to underline that our model is very complete and takes into account the presence of
individual and firm specific unobserved heterogeneity terms. Further research could consist to
consider other expression for the distribution of the workers across the firms. Moreover, adding
other effects should be straightforward. For instance, match effects (Jovanovic (1979b) and
Flinn (1986)), autoregressive effects (Lillard and Willis (1978)), or even more complex effects
such as firm-specific (random) returns to seniority.
103
A. Appendix A
A.1. Mobility equation
• Parameter γ
This parameter enters mmit∗ for t = 2, ..., T − 1
mmit∗ = γmit−1 +X
M
it δ
M +ΩEzitθ
M,E +ΩIi θ
M,I
If we put apart this term in the full conditional likelihood, we get:
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=2
exp
(
− yit
2V m
(m∗it −Mmit )2
)
= exp
(
− 1
2V m
N∑
i=1
(m˜∗i
2,T−1 − M˜mi
2,T−1
)′(m˜∗i
2,T−1 − M˜mi
2,T−1
)
)
= exp
(
− 1
2V m
N∑
i=1
(A˜i
2,T−1 − γL˜mi
2,T−1
)′(A˜i
2,T−1 − γL˜mi
2,T−1
)
)
with:
• Mmit = mm∗it +
ρy,m − ρw,mρy,w
1− ρ2y,w︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(y∗it −my∗it) +
ρw,m − ρy,mρy,w
σ(1− ρ2y,w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
(wit −mwit)
• m˜∗i
2,T−1
=

yi2m
∗
i2
...
yiT−1m
∗
iT−1

• M˜mi
2,T−1
=

yi2M
m
i2
...
yiT−1M
m
iT−1

• Ait = m∗it −Mmit + γmit−1
= m∗it −XMit δM −ΩEzitθE,M −ΩIi θI,M − a(y∗it −my∗it)− b(wit −mwit)
By gathering squared and crossed terms, we get:
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V post,−1γ = V
prior,−1
γ +
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
L˜mi
2,T−1
V post,−1γ M
post
γ = V
prior,−1
γ M
prior
γ +
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
A˜i
2,T−1
• Parameter δM
We proceed the same way as before and we get with analogous notations:
V
post,−1
δM
= V prior,−1
δM
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi
2,T−1
)′
X˜Mi
2,T−1
V
post,−1
δM
M
post
δM
= V prior,−1
δM
M
prior
δM
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi
2,T−1
)′
A˜i
2,T−1
with Ait = m∗it −Mmit + δMXMit = m∗it − γmit−1 − ΩEzitθE,M − ΩIi θI,M − a(y∗it − my∗it) −
b(wit −mwit)
A.2. Wage equation
• Parameter δW
We have to take into account that δW enters both mwit for t = 1...T and Mmit for t = 1...T − 1.
Thus if we put apart these terms in the full conditional likelihood, we get:
N∏
i=1
exp
(
− 1
2V w
T∑
t=1
yit(wit −Mwit )2
)
exp
(
− 1
2V m
T−1∑
t=1
yit(m
∗
it −Mmit )2
)
=
N∏
i=1
exp
(
− 1
2V w
T∑
t=1
yit(Ait −XWit δW )2
)
exp
(
− 1
2V m
T−1∑
t=1
yit(Bit + bX
W
it δ
W )2
)
with:
• wit −Mwit = Ait −XWit δW
• m∗it −Mmit = Bit + bXWit δW
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which is equivalent to:
• Ait = wit −ΩEzitθE,W −ΩIi θI,W − ρy,wσ(y∗it −my∗it))
• Bit = m∗it −mm∗it − a(y∗it −my∗it)− b(wit −ΩEzitθE,W −ΩIi θI,W )
If we use analogous notations as before, we get:
V
post,−1
δW
= V prior,−1
δW
+
1
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T
)′
X˜Wi
1,T
+
b2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T−1
)′
X˜Wi
1,T−1
V
post,−1
δW
M
post
δW
= V prior,−1
δW
M
prior
δW
+
1
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T
)′
A˜i
1,T − b
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Wi
1,T−1
)′
B˜i
1,T−1
A.3. Participation equation
• Parameter γY
We have to take into account that γY enters both my∗it for t = 2...T , M
w
it for t = 2...T and Mmit
for t = 2...T − 1
Thus if we put apart these terms in the full conditional likelihood, we get:
exp
(
−1
2
T∑
t=2
(y∗it −my∗it)2 −
1
2V w
T∑
t=2
yit(wit −Mwit )2 −
1
2V m
T−1∑
t=2
yit(m
∗
it −Mmit )2
)
= exp
(
−1
2
T∑
t=2
(Ait − γY Lyit)2 − 1
2V w
T∑
t=2
yit(Bit + ρy,wσγ
Y Lyit)
2 − 1
2V m
T−1∑
t=2
yit(Cit + aγ
Y Lyit)
2
)
with:
• y∗it −my∗it = Ait − γY Lyit
• wit −Mwit = Bit + ρy,wσγY Lyit
• m∗it −Mmit = Cit + aγY Lyit
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which is equivalent to:
• Ait = y∗it − γMLmit −XYit δY −ΩEzitθE,Y −ΩIi θI,Y
• Bit = wit −mwit − ρy,wσAit
• Cit = m∗it −mm∗it − b(wit −mwit)− aAit
If we use analogous notations as before, we get:
V
post,−1
γY
= V prior,−1
γY
+
N∑
i=1
(
Ly2,T
i
)′
Ly2,T
i
+
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T
)′
L˜y
i
2,T
+
a2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T−1
)′
L˜y
i
2,T−1
V
post,−1
γY
M
post
γY
= V prior,−1
γY
M
prior
γY
+
N∑
i=1
(
Ly2,T
i
)′
A
2,T
i −
ρy,wσ
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T
)′
B˜i
2,T − a
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜y
i
2,T−1
)′
C˜i
2,T−1
• Parameter γM
We proceed the same way and we get:
V
post,−1
γM
= V prior,−1
γM
+
N∑
i=1
(
Lm
2,T
i
)′
Lm
2,T
i +
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T
)′
L˜mi
2,T
+
a2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
L˜mi
2,T−1
V
post,−1
γM
M
post
γM
= V prior,−1
γM
M
prior
γM
+
N∑
i=1
(
Lm
2,T
i
)′
A
2,T
i −
ρy,wσ
V w
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T
)′
B˜i
2,T − a
V m
N∑
i=1
(
L˜mi
2,T−1
)′
C˜i
2,T−1
with:
• Ait = y∗it − γY Lyit −XYit δY −ΩEzitθE,Y −ΩIi θI,Y
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• Bit = wit −mwit − ρy,wσ (Ait)
• Cit = m∗it −mm∗it − b(wit −mwit)− a (Ait)
• Parameter δY
We proceed the same way and we get:
V
post,−1
δY
= V prior,−1
δY
+
N∑
i=1
(
XYi
2,T
)′
XYi
2,T
+
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T
)′
X˜Yi
2,T
+
a2
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T−1
)′
X˜Yi
2,T−1
V
post,−1
δY
M
post
δY
= V prior,−1
δY
M
prior
δY
+
N∑
i=1
(
XYi
2,T
)′
A
2,T
i −
ρy,wσ
V w
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T
)′
B˜i
2,T − a
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Yi
2,T−1
)′
C˜i
2,T−1
with:
• Ait = y∗it − γY Lyit − γMLmit −ΩEzitθE,Y −ΩIi θI,Y
• Bit = wit −mwit − ρy,wσ (Ait)
• Cit = m∗it −mm∗it − b(wit −mwit)− a (Ait)
A.4. Initial equations
• Parameter δM0
δM0 only enters m∗i1. We thus get:
V
post,−1
δM0
= V prior,−1
δM0
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi1
)′
X˜Mi1
V
post,−1
δM0
M
post
δM0
= V prior,−1
δM0
M
prior
δM0
+
1
V m
N∑
i=1
(
X˜Mi1
)′
A˜i1
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with:
• Ai1 = m∗i1 −ΩEzi1αE,M − a(y∗i1 −my∗i1)− b(wi1 −mwi1)
• Parameter δY0
We proceed the same way and we get:
V
post,−1
δY0
= V prior,−1
δY0
+
N∑
i=1
XYi1
′
XYi1 +
(
ρ2y,wσ
2
V w
+
a2
V m
)
N∑
i=1
X˜Yi1
′
X˜Yi1
V
post,−1
δY0
M
post
δY0
= V prior,−1
δY0
M
prior
δY0
+
N∑
i=1
XYi1
′
Ai −
N∑
i=1
X˜Yi1
′ (ρy,wσ
V w
B˜i +
a
V m
C˜i
)
with:
• Ai = y∗i1 −ΩEzitαE,Y
• Bi = wi1 −mwi1 − ρy,wσAi
• Ci = m∗i1 −mm∗i1 − b(wi1 −mwi1)− aAi
A.5. Latent variables
A.5.1. Latent participation
We seek for terms where y∗it is.
1. For t = 1...T − 1
(a) If yit = 1
y∗it ∼ NT R+(MApost, V Apost)
V Apost,−1MApost = (
σρv,ǫ
V w
− ab
V m
)(wit −mwit) +
a
V m
(m∗it −mm∗it) + (
σ2ρ2v,ǫ
V w
+
a2
V m
+ 1)my∗it
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V Apost =
1
1 + a
2
Vm
+
σ2ρ2v,ǫ
V w
(b) If yit = 0
y∗it ∼ NT R−(my∗it , 1)
2. For t = T
(a) If yiT = 1
y∗iT ∼ NT R+(MApost, 1− ρ2v,ǫ)
MApost = (1− ρ2v,ǫ)
(
my∗
iT
(1 +
σ2ρ2v,ǫ
V w
) +
σρv,ǫ
V w
(wiT −mwiT )
)
(b) If yiT = 0
y∗iT ∼ NT R−(my∗iT , 1)
A.5.2. Latent mobility
Two conditions must be checked: first, t = 1...T − 1 and, yit = 1. When these conditions are fulfilled,
we distinguish between different cases:
1. If yit+1 = 0
m∗it ∼ N (Mmit , V m) and mit = I(m∗it > 0)
2. If yit+1 = 1
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(a) If mit = 1
m∗it ∼ NT R+(Mmit , V m)
(b) If mit = 0
m∗it ∼ NT R−(Mmit , V m)
A.5.3. Latent location
1. First case: yit = 1
We know where the individual works.
P(zit = j|yit = 1, ...) = δJ(i,t)(j)
2. Second case: yit = 0
• First case: yit−1 = 0
Let us note: Fit−1 = (yit−1 = 0, zit−1, ...)
P(zit = j|yit = 0, y∗it,Fit−1) =
exp
(
−12(y∗it −mjy∗it)
2
)
pj∑J
j=1 exp
(
−12(y∗it −mjy∗it)2
)
pj
• Second case: yit−1 = 1,mit−1 = 0
Let us note: Fit−1 = (yit−1 = 1, zit−1 = J(i, t− 1),mit−1 = 0, ...)
mit−1 = 0 therefore the individual a priori does not want to move.
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P(zit = j|yit = 0, y∗it,Fit−1) = δJ(i,t−1)(j)
• Third case: yit−1 = 1,mit−1 = 1
Let us note: Fit−1 = (yit−1 = 1, zit−1 = J(i, t− 1),mit−1 = 1, ...)
For j 6= J(i, t− 1),
P(zit = j|yit = 0, y∗it,Fit−1) =
exp
(
−12(y∗it −mjy∗it)
2
)
pj∑J
j=1,j 6=J(i,t−1) exp
(
−12(y∗it −mjy∗it)2
)
pj
A.6. Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals
We use Hasting Metropolis algorithm because we do not get conjugate priors.
A.7. Variance-Covariance Matrices of Effects
• For Individual Effects ΣI,−1|(...); z; y,w
ΣI only enters the parameter distribution but it does not enter the full conditional likelihood.
Moreover, in the parameter distribution, the interesting terms are:
L(θI |ΣI,−1).L(ΣI,−1)
We get:
L(θI |ΣI,−1).L(ΣI,−1)
∝ 1
(det(ΣI))
N
2
exp
(
−1
2
θI
′
(DI0)
−1θI
)
.(det(ΣI,−1))
ρI−3−1
2 exp(−1
2
tr(R−1I Σ
I,−1))
We need to simplify θI ′(DI0)−1θI .
θI
′
(DI0)
−1θI = θI
′ (
ΣI,−1 ⊗ IN
)
θI
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= tr
(
θI
′ (
ΣI,−1 ⊗ IN
)
θI
)
= tr
(
θIθI
′ (
ΣI,−1 ⊗ IN
))
Let us rewrite the matrix θIθI ′ as a 3x3 partitioned matrix. Therefore we get:
θIθI
′ (
ΣI,−1 ⊗ IN
)
=

θY,IθY,I
′
θY,IθW,I
′
θY,IθM,I
′
θW,IθY,I
′
θW,IθW,I
′
θW,IθM,I
′
θM,IαI
′
θM,IθW,I
′
θM,IθM,I
′


d1IN a1IN a2IN
a1IN d2IN a3IN
a2IN a3IN d3IN

When we use previously mentioned parameters to evaluate the trace of this matrix product, we
get12 :
tr
(
θIθI
′ (
ΣI,−1 ⊗ IN
))
= d1tr(θ
Y,I .θY,I
′
) + d2tr(θ
W,I .θW,I
′
) + d3tr(θ
M,I .θM,I
′
)
+ 2a1tr(θ
Y,I .θW,I
′
) + 2a2tr(θ
Y,I .θM,I
′
) + 2a3tr(θ
M,I .θW,I
′
) (A.19)
What can be written:
tr


tr(θY,IθY,I
′
) tr(θY,IθW,I
′
) tr(θY,IθM,I
′
)
tr(θW,IθY,I
′
) tr(θW,IθW,I
′
) tr(θW,IθM,I
′
)
tr(θM,IθY,I
′
) tr(θM,IθW,I
′
) tr(θM,IθM,I
′
)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
AI
ΣI,−1

(A.20)
Finally the posterior conditional distribution of ΣI,−1 is:
W3(ρI +N, (R−1I +AI)−1) (A.21)
• For Firm Effects
12We use the relation tr(A) = tr(A′)
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We use the same method as the one previously used.
θE =

αE,Y
αE,M
θE,Y
θE,W
θE,M

∼ N
0, ΣE︸︷︷︸
∈M(5,5)
⊗IJ

We have the following prior distribution:
ΣE ∼ IW (ρE , RE)
Finally, with analogous notations, the posterior conditional distribution of ΣE,−1 is:
W5(ρE +N, (R−1E +AE)−1) (A.22)
A.8. Firm effects
There is the likelihood terms where θE is.
N∏
i=1
exp
(
−1
2
(y∗i1 −my∗i1)2
)
exp
(
− yi1
2V w
(wi1 −Mwi1)2
)
T∏
t=2
exp
(
−1
2
(y∗it −my∗it)2
)
exp
(
− yit
2V w
(wit −Mwit )2
)
exp
(
−yit−1
2V m
(m∗it−1 −Mmit−1)2
)
with
Mmit = mm∗it + a(y
∗
it −my∗it) + b(wit −mwit)
Mwit = mwit + σρv,ε(y
∗
it −my∗it)
Some notations to ease evaluations:
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1. First term
(y∗i1 −my∗i1)2 = (Ai1 −ΩEi1αE,Y )2
Ai1 = y
∗
i1 −XYi1δY0
2. Second term
yi1(wi1 −Mwi1)2 = yi1(Bi1 −ΩEi1θE,W + ρv,εσΩEi1αE,Y )2
Bi1 = wi1 −XWi1δw −ΩIi1θI,W − ρv,εσ(y∗i1 −XYi1δY0 )
B˜i1 = yi1Bi1
Ω˜Ei1 = yi1Ω
E
i1
3. Third term
(y∗it −my∗it)2 = (Cit −ΩEit θY,E)2
Cit = y
∗
it −XYitδY − γY yit−1 − γMmit−1 −ΩIitθY,I
Ĉit = Cit
Ω̂Eit = Ω
E
it
4. Fourth term
yit(wit −Mwit)2 = yit(Dit −ΩEit θW,E + ρv,εσΩEit θY,E)2
Dit = wit −XWitδw −ΩIitθI,W − ρv,εσCit
D˜it = yitDit
Ω˜Eit = yitΩ
E
it
5. Fifth term
For t > 1
yit(m
∗
it −Mm∗it)2 = yit(Fit +ΩEit (−θM,E + aθY,E + bθW,E))2
Fit = m
∗
it − γmit−1 −XMitδM −ΩIitθM,I − aCit − b(wit −XWitδw −ΩIitθI,W )
F˜it = yitFit
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For t = 1
yi1(m
∗
i1 −Mm∗i1)2 = yi1(Gi1 +ΩEi1(−αM,E + aαY,E + bθW,E))2
Gi1 = m
∗
i1 −XMi1δM0 − aAi1 − b(wi1 −XWi1δw −ΩIi1θI,W )
G˜i1 = yi1Gi1
The posterior distribution checks:
l(θE |...) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
θE
′
DE,−1θE
)
exp
(
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(Ai1 −ΩEi1αY,E)2 −
1
2V w
∑
i
(
B˜i1 − Ω˜Ei1(θW,E − ρv,εσαY,E)
)2)
exp
(
−1
2
∑
i
T∑
t=2
(Cit −ΩEit θY,E)2 −
1
2V w
∑
i
T∑
t=2
(
D˜it − Ω˜Eit (θW,E − ρv,εσθY,E)
)2)
exp
(
− 1
2V m
∑
i
(G˜i1 + Ω˜
E
i1(−αM,E + aαY,E + bθW,E))2
)
exp
(
− 1
2V m
∑
i
T−1∑
t=2
(
F˜it + Ω˜
E
it (−θM,E + aθY,E + bθW,E)
)2)
We define several projection operators: P1 = (IJ , 0J , ..., 0J︸ ︷︷ ︸
4 matrices
) and we notice:
P1θ
E = αE,Y
P2θ
E = αE,M
P3θ
E = θE,Y
P4θ
E = θE,W
P5θ
E = θE,M
Let us denote:
1. E1 =
∑n
i=1 Ω
E
i1
′
ΩEi1
2. E˜1 =
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i1
′
Ω˜Ei1
116
3. E2T =
∑n
i=1 Ω
E
i
′
ΩEi
4. E˜2T =
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i
′
Ω˜Ei
5. E˜2,T−1 =
∑n
i=1
˜
Ω
E,2,T−1
i
′
˜
Ω
E,2,T−1
i
So we get for the variance-covariance matrix:
V
−1
= D
E,−1
0
+
E1 + (
ρ2v,εσ
2
V w
+ a
2
Vm
)fE1 −
a
Vm
fE1 0 T41 0
−
a
Vm
fE1
1
Vm
fE1 0 T42 0
0 0 E2T +
ρ2v,εσ
2
V w
E˜2,T +
a2
Vm
E˜2,T−1 T43 T53
(−
ρv,εσ
V w
+ ab
Vm
)fE1 −
b
Vm
fE1 −
ρv,εσ
V w
E˜2T +
ab
Vm
E˜2T−1
fE1(
1
V w
+ b
2
Vm
) + 1
V w
E˜2T +
b2
Vm
E˜2T−1 T54
0 0 − a
Vm
E˜2T−1 −
b
Vm
E˜2T−1
1
Vm
E˜2T−1
As for the posterior mean:

∑n
i=1 Ω
E
i1
′
Ai1 − ρv,εσV w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i1
′
B˜i1 − aVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i1
′
G˜i1
1
Vm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i1
′
G˜i1∑n
i=1 Ω
E
i
′
Ci − ρv,εσV w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i
′
D˜i − aVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
iT−1
′
F˜ iT−1
1
V w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i1
′
B˜i1 +
1
V w
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i
′
D˜i − bVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
i1
′
G˜i1 − bVm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
iT−1
′
F˜ iT−1
1
Vm
∑n
i=1 Ω˜
E
iT−1
′
F˜ iT−1

B. Results
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Table 1: Participation equation for women with a vocational-technical school
Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -0.2757 0.2340 -1.2000 0.6549
Experience at t-1 0.1578 0.0107 0.1175 0.2018
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0033 0.0002 -0.0042 -0.0025
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.2475 0.0598 -0.4601 0.0108
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.1941 0.0646 -0.4410 0.0594
Married 0.0249 0.0626 -0.2037 0.2540
Located in "Île de France" 4.9798 0.3745 3.9270 6.3089
Other than French -0.2427 0.0957 -0.5786 0.0708
Unemployment Rate 2.0884 0.6729 -0.6267 4.5066
Mobility at t-1 0.4510 0.0753 0.2067 0.7073
Participation at t-1 1.3286 0.0740 1.0697 1.5702
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 -2.7878 0.1693 -3.4321 -2.1655
Born between 1930 and 1939 -2.4906 0.1470 -2.9976 -1.9757
Born between 1940 and 1949 -2.3221 0.1308 -2.8347 -1.7766
Born between 1950 and 1959 -1.6335 0.1029 -2.0634 -1.2801
Born between 1960 and 1969 -0.9520 0.0650 -1.2211 -0.6995
Time Effect
Year 1977 0.2434 0.2297 -0.6673 1.0540
Year 1978 0.1994 0.2300 -0.6896 1.0289
Year 1979 0.1687 0.2293 -0.8049 0.9822
Year 1980 0.1354 0.2301 -0.7490 0.9636
Year 1981 -0.1686 0.2290 -0.9924 0.7077
Year 1982 0.2749 0.2297 -0.6568 1.1165
Year 1983 -0.3926 0.2293 -1.2292 0.4558
Year 1984 0.2636 0.2307 -0.5745 1.1680
Year 1985 -0.0722 0.2302 -0.9748 0.8416
Year 1986 -0.0633 0.2315 -0.9315 0.7633
Year 1987 -0.2712 0.2315 -1.1559 0.6341
Year 1988 -0.0242 0.2310 -0.9440 0.7864
Year 1989 -0.0487 0.2323 -0.9839 0.8058
Year 1990 -1.2223 0.2326 -2.0833 -0.3598
Year 1991 0.3924 0.2329 -0.4850 1.3096
Year 1992 0.0471 0.2327 -0.8215 0.9383
Year 1993 -0.2070 0.2347 -1.0849 0.6890
Year 1994 -0.3214 0.2327 -1.2672 0.5511
Year 1995 -0.3175 0.2342 -1.2745 0.5814
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Table 2: Mobility equation for women with a vocational-technical school
Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 0.7082 0.2705 -0.3407 1.9438
Experience at t-1 0.0182 0.0154 -0.0406 0.0725
Experience at t-1 squared 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0014
Seniority at t-1 0.0109 0.0167 -0.0473 0.0696
Seniority at t-1 squared -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0033 0.0024
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.0903 0.0921 -0.2896 0.4017
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.0201 0.0943 -0.3750 0.3723
Married 0.1941 0.0808 -0.1050 0.4865
Located in "Île de France" -0.1684 0.0913 -0.5066 0.1483
Other than French 0.0440 0.1121 -0.3555 0.4598
Mobility at t-1 0.2231 0.0677 0.0148 0.4341
Part Time -0.3549 0.0638 -0.6168 -0.1291
Unemployment Rate 0.1756 0.8727 -3.0517 3.4377
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 0.5679 0.3973 -0.9454 2.2319
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.4620 0.2944 -0.5482 1.5944
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.4596 0.2255 -0.3503 1.2406
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.5350 0.1731 -0.0760 1.1344
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.3724 0.1280 -0.1141 0.8154
Time Effect
Year 1977 -0.5008 0.2598 -1.4716 0.5619
Year 1978 -0.2364 0.2607 -1.1926 0.8340
Year 1979 -0.3133 0.2597 -1.3824 0.7989
Year 1980 0.6003 0.2929 -0.5912 1.6512
Year 1981 0.7002 0.3027 -0.4031 1.9807
Year 1982 0.7889 0.3051 -0.2625 2.2001
Year 1983 1.0297 0.3320 -0.1481 2.4981
Year 1984 -0.2188 0.2485 -1.2795 1.0294
Year 1985 -0.2280 0.2501 -1.1702 0.7692
Year 1986 -0.3585 0.2500 -1.3799 0.6155
Year 1987 -0.2173 0.2494 -1.1983 0.7311
Year 1988 -0.3067 0.2474 -1.3196 0.6109
Year 1989 0.4059 0.2651 -0.6226 1.3677
Year 1990 0.2619 0.2669 -0.7067 1.2404
Year 1991 -0.3241 0.2452 -1.2465 0.7196
Year 1992 -0.1815 0.2483 -1.1533 0.7049
Year 1993 -0.3928 0.2493 -1.3743 0.6486
Year 1994 -0.0656 0.2554 -1.1196 0.9569
Year 1995 0.0005 0.9985 -3.8312 3.9405
119
Table 3: Wage equation for women with a vocational-technical school
Wage Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 3.2511 0.0489 3.0644 3.4364
Experience at t 0.0402 0.0045 0.0238 0.0575
Experience at t squared -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0002
Seniority at t 0.0181 0.0041 0.0016 0.0343
Seniority at t squared -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0004
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.0489 0.0289 -0.1677 0.0580
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.0081 0.0288 -0.1223 0.1082
Married 0.0153 0.0333 -0.1081 0.1478
Unmarried Couples -0.0387 0.0428 -0.2205 0.1183
Located in "Île de France" 0.2681 0.0398 0.1208 0.4361
Other than French -0.0243 0.0472 -0.2211 0.1574
Part Time -0.5375 0.0237 -0.6220 -0.4368
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 0.0206 0.0773 -0.2893 0.3295
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.0957 0.0644 -0.1401 0.3659
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.1980 0.0542 -0.0035 0.4321
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.3070 0.0505 0.1308 0.4924
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.3497 0.0477 0.1352 0.5285
Time Effect
Year 1977 0.0257 0.0411 -0.1231 0.2144
Year 1978 0.1006 0.0404 -0.0575 0.2459
Year 1979 0.0890 0.0396 -0.0954 0.2391
Year 1980 0.0795 0.0399 -0.0553 0.2360
Year 1981 0.1048 0.0433 -0.0622 0.2912
Year 1982 0.1158 0.0383 -0.0417 0.2668
Year 1983 0.1017 0.0432 -0.0779 0.2735
Year 1984 0.1253 0.0381 -0.0175 0.2696
Year 1985 0.1246 0.0378 -0.0114 0.2713
Year 1986 0.1366 0.0371 -0.0165 0.2778
Year 1987 0.0967 0.0367 -0.0368 0.2611
Year 1988 0.1364 0.0358 -0.0006 0.2760
Year 1989 0.1017 0.0358 -0.0374 0.2479
Year 1990 0.1153 0.0397 -0.0329 0.2598
Year 1991 0.1501 0.0358 0.0160 0.2852
Year 1992 0.1541 0.0359 0.0113 0.2811
Year 1993 0.1244 0.0361 -0.0057 0.2558
Year 1994 0.0523 0.0376 -0.0971 0.1916
Year 1995 0.0803 0.0375 -0.0636 0.2273
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Table 4: Initial participation equation for women with a vocational-technical school
Initial Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -1.9266 0.1295 -2.4064 -1.3908
Experience at t-1 0.1451 0.0178 0.0827 0.2190
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0028 0.0005 -0.0046 -0.0008
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.0209 0.1776 -0.7166 0.7139
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.3816 0.1891 -1.2446 0.4146
Married 0.6984 0.1490 0.1323 1.2761
Located in "Île de France" 3.1482 0.4425 1.8310 5.2085
Other than French 0.2578 0.1564 -0.3560 0.8248
Unemployment Rate -1.1164 0.9767 -5.2166 2.8333
Table 5: Initial mobility equation for women with a vocational-technical school
Initial Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 1.1737 0.3486 -0.2858 2.4884
Experience at t-1 0.0255 0.0331 -0.1035 0.1676
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0036 0.0022
Seniority at t-1 -0.0349 0.0542 -0.2990 0.2005
Seniority at t-1 squared 0.0027 0.0031 -0.0099 0.0163
Children 0 to 2 years old 1.0012 0.4452 -0.5296 2.8540
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.3369 0.3534 -0.9247 2.0497
Married 0.0192 0.2270 -1.1188 0.8122
Located in "Île de France" -0.6363 0.2159 -1.4359 0.3297
Other than French -0.4837 0.2169 -1.3648 0.3639
Unemployment Rate 0.0669 0.9901 -4.2351 3.8306
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Table 6: Variance-covariance matrix for women with a vocational-technical school
Variance-covariance Matrix Elements
for Women with a Technical Degree
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Residual Variance (Σ)
σ2 0.4080 0.0231 0.3437 0.5516
ρwm 0.0620 0.0244 -0.0309 0.1489
ρym -0.0079 0.0354 -0.1312 0.1163
ρyw 0.0636 0.0320 -0.0609 0.1671
Individual Effects (ΣI)
σ2
θY,I
0.7159 0.0647 0.5092 1.0069
ρθY,IθW,I 0.0639 0.0555 -0.1540 0.2895
ρθY,IθM,I -0.1399 0.0816 -0.4397 0.1520
σ2
θW,I
0.2107 0.0177 0.1579 0.3012
ρθW,IθM,I 0.0431 0.0630 -0.1872 0.2796
σ2
θM,I
0.4106 0.0552 0.2504 0.6518
Firm Effects (ΣE)
σ2
αY,E
0.2163 0.0174 0.1590 0.2914
ραY,EαM,E 0.0356 0.0540 -0.1611 0.2447
ραY,EθY,E 0.0030 0.0387 -0.1429 0.1458
ραY,EθW,E 0.0016 0.0383 -0.1413 0.1446
ραY,EθM,E 0.0003 0.0401 -0.1546 0.1638
σ2
αM,E
0.2205 0.0222 0.1475 0.3259
ραM,EθY,E 0.0035 0.0386 -0.1393 0.1538
ραM,EθW,E -0.0009 0.0382 -0.1546 0.1378
ραM,EθM,E -0.0086 0.0393 -0.1860 0.1612
σ2
θY,E
0.2154 0.0179 0.1529 0.2908
ρθY,EθW,E 0.0303 0.0542 -0.1656 0.2326
ρθY,EθM,E 0.0451 0.0476 -0.1489 0.2241
σ2
θW,E
0.2117 0.0183 0.1514 0.2929
ρθW,EθM,E 0.0274 0.0460 -0.1382 0.2366
σ2
θM,E
0.2184 0.0199 0.1473 0.3041
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for women with a vocational-technical school
Year
Variable 1976-1995 1976 1985 1995
Experience 13.1909 8.9961 12.5800 18.4044
(13.4160) (11.5179) (13.4461) (13.2853)
Seniority 2.7086 2.9840 2.4912 3.3044
(5.6840) (5.3040) (5.6625) (6.0035)
Log Wage 4.1304 4.1002 4.1512 4.0995
(0.8003) (0.6781) (0.7882) (0.9073)
Participation 0.4447 0.3085 0.4303 0.5831
(0.4969) (0.4619) (0.4952) (0.4931)
Mobility 0.3257 0.2442 0.3402 0.0000
(0.4686) (0.4297) (0.4738) (0.0000)
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.0916 0.0942 0.0831 0.0759
(0.2884) (0.2922) (0.2760) (0.2649)
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.0755 0.0858 0.0837 0.0673
(0.2642) (0.2800) (0.2770) (0.2505)
Married 0.4563 0.3327 0.4556 0.5517
(0.4981) (0.4712) (0.4981) (0.4974)
Unmarried Couples 0.0507 0.0000 0.0100 0.1515
(0.2195) (0.0000) (0.0995) (0.3586)
Located in "Île de France" 0.1286 0.1115 0.1259 0.1373
(0.3347) (0.3148) (0.3318) ( 0.3442)
Other than French 0.0764 0.0666 0.0790 0.0758
(0.3115) (0.2914) (0.3155) (0.3122)
Born before 1930 0.0724 0.0792 0.0773 0.0434
(0.2592) (0.2700) (0.2671) (0.2038)
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.1192 0.1192 0.1192 0.1192
(0.3240) (0.3240) (0.3240) (0.3240)
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.1966 0.1966 0.1966 0.1966
(0.3974) (0.3975) (0.3975) (0.3975)
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.1771 0.1771 0.1771 0.1771
(0.3818) (0.3818) (0.3818) (0.3818)
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.2407 0.0537 0.3127 0.3127
(0.4275) (0.2255) (0.4636) (0.4636)
Part Time 0.6643 0.7632 0.6703 0.6002
(0.4722) (0.4251) (0.4701) (0.4899)
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Table 8: Initial Participation Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Initial Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -1.7185 0.1253 -2.3117 -1.1900
Experience at t-1 0.1426 0.0180 0.0717 0.2089
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0023 0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0004
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.3230 0.1866 -0.3545 1.0590
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.1517 0.1939 -0.9183 0.7070
Married 0.7011 0.1627 0.0755 1.4050
Located in "Île de France" 2.8640 0.4571 1.4217 5.1261
Other than French 0.1118 0.1432 -0.4433 0.6388
Unemployment rate -1.3283 0.9811 -5.4080 2.2546
Table 9: Initial Mobility Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Initial Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 0.4267 0.2888 -0.8114 1.5471
Experience at t-1 0.0372 0.0310 -0.0765 0.1665
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0028 0.0023
Seniority at t-1 0.0014 0.0444 -0.1750 0.1711
Seniority at t-1 squared 0.0002 0.0022 -0.0078 0.0098
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.0349 0.2379 -0.8494 0.9663
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.4191 0.2800 -0.5685 1.6695
Married 0.2704 0.2194 -0.5313 1.1126
Located in "Île de France" 0.2390 0.2080 -0.5239 1.0316
Other than French -0.4667 0.1866 -1.1438 0.2296
Unemployment rate 0.0817 0.9964 -3.8903 3.7749
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Table 10: Participation Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -0.2881 0.2328 -1.2498 0.5703
Experience at t-1 0.12545 0.0089 0.0935 0.1694
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0024 0.0002 -0.0033 -0.0018
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.0369 0.0711 -0.3156 0.2362
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.0264 0.0727 -0.3180 0.2720
Married 0.0285 0.0665 -0.2265 0.2623
Located in "Île de France" 4.9743 0.3171 4.0698 5.8838
Other than French -0.3436 0.0820 -0.6398 -0.0637
Unemployment Rate 1.4712 0.6896 -2.0813 4.8732
Mobility at t-1 0.4203 0.0661 0.1860 0.6534
Participation at t-1 1.6206 0.0665 1.3378 1.8917
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 -2.6538 0.1263 -3.1350 -2.0839
Born between 1930 and 1939 -2.2994 0.1304 -2.7678 -1.7769
Born between 1940 and 1949 -1.9916 0.1174 -2.4204 -1.5751
Born between 1950 and 1959 -1.5877 0.0879 -1.9031 -1.2487
Born between 1960 and 1969 -0.8943 0.0682 -1.1689 -0.6200
Time Effect
Year 1977 0.3270 0.2300 -0.5353 1.2124
Year 1978 0.2392 0.2299 -0.6544 1.1694
Year 1979 0.2477 0.2293 -0.6944 1.2162
Year 1980 0.2306 0.2293 -0.6229 1.0806
Year 1981 -0.2358 0.2286 -1.0561 0.7129
Year 1982 0.4023 0.2299 -0.5567 1.2852
Year 1983 -0.4325 0.2299 -1.4353 0.4025
Year 1984 0.4115 0.2307 -0.4944 1.3409
Year 1985 -0.0626 0.2309 -0.9155 0.8239
Year 1986 -0.0438 0.2330 -0.8842 0.8249
Year 1987 -0.2869 0.2322 -1.2051 0.6712
Year 1988 -0.1936 0.2323 -1.1344 0.6802
Year 1989 -0.0957 0.2322 -0.9275 0.8015
Year 1990 -1.2978 0.2334 -2.1516 -0.3210
Year 1991 0.4253 0.2329 -0.5541 1.3887
Year 1992 -0.2217 0.2336 -1.2413 0.6107
Year 1993 -0.2244 0.2341 -1.1692 0.6141
Year 1994 -0.3757 0.2346 -1.2434 0.6405
Year 1995 -0.5510 0.2350 -1.3905 0.3717
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Table 11: Mobility Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 0.7131 0.2763 -0.2489 1.7568
Experience at t-1 0.02431 0.0152 -0.0390 0.0821
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0009
Seniority at t-1 0.0145 0.0152 -0.0449 0.0764
Seniority at t-1 squared -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0024
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.1775 0.0975 -0.1979 0.5454
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.0911 0.0939 -0.4372 0.2843
Married 0.2004 0.0958 -0.2193 0.5252
Located in "Île de France" -0.1659 0.0922 -0.5074 0.2417
Other than French 0.0121 0.1143 -0.3635 0.6171
Mobility at t-1 0.0108 0.0647 -0.2486 0.2419
Part time -0.7229 0.0764 -1.0451 -0.4419
Unemployment Rate -0.0416 0.8669 -3.9669 3.1219
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 0.8046 0.3828 -0.6158 2.1426
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.6719 0.3076 -0.6456 1.8179
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.6187 0.2406 -0.2324 1.5728
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.5946 0.1880 -0.1890 1.2840
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.3360 0.1441 -0.3091 0.8977
Time Effect
Year 1977 -0.2294 0.2584 -1.3095 0.8734
Year 1978 -0.2427 0.2579 -1.2469 0.7926
Year 1979 -0.3343 0.2536 -1.2399 0.7277
Year 1980 0.2164 0.2711 -0.7108 1.3638
Year 1981 0.4560 0.2808 -0.5451 1.5486
Year 1982 0.3208 0.2760 -0.8439 1.3718
Year 1983 0.6375 0.2877 -0.6578 1.6782
Year 1984 -0.1017 0.2500 -1.1508 1.0398
Year 1985 -0.1632 0.2502 -1.1390 0.8535
Year 1986 -0.3700 0.2462 -1.3948 0.5626
Year 1987 -0.3425 0.2478 -1.2806 0.5847
Year 1988 -0.0753 0.2485 -0.9798 0.8555
Year 1989 0.6836 0.2692 -0.2794 1.7781
Year 1990 0.3166 0.2611 -0.6588 1.2486
Year 1991 -0.2134 0.2465 -1.1536 0.7426
Year 1992 -0.0733 0.2495 -1.0076 0.8031
Year 1993 -0.0154 0.2525 -0.9637 0.9761
Year 1994 0.1703 0.2527 -0.8082 1.0984
Year 1995 0.0003 0.9940 -3.9034 3.5625
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Table 12: Wage Equation for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Wage Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 3.9828 0.0497 3.7495 4.1652
Experience at t 0.0341 0.0045 0.0169 0.0517
Experience at t squared -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0001
Seniority at t 0.0075 0.0040 -0.0077 0.0221
Seniority at t squared 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0008
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.0394 0.0308 -0.1666 0.0846
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.0040 0.0292 -0.1197 0.1094
Married 0.1642 0.0371 0.0041 0.3062
Unmarried Couples 0.0772 0.0484 -0.1123 0.2759
Located in "Île de France" 0.0724 0.0380 -0.0692 0.2319
Other than French 0.0207 0.0475 -0.1730 0.1782
Part Time -0.6154 0.0323 -0.7282 -0.4956
Cohort Effect
Born before 1929 0.0347 0.0747 -0.2452 0.3192
Born between 1930 and 1939 -0.0296 0.0654 -0.2959 0.2079
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.0348 0.0554 -0.1828 0.2206
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.0230 0.0537 -0.1617 0.2295
Born between 1960 and 1969 -0.0203 0.0513 -0.2169 0.1811
Time Effect
Year 1977 -0.0938 0.0374 -0.2488 0.0657
Year 1978 -0.0642 0.0376 -0.2055 0.0896
Year 1979 -0.0505 0.0370 -0.1932 0.0937
Year 1980 -0.0509 0.0368 -0.2185 0.0868
Year 1981 -0.0343 0.0407 -0.1915 0.1218
Year 1982 -0.0520 0.0370 -0.2055 0.1106
Year 1983 0.0026 0.0407 -0.1635 0.1608
Year 1984 0.0344 0.0359 -0.1048 0.1613
Year 1985 -0.0003 0.0363 -0.1470 0.1283
Year 1986 0.0139 0.0362 -0.1460 0.1606
Year 1987 0.0080 0.0366 -0.1377 0.1570
Year 1988 0.0483 0.0363 -0.0967 0.1848
Year 1989 0.0459 0.0358 -0.0929 0.1962
Year 1990 0.0560 0.0396 -0.0846 0.2155
Year 1991 0.0724 0.0359 -0.0632 0.1979
Year 1992 0.0883 0.0362 -0.0521 0.2329
Year 1993 0.0699 0.0362 -0.0754 0.2248
Year 1994 0.0921 0.0372 -0.0370 0.2363
Year 1995 0.0726 0.0388 -0.0857 0.2281
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Table 13: Variance-covariance matrix for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Variance-covariance Matrix Elements
for Men with a Vocational-Technical School
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Residual Variance (Σ)
σ2 0.4159 0.0220 0.3561 0.5650
ρwm 0.0505 0.0222 -0.0603 0.1373
ρym -0.0211 0.0286 -0.1232 0.0897
ρyw -0.0211 0.0310 -0.1237 0.0931
Individual Effects (ΣI)
σ2
θY,I
0.6049 0.0547 0.4244 0.8264
ρθY,IθW,I 0.0649 0.0545 -0.1489 0.2846
ρθY,IθM,I -0.0187 0.0756 -0.2782 0.2554
σ2
θW,I
0.2777 0.0247 0.1977 0.4061
ρθW,IθM,I 0.0653 0.0622 -0.1773 0.2939
σ2
θM,I
0.5623 0.0671 0.3544 0.8806
Firm Effects (ΣE)
σ2
αY,E
0.2849 0.0276 0.2026 0.4328
ραY,EαM,E 0.0028 0.0651 -0.2800 0.2285
ραY,EθY,E 0.0872 0.0585 -0.1567 0.3304
ραY,EθW,E 0.0009 0.0503 -0.1888 0.1914
ραY,EθM,E 0.0030 0.0397 -0.1570 0.1446
σ2
αM,E
0.2858 0.0256 0.2041 0.4027
ραM,EθY,E -0.0050 0.0568 -0.2075 0.1979
ραM,EθW,E 0.0838 0.0513 -0.1098 0.2978
ραM,EθM,E 0.0031 0.0392 -0.1321 0.1642
σ2
θY,E
0.2835 0.0219 0.2137 0.3825
ρθY,EθW,E -0.0089 0.0465 -0.1642 0.1795
ρθY,EθM,E 0.0555 0.0385 -0.1075 0.2092
σ2
θW,E
0.2738 0.0241 0.1930 0.3931
ρθW,EθM,E 0.0061 0.0378 -0.1577 0.1427
σ2
θM,E
0.2853 0.0291 0.1961 0.4536
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Table 14: Summary statistics for men with a Vocational Technical Degree
Year
Variable 1976-1995 1976 1985 1995
Experience 15.5053 10.7550 14.9819 21.0103
(14.5587 ) (12.7510 ) (14.6378) (14.0915)
Seniority 3.5184 4.2806 3.5263 3.5702
(6.7760) (6.5467) (6.9945) (6.6418)
Log Wage 4.5124 4.4853 4.5380 4.4965
(0.7694) (0.5902) (0.7557) (0.8704)
Participation 0.4824 0.4105 0.4674 0.5899
(0.4997) (0.4920) (0.4990) (0.4919)
Mobility 0.3576 0.3275 0.3707 0.0000
(0.4793) (0.4693) (0.4830) (0.0000)
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.0787 0.0995 0.0668 0.0564
(0.2692) (0.2993) (0.2498) (0.2307)
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.0696 0.0879 0.0810 0.0484
(0.2544) (0.2832) (0.2729) (0.2146)
Married 0.5031 0.3966 0.5062 0.5803
(0.5000) (0.4892) (0.5000) (0.4936)
Unmarried Couples 0.0409 0.0000 0.0122 0.1174
(0.1980) (0.0000) (0.1099) (0.3219)
Located in "Île de France" 0.1255 0.1199 0.1293 0.1323
(0.3313) (0.3248) (0.3355) (0.3388)
Other than French 0.1254 0.1204 0.1284 0.1156
(0.3935) (0.3844) (0.3971) (0.3847)
Born before 1930 0.1060 0.1179 0.1142 0.0613
(0.3078) (0.3225) (0.3181) (0.2400)
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.1356 0.1356 0.1356 0.1356
(0.3424) (0.3424) (0.3424) (0.3424)
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.1871 0.1871 0.1871 0.1871
(0.3900) (0.3900) (0.3900) (0.3900)
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.1849 0.1849 0.1849 0.1849
(0.3882) (0.3883) (0.3883) (0.3883)
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.1979 0.0505 0.2551 0.2551
(0.3984) (0.2191) (0.4360) (0.4360)
Part Time 0.5719 0.6548 0.5801 0.4888
(0.4948) (0.4755) (0.4936) (0.4999)
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Table 15: Participation equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate Univer-
sity
Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -0.2163 0.2403 -1.1355 0.7020
Experience at t-1 0.0870 0.0091 0.0539 0.1184
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0013
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.1588 0.0639 -0.4213 0.0956
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.0912 0.0670 -0.3603 0.1636
Married 0.1830 0.0667 -0.0593 0.4507
Located in "Île de France" 6.1529 0.3399 5.3605 7.4000
Other than French -0.1285 0.0794 -0.3851 0.1551
Unemployment rate 2.9261 0.7519 0.1767 6.4721
Mobility at t-1 0.5265 0.0741 0.2897 0.8092
Participation at t-1 1.3033 0.0712 1.0314 1.5658
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 -2.7021 0.1992 -3.4142 -2.0403
Born between 1930 and 1939 -2.3237 0.1591 -2.9589 -1.7199
Born between 1940 and 1949 -2.4530 0.1097 -2.8768 -1.9691
Born between 1950 and 1959 -2.0083 0.0877 -2.3263 -1.6812
Born between 1960 and 1969 -1.6749 0.0930 -2.0025 -1.3128
Time Effect
Year 1977 0.1305 0.2360 -0.7458 1.1721
Year 1978 0.1638 0.2359 -0.6850 1.0913
Year 1979 0.0707 0.2354 -0.8620 0.9740
Year 1980 0.1802 0.2356 -0.8249 1.1747
Year 1981 -0.5385 0.2349 -1.4579 0.3698
Year 1982 0.3014 0.2368 -0.6703 1.3255
Year 1983 -0.8893 0.2381 -1.8691 0.0721
Year 1984 0.3296 0.2385 -0.6318 1.2306
Year 1985 -0.2323 0.2388 -1.2453 0.6792
Year 1986 -0.0341 0.2382 -1.0252 0.9075
Year 1987 -0.1688 0.2388 -1.1256 0.6763
Year 1988 0.3160 0.2385 -0.7446 1.1637
Year 1989 0.1496 0.2365 -0.7864 1.1960
Year 1990 -1.0350 0.2409 -1.9747 -0.1713
Year 1991 0.3909 0.2373 -0.6069 1.3637
Year 1992 -0.0366 0.2395 -0.9843 0.8516
Year 1993 -0.0256 0.2404 -0.9780 0.9389
Year 1994 -0.1481 0.2401 -1.1698 0.7366
Year 1995 -0.2018 0.2406 -1.1626 0.7944
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Table 16: Mobility equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 1.0879 0.4620 -0.6375 2.8647
Experience at t-1 0.0298 0.0163 -0.0269 0.0877
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0012 0.0005 -0.0030 0.0006
Seniority at t-1 0.0257 0.0198 -0.0542 0.0976
Seniority at t-1 squared -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0040 0.0029
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.1426 0.1064 -0.2150 0.5372
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.0014 0.1091 -0.4112 0.4214
Married 0.2608 0.1012 -0.0898 0.5873
Located in "Île de France" -0.0747 0.1032 -0.4750 0.3253
Other than French 0.0428 0.1027 -0.3365 0.4278
Unemployment Rate 0.4215 0.9029 -3.5269 3.7134
Part Time -0.2420 0.0719 -0.4966 0.0188
Mobility at t-1 0.1192 0.0751 -0.1453 0.3855
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 1.2292 0.4936 -0.7596 3.0831
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.4903 0.4340 -1.4241 2.3332
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.3994 0.4112 -1.1889 2.2124
Born between 1950 and 1959 -0.0911 0.4064 -1.6532 1.6763
Born between 1960 and 1969 -0.5110 0.4188 -2.1646 1.1206
Time Effect
Year 1977 -0.5111 0.2655 -1.5279 0.5441
Year 1978 -0.3550 0.2621 -1.2824 0.5984
Year 1979 -0.4874 0.2616 -1.5874 0.5430
Year 1980 0.4637 0.3004 -0.5902 1.6099
Year 1981 0.4599 0.3003 -0.6568 1.6609
Year 1982 0.3520 0.2928 -0.8924 1.5651
Year 1983 0.5798 0.3074 -0.4411 1.8319
Year 1984 -0.1489 0.2576 -1.1466 0.8662
Year 1985 -0.2602 0.2533 -1.2240 0.7976
Year 1986 -0.1293 0.2530 -1.0590 0.9404
Year 1987 -0.3288 0.2495 -1.3029 0.7109
Year 1888 -0.1951 0.2485 -1.1994 0.8274
Year 1989 0.4423 0.2706 -0.6243 1.5491
Year 1990 0.5475 0.2760 -0.5465 1.7648
Year 1991 0.0761 0.2517 -0.9723 1.0994
Year 1992 -0.0276 0.2548 -0.9609 0.9154
Year 1993 0.2191 0.2578 -0.7269 1.2489
Year 1994 0.1727 0.2595 -0.7961 1.2287
Year 1995 0.0024 1.0028 -3.6287 4.5741
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Table 17: Wage equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
Wage Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 2.6811 0.0657 2.4180 2.9107
Experience at t 0.0529 0.0057 0.0301 0.0799
Experience at t squared -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0013 0.0000
Seniority at t 0.0244 0.0054 0.0035 0.0439
Seniority at t squared -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0007
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.0023 0.0395 -0.1541 0.1600
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.0035 0.0401 -0.1514 0.1583
Married 0.2489 0.0455 0.0830 0.4120
Unmarried Couples -0.0353 0.0558 -0.2471 0.2134
Located in "Île de France" 0.4266 0.0485 0.2412 0.6010
Other than French 0.0033 0.0549 -0.2256 0.2158
Part Time -0.7208 0.0313 -0.8359 -0.5986
Cohort Effect
Born before 1930 0.0362 0.0886 -0.3052 0.4191
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.1308 0.0806 -0.1708 0.4488
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.2960 0.0667 0.0373 0.5611
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.5308 0.0601 0.2917 0.7425
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.6800 0.0671 0.3779 0.9596
Time Effect
Year 1977 0.0484 0.0560 -0.1807 0.2773
Year 1978 0.1284 0.0538 -0.0785 0.3257
Year 1979 0.0676 0.0529 -0.1169 0.2742
Year 1980 0.0627 0.0507 -0.1226 0.2578
Year 1981 0.0847 0.0594 -0.1603 0.3044
Year 1982 0.1018 0.0503 -0.0868 0.2915
Year 1983 0.1229 0.0585 -0.1347 0.3373
Year 1984 0.1424 0.0494 -0.0423 0.3234
Year 1985 0.0343 0.0486 -0.1333 0.2183
Year 1986 0.0440 0.0476 -0.1604 0.2122
Year 1987 0.0250 0.0469 -0.1921 0.2064
Year 1988 0.0915 0.0448 -0.0946 0.2475
Year 1989 0.0992 0.0445 -0.0696 0.2494
Year 1990 0.0823 0.0503 -0.1192 0.2804
Year 1991 0.0814 0.0450 -0.0998 0.2434
Year 1992 0.0651 0.0455 -0.1131 0.2418
Year 1993 0.0386 0.0456 -0.1291 0.2048
Year 1994 0.0283 0.0469 -0.1906 0.2118
Year 1995 0.0193 0.0477 -0.1564 0.2285
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Table 18: Initial Participation equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University
Initial Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -1.8608 0.1259 -2.3995 -1.3676
Experience at t-1 0.0697 0.0192 -0.0082 0.1400
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0030 0.0016
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.1227 0.1933 -0.7881 0.8520
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.1656 0.2133 -0.9721 0.7075
Married 0.7367 0.1520 0.1867 1.3478
Located in "Île de France" 3.7385 0.3933 2.4188 5.4842
Other than French 0.3345 0.1234 -0.1447 0.8083
Unemployment Rate -0.6205 0.9896 -4.4382 3.0283
Table 19: Initial Mobility equation for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate Uni-
versity
Initial Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 0.6815 0.3129 -0.5931 1.8330
Experience at t-1 0.0245 0.0328 -0.1003 0.1571
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0039 0.0027
Seniority at t-1 -0.1204 0.0525 -0.3332 0.0757
Seniority at t-1 squared 0.0078 0.0033 -0.0051 0.0210
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.3920 0.3183 -1.7958 1.0344
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.2091 0.3463 -1.3746 1.5433
Married 0.6302 0.2625 -0.3372 1.7089
Located in "Île de France" 0.0372 0.2259 -0.8872 0.9015
Other than French 0.1172 0.1907 -0.6377 0.9493
Unemployment Rate 0.0710 1.0016 -3.6066 4.3921
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Table 20: Variance covariance matrix for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University
Variance-covariance Matrix Elements
for Women with Technical College
or Undergraduate University
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Residual Variance (Σ)
σ2 0.6971 0.0342 0.6038 0.8544
ρwm 0.0605 0.0250 -0.0500 0.1590
ρym -0.0064 0.0273 -0.0999 0.1076
ρyw 0.0577 0.0274 -0.0586 0.1625
Individual Effects(ΣI)
σ2
θY,I
0.8647 0.0754 0.6201 1.1716
ρθY,IθW,I 0.1871 0.0505 -0.0028 0.3822
ρθY,IθM,I -0.0242 0.0729 -0.3124 0.2352
σ2
θW,I
0.6447 0.0461 0.4973 0.8522
ρθW,IθM,I 0.1383 0.0619 -0.1005 0.3781
σ2
θM,I
0.7780 0.0942 0.4828 1.2500
Firm Effects (ΣE)
σ2
αY,E
0.3880 0.0364 0.2752 0.5575
ραY,EαM,E 0.0307 0.0496 -0.1442 0.2110
ραY,EθY,E 0.0817 0.0508 -0.1419 0.2653
ραY,EθW,E 0.0045 0.0394 -0.1760 0.1549
ραY,EθM,E 0.0076 0.0391 -0.1389 0.1528
σ2
αM,E
0.4017 0.0331 0.2872 0.5747
ραM,EθY,E 0.0755 0.0605 -0.1708 0.3101
ραM,EθW,E 0.0049 0.0391 -0.1419 0.1763
ραM,EθM,E 0.0048 0.0400 -0.1526 0.1551
σ2
θY,E
0.4068 0.0351 0.2909 0.6404
ρθY,EθW,E 0.0225 0.0358 -0.1194 0.1619
ρθY,EθM,E 0.0482 0.0380 -0.1080 0.1970
σ2
θW,E
0.3836 0.0315 0.2789 0.5478
ρθW,EθM,E 0.0614 0.0536 -0.1225 0.2728
σ2
θM,E
0.4102 0.0367 0.2828 0.5709
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Table 21: Summary Statistics for women with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
Year
Variable 1976-1995 1976 1985 1995
Experience 10.1013 5.9130 9.4643 15.4055
(9.2327) (7.4484) (8.8420) (9.4755)
Seniority 1.5574 1.8950 1.2973 2.5561
(4.2399) (4.4060) (4.0910) (4.9434)
Log Wage 4.1886 3.9877 4.1623 4.3309
(1.1883) (1.0424) (1.1233) (1.3408)
Participation 0.3695 0.2229 0.3589 0.5179
(0.4827) (0.4163) (0.4798) (0.4998)
Mobility 0.2437 0.1429 0.2488 0.0000
(0.4293) (0.3500) (0.4325) (0.0000)
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.1186 0.1262 0.1192 0.0680
(0.3233) (0.3321) (0.3242) (0.2518)
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.1006 0.0864 0.1308 0.0755
(0.3008) (0.2810) (0.3372) (0.2642)
Married 0.4545 0.2995 0.4591 0.5530
(0.4979) (0.4582) (0.4985) (0.4973)
Unmarried Couples 0.0520 0.0000 0.0213 0.1400
(0.2219) (0.0000) (0.1445) (0.3471)
Located in "Île de France" 0.1668 0.1094 0.1619 0.2350
(0.3728) (0.3123) (0.3684) (0.4241)
Other than French 0.1503 0.1400 0.1532 0.1526
(0.4423) (0.4288) (0.4461) (0.4456)
Born before 1930 0.0383 0.0426 0.0409 0.0248
(0.1920) (0.2021) (0.1981) (0.1555)
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806
(0.2723) (0.2724) (0.2724) (0.2724)
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.2414 0.2414 0.2414 0.2414
(0.4279) (0.4280) (0.4280) (0.4280)
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.3923 0.3923 0.3923 0.3923
(0.4883) (0.4884) (0.4884) (0.4884)
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.1867 0.0478 0.2408 0.2408
(0.3897) (0.2134) (0.4277) (0.4277)
Part Time 0.7597 0.8514 0.7690 0.6688
(0.4273) (0.3558) (0.4216) (0.4708)
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Table 22: Participation Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
degree
Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -0.4511 0.2428 -1.3845 0.4352
Experience at t− 1 0.1309 0.0101 0.0947 0.1683
Experience at t− 1 squared -0.0031 0.0002 -0.0040 -0.0023
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.1457 0.0709 -0.1229 0.4192
Children 3 to 6 years old -0.0856 0.0709 -0.3625 0.2005
Married 0.0444 0.0761 -0.2074 0.3503
Located in "Île de France" 6.2034 0.3286 5.2757 7.0578
Other than French -0.4177 0.0926 -0.7160 -0.1073
Mobility at t− 1 0.5425 0.0770 0.2574 0.8649
Participation at t− 1 1.5984 0.0780 1.2218 1.8783
Cohort Effect
Born before 1929 -2.7297 0.1527 -3.2792 -2.0985
Born between 1930 and 1939 -2.3065 0.1457 -2.9020 -1.7986
Born between 1940 and 1949 -2.0098 0.1206 -2.5336 -1.5481
Born between 1950 and 1959 -1.8795 0.1106 -2.2975 -1.4514
Born between 1960 and 1969 -1.6745 0.1486 -2.2924 -1.1158
Unemployment rate 3.5008 0.7591 0.6140 6.4364
Time Effect
Year 1977 0.4057 0.2362 -0.4081 1.2599
Year 1978 0.4154 0.2351 -0.4749 1.3023
Year 1979 0.1770 0.2351 -0.6530 1.0245
Year 1980 0.3439 0.2368 -0.5651 1.1822
Year 1981 -0.7206 0.2363 -1.6296 0.2070
Year 1982 0.6725 0.2373 -0.2330 1.5864
Year 1983 -1.1395 0.2367 -2.0348 -0.2255
Year 1984 0.4882 0.2376 -0.3840 1.3718
Year 1985 -0.0873 0.2392 -0.9586 0.7859
Year 1986 -0.0516 0.2383 -0.9084 0.8288
Year 1987 -0.2241 0.2375 -1.1013 0.7002
Year 1988 -0.0984 0.2376 -0.9401 0.8109
Year 1989 0.0305 0.2373 -0.9065 0.8523
Year 1990 -1.0145 0.2372 -1.9160 0.0065
Year 1991 0.3278 0.2370 -0.6019 1.3515
Year 1992 -0.3164 0.2373 -1.2018 0.6473
Year 1993 -0.2735 0.2387 -1.1657 0.6825
Year 1994 -0.5378 0.2381 -1.4907 0.4623
Year 1995 -0.4354 0.2375 -1.3211 0.4621
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Table 23: Mobility Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
degree
Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 1.2519 0.4646 -0.5884 3.0806
Experience at t− 1 0.0168 0.0138 -0.0294 0.0740
Experience at t− 1 squared -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0017 0.0006
Seniority at t− 1 0.0177 0.0134 -0.0403 0.0672
Seniority at t− 1 squared -0.0007 0.0005 -0.0029 0.0013
Children 0 to 2 years old -0.0055 0.0820 -0.3219 0.3373
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.1003 0.0793 -0.2451 0.4130
Married 0.0691 0.0881 -0.2517 0.3862
Located in "Île de France" -0.2314 0.0797 -0.5027 0.1211
Other than French -0.0650 0.0945 -0.4168 0.2766
Unemployment rate 0.7216 0.8763 -2.7283 4.4805
Part time -0.5702 0.0770 -0.9166 -0.2459
Mobility at t-1 -0.0158 0.0642 -0.2391 0.2042
Cohort Effect
Born before 1929 0.6455 0.4523 -1.1950 2.3575
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.5239 0.4212 -1.0196 2.0141
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.1711 0.4065 -1.3828 1.6220
Born between 1950 and 1959 -0.0401 0.4062 -1.6018 1.3610
Born between 1960 and 1969 -0.5018 0.4235 -2.1213 1.1517
Time Effect
Year 1977 -0.3741 0.2525 -1.3989 0.5939
Year 1978 -0.3761 0.2507 -1.4304 0.5534
Year 1979 -0.2694 0.2498 -1.2755 0.6234
Year 1980 0.1553 0.2592 -0.8669 1.1274
Year 1981 0.3404 0.2656 -0.6054 1.3376
Year 1982 0.4988 0.2682 -0.6333 1.5334
Year 1983 0.4017 0.2645 -0.5763 1.3331
Year 1984 -0.2053 0.2457 -1.2118 0.8032
Year 1985 -0.1617 0.2461 -1.1447 0.8932
Year 1986 -0.2471 0.2461 -1.2260 0.6671
Year 1987 -0.2852 0.2457 -1.2616 0.6728
Year 1988 -0.0319 0.2470 -0.9226 0.8590
Year 1989 0.7744 0.2697 -0.2417 1.8964
Year 1990 0.3577 0.2580 -0.5415 1.3192
Year 1991 0.0851 0.2508 -0.8260 1.0606
Year 1992 0.0355 0.2518 -0.9659 1.0126
Year 1993 0.2987 0.2595 -0.6825 1.2245
Year 1994 0.2349 0.2591 -0.7487 1.2459
Year 1995 0.0013 0.9896 -3.9623 4.9080
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Table 24: Wage Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate University degree
Wage Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 4.1059 0.0634 3.8450 4.3285
Experience at t 0.0430 0.0051 0.0245 0.0640
Experience at t squared -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0000
Seniority at t 0.0129 0.0043 -0.0024 0.0309
Seniority at t squared -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0004
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.0390 0.0338 -0.1260 0.1614
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.0612 0.0314 -0.0706 0.1758
Married 0.1276 0.0433 -0.0412 0.3116
Unmarried Couples 0.0745 0.0515 -0.1196 0.2822
Located in "Île de France" 0.1562 0.0394 -0.0229 0.3162
Other than French -0.1086 0.0514 -0.3252 0.0728
Part time -0.8948 0.0343 -1.0218 -0.7712
Cohort Effect
Born before 1929 0.0705 0.0765 -0.2502 0.3997
Born between 1930 and 1939 -0.0113 0.0667 -0.3397 0.2386
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.0257 0.0602 -0.2308 0.2482
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.0647 0.0610 -0.1632 0.2842
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.0372 0.0723 -0.2249 0.3464
Time Effect
Year 1977 -0.0625 0.0432 -0.2407 0.1043
Year 1978 -0.0396 0.0424 -0.1919 0.1271
Year 1979 -0.0448 0.0424 -0.2191 0.1160
Year 1980 -0.0505 0.0415 -0.2141 0.0990
Year 1981 0.0138 0.0448 -0.1681 0.2069
Year 1982 0.0128 0.0404 -0.1411 0.1814
Year 1983 0.0344 0.0450 -0.1723 0.2339
Year 1984 0.0405 0.0410 -0.1118 0.2179
Year 1985 0.0096 0.0410 -0.1358 0.1574
Year 1986 -0.0063 0.0409 -0.1675 0.1696
Year 1987 -0.0460 0.0408 -0.2382 0.1074
Year 1988 0.0689 0.0409 -0.1062 0.2448
Year 1989 0.0628 0.0411 -0.0987 0.2479
Year 1990 0.0638 0.0451 -0.1414 0.2304
Year 1991 0.0533 0.0426 -0.1132 0.2282
Year 1992 0.0552 0.0431 -0.1194 0.2346
Year 1993 0.0429 0.0439 -0.1254 0.2009
Year 1994 0.0700 0.0455 -0.1132 0.2441
Year 1995 0.0647 0.0467 -0.1109 0.2360
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Table 25: Initial Participation Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University degree
Initial Participation Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant -1.3192 0.1259 -1.8222 -0.8373
Experience at t-1 0.0664 0.0191 -0.0094 0.1459
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0033 0.0013
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.2238 0.1635 -0.4262 0.8726
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.1748 0.1813 -0.5837 0.9075
Married 0.7095 0.1405 0.1687 1.2251
Located in "Île de France" 3.4818 0.3943 2.3201 5.4107
Other than French -0.0576 0.1219 -0.4790 0.3988
Unemployment Rate -0.4415 0.9927 -4.5822 3.2558
Table 26: Initial Mobility Equation for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate Univer-
sity degree
Initial Mobility Equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Constant 0.6653 0.2731 -0.2784 1.7049
Experience at t-1 0.0018 0.0293 -0.1117 0.1121
Experience at t-1 squared -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0031 0.0032
Seniority at t-1 -0.0934 0.0426 -0.2557 0.0768
Seniority at t-1 squared 0.0057 0.0023 -0.0044 0.0156
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.5791 0.2562 -0.4149 1.5705
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.5465 0.2759 -0.4915 1.6420
Married 0.4569 0.1913 -0.2621 1.1980
Located in "Île de France" -0.0886 0.1695 -0.8890 0.6965
Other than French 0.1826 0.1871 -0.5271 0.9440
Unemployment Rate 0.0300 0.9891 -3.5822 3.7165
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Table 27: Variance-Covariance Matrix for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University degree
Variance-covariance Matrix Elements
for Men with Technical College
or Undergraduate University
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range
Min Max
Residual Variance (Σ)
σ2 0.6481 0.0392 0.5204 0.8460
ρwm 0.0430 0.0237 -0.0456 0.1235
ρym -0.0190 0.0244 -0.1151 0.0728
ρyw -0.0339 0.0272 -0.1274 0.0553
Individual Effects(ΣI)
σ2
θY,I
1.2731 0.1110 0.9351 1.8381
ρθY,IθW,I 0.2027 0.0475 0.0165 0.3782
ρθY,IθM,I -0.0656 0.0686 -0.3072 0.2219
σ2
θW,I
0.5705 0.0409 0.4203 0.8245
ρθW,IθM,I -0.0446 0.0637 -0.2714 0.2064
σ2
θM,I
0.5933 0.0697 0.3820 0.8946
Firm Effects (ΣE)
σ2
αY,E
0.4485 0.0459 0.2993 0.6362
ραY,EαM,E -0.0468 0.0503 -0.2193 0.1313
ραY,EθY,E 0.1004 0.0518 -0.1316 0.2866
ραY,EθW,E -0.0027 0.0383 -0.1434 0.1409
ραY,EθM,E 0.0127 0.0389 -0.1569 0.1605
σ2
αM,E
0.4122 0.0333 0.3088 0.5413
ραM,EθY,E -0.0010 0.0607 -0.2390 0.2503
ραM,EθW,E -0.0015 0.0391 -0.1494 0.1497
ραM,EθM,E 0.0071 0.0392 -0.1299 0.1532
σ2
θY,E
0.4421 0.0398 0.3129 0.6318
ρθY,EθW,E -0.0274 0.0363 -0.1638 0.1104
ρθY,EθM,E 0.0593 0.0379 -0.0763 0.2105
σ2
θW,E
0.4056 0.0354 0.2924 0.5594
ρθW,EθM,E -0.0215 0.0536 -0.2281 0.1724
σ2
θM,E
0.4180 0.0366 0.2942 0.5789
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Table 28: Descriptive Statistics for Men with a Technical College or Undergraduate University
degree
Year
Variable 1976-1995 1976 1985 1995
Experience 15.3394 9.6367 14.8724 21.4711
(11.1709) (9.5811) (10.8165) (10.5628)
Seniority 3.4495 4.4343 3.3245 3.3898
(6.7224) (6.6233) (6.8343) (6.3545)
Log Wage 4.8947 4.7004 4.8763 5.0370
(1.0876) (0.9809) (1.0190) (1.2383)
Participation 0.4916 0.4313 0.5217 0.5150
(0.4999) (0.4953) (0.4996) (0.4998)
Mobility 0.3636 0.3191 0.4074 0.0000
(0.4810) (0.4662) (0.4914) (0.0000)
Children 0 to 2 years old 0.1169 0.1552 0.1035 0.0462
(0.3213) (0.3621) (0.3046) (0.2100)
Children 3 to 6 years old 0.1074 0.1235 0.1441 0.0651
(0.3096) (0.3291) (0.3513) (0.2467)
Married 0.6033 0.4754 0.6144 0.6693
(0.4892) (0.4995) (0.4868) (0.4705)
Unmarried couples 0.0541 0.0000 0.0201 0.1517
(0.2262) (0.0000) (0.1402) (0.3588)
Located in "Île de France" 0.2170 0.1883 0.2334 0.2278
(0.4122) (0.3910) (0.4230) (0.4195)
Other than French 0.2272 0.2110 0.2313 0.2229
(0.5282) (0.5089) (0.5321) (0.5272)
Born before 1930 0.1118 0.1223 0.1174 0.0715
(0.3151) (0.3277) (0.3220) (0.2577)
Born between 1930 and 1939 0.1569 0.1569 0.1569 0.1569
(0.3637) (0.3638) (0.3638) (0.3638)
Born between 1940 and 1949 0.3095 0.3095 0.3095 0.3095
(0.4623) (0.4624) (0.4624) (0.4624)
Born between 1950 and 1959 0.2935 0.2935 0.2935 0.2935
(0.4554) (0.4554) (0.4554) (0.4554)
Born between 1960 and 1969 0.0956 0.0279 0.1162 0.1162
(0.2940) (0.1647) (0.3206) (0.3206)
Part time 0.5882 0.6661 0.5638 0.5699
(0.4922) (0.4717) (0.4960) (0.4952
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Figure 1: Posterior distributions - Women with a Vocational Technical Degree
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Figure 2: Posterior Distributions - Women with a Technical College or Undergraduate
University degree
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Figure 3: Posterior distributions - Men with a Vocational Technical Degree
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Figure 4: Posterior distributions - men with a technical college or undergraduate university
degree
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Chapitre 3
Is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?
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1. Introduction
There has been an increasing interest in studying the public sector employment for more than
two decades. This process was initiated by Smith (1977) and this is justified by the large share
of public employment in total employment. Over that period of time, very few countries have
seen this share decrease but for UK. For instance, in France, in 2006, this proportion amounts
to one quarter of total employment, and it has been relatively stable since the beginning of the
nineties (source OECD data). But this large part of the public sector employment may have
adverse effects on private sector efficiency. Moreover a shortage of public sector workers can
lead to difficulties, such as an excess can lead to fiscal outcomes.
In France, this interest has been renewed recently for budgetary reasons. On the one hand
the French debt burden does not diminish, and on the other hand, the wage bill constitutes the
largest item in the public sector spending. Furthermore the retirement of many public servants
raises the following issue: should everyone departing be replaced? Is the cost of every public-
servant job justified? The French government looks for efficiently spent money, hence every
euro spent must be necessary and efficiently allocated. Hence public sector employment and
wages come under close scrutiny. Therefore it is important to compare both public and private
earnings.
However, few studies deal with the French case (Fougère and Pouget (2003), and Bargain
and Melly (2008)). Fougère and Pouget (2003) concentrate on the main determinants of the
entry into the public sector. Bargain and Melly (2008) focus on the public sector pay gap using
quantile regressions on a short panel data set. This paper aims to contribute to the classical
analysis of the public wage gap, especially in France. Do relationships between wages and
wage determining factors differ by sector of work? Do public sector employees earn a premium?
However usual the issue, the methods we develop extend some previous approaches.
Many recent studies rely on cross sectional switching regression, endogenous or not (see
Disney and Gosling (1998) and Gyourko and Tracy (1988) for UK, Dustman and Van Soest
(1998) for Germany, Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) and Van Ophem (1993) for the Nether-
lands, Fougère and Pouget (2003) for France and Heitmueller (2006) for Scotland). Hartog and
Oosterbeek (1993) stress that neglecting selectivity effects are likely to give a false picture of the
relative earnings position of public-sector workers (see Goddeeris (1988)). Moreover, Dustman
and Van Soest (1998) underlines that, even when the sector choice is controlled for, instruments
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must be chosen with particular care and exogeneity assumptions can lead to different results.
In a different way, Heitmueller (2006) controls for participation and sector selections, but in
cross-sectional analysis.
In order to overcome these potential biases, Disney and Gosling (2003) uses the natural
experiment that happened in the UK in the nineties with the privatization programme. And
they show that their results are robust to self-selection. Bargain and Melly (2008) use panel
data to control for both sector choice and individual fixed effects, and compare the quantiles
of both distributions. Raising close but different issues, Bell, Elliott, and Scott (2005) exploit
the mobility between both sectors, and study the wage incentives to change sectors. They
identify the wage premium after a job change. Other studies focus on the link between the
wage distribution and mobility. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) and Cappellari (2002) focus
on earnings dynamics and lifetime values of employment in both sectors. They argue that
public and private sectors differ not only in their log wage distribution but also in their income
mobility. They conclude, for UK and resp. for Italy, that life cycle of earnings matters in the
private sector whereas it does not in the public sector.1
In this paper, the way we proceed is more in line with Dustman and Van Soest (1998) such
as Heitmueller (2006). We extend their approach by considering a panel framework, controlling
both for self-selection -people do choose to work in the public sector - and employment -people
choose to participate. We question the earnings differences by modeling the double selection
i.e. employment and sector choice, and we account for unobserved heterogeneity by using the
method of Heckman and Singer (1984). Unobserved heterogeneity allows us to control for
individual tastes, and individual abilities. Moreover, we observe each individual for 8 years,
ensuring convergence properties that can not be ensured with the method used by Bargain and
Melly (2008), based on quantile regressions, as the LFS surveyed identical people at most three
times.
We answer the following issue: do people who work in the public sector have a different
1Another trend of the literature on public/private differences concerns queue models (Venti (1987), Heywood
and Mohanty (1995) and Fougère and Pouget (2003)) and analysis the individual propensity to seek employment
in public sectors. But these models require very detailed information about the offer and the demand for public
jobs. Furthermore, they are very sensitive to the instruments chosen and it turns out difficult to share and identify
the characteristics determining the search for a public job from those determining the access to a public job (more
risk adverse workers in the public sector -see Bellante and Link (1981), but maybe a taste for public services -see
Goddeeris (1988)).
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propensity to get high wages or low wages given their educational level and other characteris-
tics? Moreover we analyze the sector selection.2 We find that mimicking the parents is determi-
nant and as expected, that the public sector attracts more people when the local labor market is
depressed.
We also find that there exists a wage public premium at the bottom of the public wage
distribution, whereas it is not true at the upper tail. These results are in line with empirical
observations: low-wage civil-servants are weakly mobile, whereas high-wage civil servants
move more frequently from the public to the private sector.
Further, the female public-sector workers have a comparative advantage in the public sector.
Their counterfactuals wages in the private sector are lower than their current wages. Unlike
women, men would have higher wages in the private sector excepted at the bottom of the dis-
tribution. For men, this wage gap worsens with the education level; in the case of graduated
women, the public wage premium is closer to zero. These results may reflect that motivations
underlying sector choice differ between men and women.
Finally we find that wage differences between the public and the private sectors result from
three factors: first the raw mean is greater in the public sector, second the returns to different ob-
servable characteristics differ between both sectors (for instance, for most of them, degrees are
better rewarded in the private sector), finally the unobserved productivity civil-servants would
have in the private sector is a bit inferior to the one they have in their current occupation. Un-
like them, a part of the workers employed in the private sector seem to acquire specific human
capital, that they could not transfer to the public sector.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, the structural model is presented.
Section 3 reports a descriptive analysis of the data. Section 4 describes the econometric model
and the estimation methods. Sections 5 and 6 discuss results and simulations. Finally section 8
concludes.
2. The Search Model
We derive a continuous time search model in a stationary labor market environment. There are
three possible states: employment in the public sector, employment in the private sector and
2We use parental background information to ensure identification of the sector choice equation following Dust-
man and Van Soest (1998) advice.
149
nonemployment. The individuals employed in the private sector can be laid off, and they may
search for a private job even when they are employed. Those employed in the public sector do
not search for a job and can not be laid off. This is justified by the fact that in France, a public
servant can not be laid off. A public employee can be fired only in very few cases, the rules
of which greatly differ from private-sector ones (disciplinary sanctions in the public sector).
Hence firings in the public sector are neglected. Finally the nonemployed may search either for
a public or for a private job.
Agents are infinitely alive. At each point in time, they can be either nonemployed (denoted
by n, i.e. unemployed or out of the labor force), or employed either in the private sector (de-
noted by Pr) or in the public sector (denoted by Pu). Unemployment and nonparticipation are
assumed to be non distinct labor force states. This assumption is not restrictive since we focus
on the choice between the public and the private sector and the data set is restricted to people
under 60. Nonemployed individuals enjoy a real return b and receive job offers at a Poisson rate
depending on the sector of research λn,Pr and λn,Pu. b may represent unemployment benefit
or private rents. Nonemployed individuals support research costs depending on the type of job
they search for: cPr (resp. cPu) for private jobs (resp. for public jobs). They can decide to
restrict their research to private jobs. Agents who decide to search for a job in the public sector
can fail to enter public services although they get a public offer since they have to succeed the
entrance exam to become a civil servant. pS denotes the probability to succeed conditional on
searching for a job in this sector, and it implicitly depends on individual covariates.
When employed in the private sector, individuals receive a real wage w, and they continue to
receive private job offers at a Poisson rate λPr,Pr. They are assumed to restrict their job research
to the private sector and they face search costs c.3 Existing private jobs are hit by idiosyncratic
(productive) shocks that occur at a Poisson rate δ. The instantaneous discount rate is ρ and the
horizon is infinite. This assumption implies that an individual can not transit directly from the
private to the public sector, he has to go through an unemployment period.
Finally, when employed in the public sector, agents can not search for a private job. We
detail later what the consequences of this assumption are.
3To search for a public job requires a lot of time since entrance exams need preparation.
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FPr denotes the wage distribution in the private sector on [0, w], FPu in the public sector on
[0, w]. We assume that these distributions are different from one another but that they rely on the
same finite support for sake of simplicity. But the tails of the distributions can be far different
(see the empirical part for some illustration, figure 1).
In the sequel V denotes the value function.
A worker currently employed in the public sector with starting wage w receives net income w
and cannot loose his job. He receives no external nor internal offer. His function value is
VPu(w) =
w∆t
1 + ρ∆t
+
VPu(w)
1 + ρ∆t
, (2.1)
which yields
VPu(w) =
w
ρ
. (2.2)
A worker currently employed in the private sector receives a net income w − c and may be
forcibly separated from his job with probability δ. He also receives private job offers at
rate λPr,Pr which are accepted when their value exceeds the expected discounted lifetime
utility stream in the current job:
VPr(w) =
(w − c)∆t
1 + ρ∆t
+ δ
Vn∆t
1 + ρ∆t
+ (1− δ∆t− λPr,Pr∆t) VPr(w)
1 + ρ∆t
+
∆tλPr,Pr
1 + ρ∆t
∫ w
0
max (VPr(x), VPr(w)) dFPr(x),
which can be simplified in
VPr(w) (ρ+ δ) = w − c+ δVn (2.3)
+ λPr,Pr
∫ w
w
(VPr(x)− VPr(w)) dFPr(x).
A currently nonemployed person enjoys a net flow of income b− c−dPucPu depending on her
choice to search for a public job (dPu = 1) or not (dPu = 0).
V dPun =
(b− c− dPucPu)
1 + ρ∆t
∆t+
∆t
1 + ρ∆t
λn,PrEFPr (max (Vn, VPr(x)))
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+
∆t
1 + ρ∆t
λn,PudPuEFPu {max (Vn, pSVPu(x) + (1− pS)Vn)}
+
1
1 + ρ∆t
(1− λn,Pr∆t− λn,PudPu∆t)Vn. (2.4)
For the nonemployed, the optimal acceptance rule consists in accepting the first job, what-
ever the sector, that pays more than a reservation wage w∗ that is specific to the sector:
w∗Pu for the public sector and w
∗,dPu
Pr for the private sector (w∗,dPu=1Pr denotes the reserva-
tion wage when the unemployed search for both public and private jobs, w∗,dPu=0Pr when
the unemployed search only for private jobs).
dPu ∈ {0, 1} VPr(w∗,dPuPr ) = V dPun
VPu(w
∗
Pu) = V
dPu=1
n .
These reservation wages exist and are unique because the private and public value func-
tions are continuous and increasing functions. Therefore the equation (2.4) can be rewrit-
ten:4
ρV dPun = (b− c− dPucPu) + λn,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr
(VPr(x)− Vn) dFPr(x) (2.5)
+λn,PudPup
∫ w
w∗
Pu
(VPu(x)− Vn) dFPu(x).
When does a nonemployed worker decide to search for a public job? Searching for a public
job is actually costly and risky since individuals are not sure to succeed to enter public services.
This cost of searching for a public job is induced by the fact that individuals have to pick
up information, to prepare entrance exams, and by the fact that they anticipate private sector
opportunities. Hence nonemployed will search for a public job when their expected gains, which
may depend on individual characteristics and unobserved ability, exceed the cost of searching
4Note that max (x, zp+ (1− p)x) = pmax (x, z) + (1 − p)x with p ∈]0, 1[
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(see figure (6)). So dpu = 1 when:5
cPu ≤ pS λn,Pu
ρ
∫ w
h(w∗
d=0)
F Pu(x)dx, (2.6)
where pS
λn,Pu
ρ
∫ w
h(w∗
d=0)
F Pu(x)dx = Upu
and h(w∗d=0)is a function of
(
b, λn,Pr, λPr,Pr, w, ρ, δ, FPr
)
.
h(w∗d=0) can also be written as
h(w∗d=0) =
λn,Pr
λn,Pr − λPr,Prw
∗
d=0 − c−
λPr,Pr
λn,Pr − λPr,Pr b (2.7)
The probability to search for a public job is P (cPu ≤ Upu). When the cost of searching for
a public job is greater than Upu, the nonemployed had rather search for a private job only. Upu
depends on individual characteristics, on the probability of passing the exam and finally, on the
reservation wage via h(w∗d=0).
Equation (2.6) entails that the value of the threshold, determining the search for a public
job, is lower when the probability to succeed the entrance exams decreases or when the public
offer is lower. Upu depends on λn,Pu and pS in a multiplicative way, since h(w∗d=0) does not
depend on these variables.
The model teachings
First, the higher the probability to pass the exam, the higher the probability to search for
a public job. This feature is empirically illustrated by the fact that individuals with higher
degree are more likely to pass the exam. For instance, among individuals who take the
"CAPES" exam (entrance exam for high-school and secondary school) in 2006, 53.2%
have a "licence" degree and 44.0% a "maîtrise" (which requires an additional year of
studies). And when considering those who pass the exam, the proportions switch: 57.8%
who pass the exam have a maîtrise and 40.7% a licence. Similar features hold for other
public-sector exams.
An unemployment growth is captured by the parameter δ. And h(w∗d=0) depends on δ
5Details are in appendix A
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only by the way of w∗d=0, and w∗d=0 diminishes when δ grows (see equation (2.7)). Hence
the probability to search for a public job increases with δ.
The possible limits of the model
This model presents several limits: unemployed and nonparticipants are not distinguished.
As the sample is composed of people aged between 17 and 59, largely economically
active, this assumption is not very restrictive. Furthermore, the model assumes that public
workers can not search for a private job. This assumption is made for sake of simplicity
but if relaxed, our core results would not be modified. The function value associated to
the public sector would be larger, since more flexible as the French civil servants would be
able to work a few years in the private sector and get back to public services. Henceforth
they could not suffer from their private-job experience: even if laid off, they could recover
a job in public services. In such a case, their wage would be the wage they had when
departing for a private experience.
Finally the model does not take into account possible parental or sabbatic leaves for civil
servants. Moreover we do not enable direct transitions from the public to the private
sector, and vice versa. These limits would modify both the public and the private function
values but the core results would not change.
3. The data
3.1. A brief description
The data used are taken from the French European Household Survey which was set up by
the European Union via Eurostat. This survey analyzes and follows the wage and employment
dynamics. Individuals were interviewed annually over 8 years, from 1994 to 2001.
In the following, we consider a balanced panel. The individuals who work, but for whom
the wage is not declared, are excluded. Self-employed workers and unpaid workers in a family
business are also excluded. Finally the data consist in 5, 092 individuals, between 16 and 59,
who are followed from 1994 to 2001.
Further, we consider the highest education degree instead of the educational level. In France,
civil-servant exams are actually conditional on degrees and not on a certain number of years of
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studying. The activity sector is declared by individuals. We consider that they work in the public
sector when they answered that they work for state or local governments. Otherwise, they are
said to work in the private sector, namely that they are employed by national or private firms, or
by their own firm.6
The French European Household survey provides annual wage earnings and a monthly de-
scription of the occupation but it does not provide the specific wage of the job occupied during
the month of the interview. We divide the annual wage earnings by the total number of months
employed during the year. In order to get an accurate estimate for this monthly wage, cautious-
ness is required when people had two jobs or more in a given year, but this actually concerns
less than 5% of the employed people in a given year. Hence, for these people, we divide the
annual wage earnings by the number of months they are employed whatever the number of jobs
they got throughout the year. When there is a single employment spell in a year, no problem
arises, since the data set distinguishes benefits from wages. Finally, monthly wages are assessed
in euros at 1994 prices.
Figure 1 Density of the log of wages in 1994.
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3.2. Some descriptive statistics on balanced data
The initial sample (without age restriction) contains half nonemployed people and half em-
ployed people. Logically the sample restricted to people aged less than 60 over-represents
6There is no cross-validation of their employment status as in Card (1996) and the different public services can
not be distinguished.
155
employed people (table (1)). In the data set, the public sector is over represented compared to
usual national statistics. The public sector amounts to one third of employed people, versus one
fourth for national statistics. This can be due to the fact that short-term jobs in public services
may be occupied by individuals who declare themselves as civil servants, and who are not. And
this over representation of civil-servants is not due to the balanced panel, as this proportion is
also higher when assessed on the non balanced data set.
The proportion of female is traditionally higher in the public than in the private sector, since
it is easier to conciliate professional and family lives while employed in public sectors (table
(2)). Few foreigners work in the public sector because entrance exams often require French
citizenship. Entrance exams also require a minimum level of degree and a certain age, so degree
distribution differs within sectors. There are less graduates in the private sector compared to
the public one, and there are less high-school drop-outs. The same remarks hold for the age
distribution.
The log monthly wage variance is lower in the public sector than in the private one whatever
the degree considered. The log monthly wage mean is also higher in the public sector when de-
gree is not controlled for, see (figure (1), appendix B). When degree is controlled for, this still
holds for high-school dropouts and vocational technical degrees, but this mean wage is roughly
equivalent in both sectors for high-school graduates, and university degrees seem to be less re-
warded in the public sector. The public sector would play an insurance role for lower degrees,
it would protect them from too low wages and it would guarantee them a lower variance. As
descriptive statistics do not control for selectivity, the model we estimate goes one step further.
It controls for participation selection and sector choice, such as unobserved and observed het-
erogeneity: age, experience,7 region, number of children less than 3 years old, between 3 and
6...
Finally consider some figures about transitions. From 1994 to 2001, 816 individuals are
nonemployed, and 2, 384 are employed. Over these 2, 384 individuals, 775 are employed in
public services, and 1, 544 are employed in the private sector. Moreover, 4, 276 individuals
are employed at least once throughout this period. Few direct transitions from the public to
the private sectors and from the private to the public sectors are observed: 93 transitions from
the public to the private sector over the whole period (experienced by 92 individuals), against
7Experience can not be precisely measured in the data set. Hence it is assessed by age minus age at the end of
studies. It is a proxy for general experience and not for sector-specific experience.
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67 from the private to the public sector (experienced by 67 individuals). 217 individuals are
employed at least one period in the public sector and at least one period in the private sector. 334
individuals previously employed in the public sector become non-employed, which confirms
that very few individuals transit from public employment to nonparticipation.
Table 1 Nonemployment, employment in public and private sectors.
Activity status 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Non Employed 1,692 1,653 1,663 1,671 1,655 1,637 1,692 1,740
(33%) (32%) (33%) (33%) (32%) (32%) (33%) (34%)
Employed 3,400 3,439 3,429 3,421 3,437 3,455 3,400 3,352
(67%) (68%) (67%) (67%) (68%) (68%) (67%) (66%)
Sector
Public 1,061 1,084 1,086 1,057 1,052 1,042 1,014 993
(31%) (32%) (32%) (31%) (31%) (30%) (30%) (30%)
Private 2,339 2,355 2,343 2,364 2,385 2,413 2,386 2,359
(69%) (68%) (68%) (69%) (69%) (70%) (70%) (70%)
Source: French European Household.
4. Econometric model and estimation principles
4.1. Model
The structural model described above confirms that the sector choice equation can be modeled
by a binary variable: nonemployed search for both public and private jobs when cPu ≤ Upu.
And this threshold depends on explanatory variables such as individuals covariates and local
unemployment rate.
In addition to the sector choice equation, we consider an employment equation, and a switch-
ing wage equation. Hence the reduced form model is composed of four equations. The first one
describes employment, namely the fact that the individual works or not (yit = 1 if the individ-
ual works). The second one describes the sector choice: public versus private (zit = 1 when
the individual works in the private sector, zit = 0 otherwise). Finally, the third (resp. fourth)
equation is the log monthly wage in the private sector wPrit (resp. public sector wPuit ).
yit = I
(
XYit β
Y + θYi + u
Y
it > 0
) (4.8)
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Table 2 General descriptive statistics
Whole Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Gender
Women 2,750 54.01 955 40.83 628 59.19
Men 2,342 45.99 1,384 59.17 433 40.81
Nationality
French 4,887 95.97 2,220 94.91 1,053 99.25
Not French 205 4.03 119 5.09 8 0.75
Region
Paris 698 13.71 351 15.01 170 16.02
Out of Paris 4,394 86.29 170 84.99 891 83.98
Age
16-29 1,442 28.32 555 23.73 170 16.02
30-39 1,395 27.40 742 31.72 340 32.05
40-49 1,378 27.06 741 31.68 372 35.06
50-59 877 17.22 301 12.87 179 16.87
Highest diploma
No secondary degree 1,838 36.10 742 31.72 276 26.01
Vocational technical school (Basic) 1,449 28.46 851 36.38 242 22.81
High school degree 745 14.63 308 13.17 143 13.48
(general or vocational)
Technical College, undergraduate 765 15.02 299 12.78 270 25.45
university,
or Licence, Maitrise
Graduates 295 5.79 139 5.94 130 12.25
Part-time 541 15.9 360 15.4 181 17.1
The statistics given above are assessed on the first year 1994.
Source: French European Household.
And if the individual works,
zit = I
(
XZitβ
Z + θZi + u
Z
it > 0
) (4.9)
wPrit = zit
(
XPrit β
Pr + θPri + u
Pr
it
) (4.10)
wPuit = (1− zit)
(
XPuit β
Pu + θPui + u
Pu
it
) (4.11)
where
θ =
(
θY , θZ , θPr, θPu
)
denotes the vector of the unobserved heterogeneity components,
X =
(
XY , XZ , XPr, XPu
)
denotes the vector of the observable characteristics,
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β =
(
βY , βZ , βPr, βPu
)
denotes the vector of parameters,
u =
(
uY , uZ , uPr, uPu
)
denotes the vector of residuals, which are assumed to be independent
and normally distributed across time and individuals, with variance σ2Pr (resp. σ2Pu).8
As unobserved heterogeneity is crucial to understand different economic behaviors and unob-
served productivity, we integrate unobserved terms in each equation. And following the method
of Heckman and Singer (1984), we model unobserved heterogeneity θ via a discrete random
variable whose distribution has a given number of support points and has to be estimated. The
model is estimated using an EM algorithm and standard errors are obtained by a parametric
bootstrap. The effects of unobservables on wages vary between public and private sectors. It
means that an individual may have a sector specific ability and his unobserved ability will be
differently rewarded.
The model does not include lagged dependent variables. It could be included to capture
state dependence. In such a case, the introduction of initial conditions could be solved using the
method proposed by Wooldridge (2005) or the one proposed by Heckman (1981). This would
entail to compute the likelihood recursively, conditional on the initial conditions. Finally, the
model is estimated on a balanced panel, it could have been estimated easily on an unbalanced
one.
4.2. Likelihood and estimation principles
We do not use Simulated Maximum Likelihood to estimate the model, since it is too time con-
suming and presents convergence failures. Even with precise and accurate initial conditions, the
program fails to converge quickly and it seems to get trapped in some regions.
Instead of that, as previously mentioned, we follow the method proposed by Heckman and
Singer (1984) and we consider a discrete distribution for the heterogeneity terms. The hetero-
geneity is modeled by K distinct types (θ1, θ2, ..., θK) with θk =
(
θYk , θ
Z
k , θ
Pr
k , θ
Pu
k
)′
. Let πk
denote the unconditional probability that an individual belongs to the type k. As it is usual for
finite mixture distributions, we rely on the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Demp-
ster, Laird, and Rubin (1977)) to estimate the model.
8The assumption of independence across residuals is not restrictive since we follow Heckman and Singer (1984)
to model the unobserved heterogeneity, see also Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Arcidiacono (2005).
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This algorithm iterates the two following steps until the stability of the log-likelihood (for
detailed explanations, see appendix C). At each iteration n of the algorithm, we use the values
πnk and the values (θn1 , θn2 , ..., θnK) of the mixture distribution, and the values
(
βn, σ2,nPu, σ
2,n
Pr
)
of
the parameters of interest.
E-step
For each type k = 1, ..., K and each individual i, the posterior probability of type k is:
P
(
Ti = k|yi, zi, wi
)
=
πkP(yi, zi, wi|Ti = k)∑K
l=1 πlP(yi, zi, wi|Ti = l)
. (4.12)
where Ti is the random variable representing the type of the individual i. π(n)ik denotes
these posterior probabilities.
M-step
The expected completed log likelihood is maximized:
max
β, σ2Pu, σ
2
Pr,
(πk)k=1,...,K,
(θk)k=1,...,K
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
π
(n)
ik ln l
(
y
i
, zi, wi|Ti = k, β, σ2Pu, σ2Pr, (πk)Kk=1, (θk)Kk=1
)
(4.13)
First π(n)k is updated such that:
π
(n+1)
k =
∑N
i=1 π
(n)
ik∑K
l=1
∑N
i=1 π
(n)
il
(4.14)
Second the following three optimization problems are solved separately, thanks to the
separability of the conditional completed log-likelihood (see Appendix C).
1. Optimization on the employment equation parameters
max
βY ,(θYk )
K
k=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
pi
(n)
il Iyit=0 lnΦ
(−XYit βY − θYk )
+ pi
(n)
il Iyit=1 lnΦ
(
XYit βY + θ
Y
k
)
,
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2. Optimization on the sector choice equation parameters
max
βZ ,(θZk )
K
k=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
pi
(n)
il Iyit=1,zit=0 lnΦ
(−XZitβZ − θZk )
+ pi
(n)
il Iyit=1,zit=1 lnΦ
(
XZitβZ + θ
Z
k
)
,
3. Optimization on the wage equations parameters
min
βPr ,σPr ,(θ
Pr
k )
K
k=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
pi
(n)
il Iyit=1,zit=1 lnσPr
+
pi
(n)
il
2σ2Pr
Iyit=1,zit=1(w
Pr
it −XPrit βPr − θPrk )2,
and
min
βPu,σPu,(θ
Pu
k )
K
k=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
pi
(n)
il Iyit=1,zit=0 lnσPu
+
pi
(n)
il
2σ2Pu
Iyit=1,zit=1(w
Pu
it −XPuit βPu − θPuk )2.
Standard errors estimates are obtained by a parametric bootstrap procedure, instead of a
non parametric one, since this last method is unstable when applied to the EM algorithm. The
parametric bootstrap consists first in obtaining reliable parameter estimates for the whole set
of unknown parameters denoted χ̂. χ̂ is obtained by replicating the previously described EM
algorithm with different random initial values for the parameters. The iteration process is nec-
essary to ensure that a global maximum is obtained. Then, given X and χ̂, we generate H
vectors of the endogenous variables
(
yhi , z
h
i , w
h
i
)
h=1...H
. For each newly generated data set, we
estimate the whole set of unknown parameters. Final parameters and standard error estimates
are computed as
β∗ =
1
H
H∑
h=1
β∗h (4.15)
σβ∗ =
1
H − 1
H∑
h=1
(β∗h − β∗)2. (4.16)
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5. Results
5.1. Identification
The model identification does not only rely on functional assumptions, imposed on the
residual distributions, but on exclusion restrictions. On the one hand, in the nonemploy-
ment/employment equation, we include the number of children between 0 and 3, and the number
of children between 3 and 6. These variables are crucial for explaining female participation (see
Hyslop (1999) and Edon and Kamionka (2008)). These variables are excluded from the sector
choice and the wage equation. The fertility of a woman may influence the sector choice but this
component is captured by the unobserved heterogeneity specific to the sector choice equation.
On the other hand, in the sector choice equation, a proxy of the father status as a proxy
of the mother status at the end of the individual studies, is included. This is known to be a
determinant of civil servant status (Audier (2000)). The status of the parents occupation is not
directly observed, a proxy is built from the two-digit classification of their occupation. Hence
we consider the father (resp. mother) was a civil servant when he (resp. she) was either ’senior
civil servants, information professionals or creative and performing artists’ or ’middle-level
health and teaching workers, middle-level civil servants’ or finally ’middle-level civil servants’.
These variables are excluded from the rest of the model.9
5.2. Estimations
5.2.1. Estimation results
Employment
As expected, gender negatively affects employment, as well as children under 3 and 6 do.
Women choose to get out of the labor market to bring up their children, and usually wait
for their entrance into nursery or primary school to look for a job. In France, some chil-
dren part-time attend nursery school. The marriage is not determinant for the employment
decision. The effect of age on employment is quadratic. The employment probability first
increases, and then decreases with age.
9In 1994, among women who work, 13.3% of them have a father who was civil-servant, and 10.9% a mother
who was civil-servant. For men, these percentage are respectively 12.4% and 8.1%.
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Moreover, the higher the degree, the higher the probability to be employed. Graduate
degrees are the most rewarding ones in terms of employment probabilities.
Individuals who live in the region around Paris or in Paris have a greater probability to be
employed because of job offer opportunities. Finally, as expected, local unemployment
rate has a negative effect on the probability to be employed.
Sector Choice
Our theoretical model teaches us that, given risk aversion, a higher unemployment rate
diminishes the cost of searching for a public job when unemployed. The return associated
to the private sector drops when the unemployment rate rises. This is confirmed by our
estimations: the local unemployment rate favors the choice of public sector (Table 3).
Fougère and Pouget (2003) also find that the number of candidates for a public job and
the macroeconomic cycle go along. Hence the local unemployment rate is a core variable
to understand public sector attractiveness.
The father’s position directly influences his children sector choice. A son would prefer
public services if his father is a civil-servant. This confirms empirical observations: civil
servants’ children are over-represented in the public sector (Audier (2000)). But women
whose father is a civil-servant would prefer private sector compared to women whose
father is not a civil-servant.
Moreover, as expected, women have a higher propensity than men to work in public
services. This would be enforced thanks to the wage analysis. This result is in line with
Bell, Elliott, and Scott (2005), who find, for UK, that the gains to staying in the public
sector are greater for women than for men, and that women tend to gain by joining the
public sector, almost irrespective of their position in the earnings distribution. We find
similar results for France (see following sections). Fougère and Pouget (2003) also find
that the length of queue for public sector is longer for female.
Individuals with lower degree tend to work in the private sector unlike individuals with
post-secondary education. Two reasons may explain this effect: first, French public jobs
are more qualified on the whole than jobs in private sector (teaching, executive...). And
many public jobs require to pass an exam which is conditional on a given degree.
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Wages
Usual results are obtained in terms of effects of different variables, such as age, experi-
ence, degree... The comparison between private and public wages is more instructive.
Unlike empirical results, the residual variance is slightly higher in the public sector (0.11)
than in the private one (0.08). And, the constant associated to public wages is higher
(5.82 against 5.08), what people usually call "the public raw wage premium". For most
degrees (except for graduates) we can not conclude that education is less rewarded in
public services. But for graduates, the returns to education are statistically different and
greater in the private sector.
Worth to be pointed out is the worst returns to gender in the private sector. As Gregory
and Borland (1999) underlined, public sector wage inefficiency may counterbalance wage
discriminations. That seems to be the case in France. Nonetheless, to be a woman has
also a negative effect on public wages. Indeed women have lower probabilities to be pro-
moted than men with similar characteristics (Bessière and Pouget (2007)). But in public
services, wage increases are closely linked to grade promotions. Thus career differences
may explain wage differences between men and women in public services.
Finally, living around Paris and in Paris gives a positive premium for wages.
We give further details on wages in the following section thanks to simulations.
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Table 3. Employment equation
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Constant -5.515 0.092
Not French 0.137 0.048
French - -
Not Married 0.032 0.017
Married - -
Women -0.546 0.015
Men - -
Children under 3 -0.237 0.021
Children between 3 and 6 -0.259 0.021
Age/10 4.556 0.567
Age/10 squared -5.651 0.673
No secondary degree - -
Vocational degree 0.217 0.021
High School degree 0.264 0.026
College and Under Graduate 0.335 0.023
Graduate 0.706 0.035
Paris 0.206 0.027
Local unemployment rate -0.012 0.003
Source: French European Household.
Table 4. Private sector choice
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Intercept 1.067 0.251
Women -0.604 0.041
Men - -
Age/100 3.024 1.483
Age/100 squared -5.594 1.795
Not Married 0.032 0.042
Vocational degree 0.160 0.050
High School degree 0.317 0.055
College and Under Graduate -0.122 0.041
Graduate -0.109 0.063
Women times Father civil servant 0.406 0.080
Men times Father civil servant -0.361 0.061
Women times Mother civil servant 0.070 0.085
Men times Mother civil servant -0.109 0.083
Local unemployment rate -0.047 0.006
Source: French European Household.
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Table 5. Public wage equation
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Intercept 5.822 0.041
Women -0.185 0.007
Paris 0.118 0.009
Age/100 4.919 0.271
Age/100 squared -4.152 0.327
Age of end of study/100 0.308 0.205
Age of end of study/100 squared -1.560 0.689
Vocational degree 0.068 0.010
High School degree 0.339 0.016
College and Under Graduate 0.459 0.015
Graduate 0.667 0.015
Part-time -0.436 0.010
Variance of residuals 0.110 0.002
Source: French European Household.
Table 6. Private wage equation
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Intercept 5.075 0.028
Women -0.385 0.005
Paris 0.287 0.007
Age/100 8.935 0.188
Age/100 squared -9.284 0.232
Age of end of study/100 1.806 0.131
Age of end of study/100 squared -1.787 0.358
Vocational degree 0.106 0.006
High School degree 0.351 0.008
College and Under Graduate 0.428 0.008
Graduate 0.800 0.010
Part-time -0.494 0.007
Variance of residuals 0.083 0.001
Source: French European Household.
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5.2.2. Types
Four types were chosen instead of three because of the insufficient fit we had and the peculiar
results we got. Three were not sufficient to capture heterogeneity. Why not five? For computa-
tional reasons, since four types are already heavy to implement.
In a first step, we compute the individual posterior probability to be of a given type at the
initial date 1994. We consider that an individual is of type k when the individual posterior
probability associated to type k is the highest. Results show that a clear type-partition exists. At
the initial date, type-2 people are mainly nonemployed (85.9%) whereas type-1, type-3 and type-
4 individuals are employed. These latter groups differ according to the sector choice. 85.1% of
type-3 individuals are employed in public services in 1994, whereas 88.4% of type-1 individuals
and 74.1% of type-4 individuals are employed in the private sector. Thus employment and
sectors distinctly partition individuals in our sample.
Considering the values of unobserved heterogeneity for different types, remark that type-1
and type-3 individuals have an unobserved ability roughly similar in both sectors (for type 1:
θWPr = 0.184 and θWPu = 0.014 ; for type 3: θWPr = −0.247 and θWPu = 0.007), whereas
type-4 individuals would have a different unobserved productivity in both sectors. These indi-
viduals clearly have chosen the sector in which they are the most productive. Type-4 individuals
are clearly more efficient in the private sector than in the public sector (θWPr = −0.468 and
θWPu = −1.031).They may have sorted themselves into the sector that pays them more.
6. Simulations
6.1. Model fit
This section presents a brief fit analysis of the statistical model presented above. Table (8)
presents the predicted probabilities for nonemployment, public jobs and private jobs. The fre-
quencies of nonemployment and of employment in either sector are well replicated whatever
the date considered.
Further the model replicates well the cross sectional distribution. Figure (2) plots the ob-
served and predicted log of monthly wage densities for the two sectors separately, which are
quite close.
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Table 7. Other parameters
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Probability of different types
Type 1 0.208 0.006
Type 2 0.218 0.006
Type 3 0.225 0.006
Type 4 0.349 0.006
Type-specific heterogeneity parameters
Type 1
θY -1.051 0.027
θZ 1.972 0.101
θWPr 0.014 0.011
θWPu 0.184 0.030
Type 2
θY -3.788 0.036
θZ 0.046 0.086
θWPr -1.199 0.013
θWPu -0.555 0.020
Type 3
θY -1.235 0.033
θZ -2.581 0.087
θWPr -0.247 0.016
θWPu 0.007 0.016
Type 4
θY -1.924 0.032
θZ 1.630 0.087
θWPr -0.468 0.011
θWPu -1.031 0.024
Source: French European Household.
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Table 8. Model Fit
Variables Year Predicted probability Observed probability
% %
Nonemployed 1994 34.379 33.229
1995 33.522 32.463
1996 33.160 32.659
1997 32.840 32.816
1998 32.711 32.502
1999 32.765 32.148
2000 33.035 33.229
2001 33.800 34.171
Public sector 1994 20.105 20.837
1995 20.356 21.288
1996 20.605 21.328
1997 20.647 20.758
1998 20.586 20.660
1999 20.355 20.463
2000 20.033 19.914
2001 19.804 19.501
Private sector 1994 45.516 45.935
1995 46.122 46.249
1996 46.235 46.013
1997 46.513 46.426
1998 46.703 46.838
1999 46.880 47.388
2000 46.932 46.858
2001 46.396 46.328
Source: French European Household
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6.2. What private wages would civil servants have? Counterfactual dis-
tributions
We derive the counterfactual distribution of the log monthly wages for the individual employed
in the public sector. Which log of wages would public servants have if they were employed in
the private sector?
We use bootstrapping methods: we drawH independent replicates drawn from the empirical
distribution of the explanatory variables of people working in the public sector at date t. For
each replicate, we draw a type t(i) in the following posterior distribution
P (Ti = k|yit = 1, zit = 0, Xit) = πkP(yit = 1, zit = 0|Ti = k,Xit)∑K
l=1 πlP(yit = 1, zit = 0|Ti = l, Xit)
, (6.17)
where Ti is the random variable representing the type of the individual i. Then we compute the
corresponding fitted value of the log monthly wages in both sectors:
ws,P rit = Xitβ̂
Pr + θ̂Prt(i), (6.18)
ws,Puit = Xitβ̂
Pu + θ̂Put(i). (6.19)
Finally we add a sector-specific residual term that is i.i.d normally distributed with a sector-
specific variance.
In figure 3, we observe that the counterfactual distribution remains close to the log of wage
public distribution. But this hides different effects according to gender and degrees. The coun-
terfactual distribution for men is rather stable except for the upper tail, whereas the one for
women shifts left.
In order to precisely evaluate the public wage premium, let us derive and compare quantiles
of the former distributions: the public log of wage distribution and the counterfactual distribu-
tion. Further details are given in appendix E. Figures 5 and 8 plot the difference of quantiles
between the current and the counterfactual distributions according to gender and degrees. The
term "public wage premium" seems to be justified at the bottom of the distribution, whereas it is
not anymore for upper wages. But when detailed by degree and gender, we find that the public
sector actually gives a premium to women, whereas men would be better paid in the private
sector except for those at the lower tail of the distribution. As expected given previous estima-
170
tions, male graduates would be far better paid in the private sector. So we find similar results as
Disney and Gosling (1998) and Bell, Elliott, and Scott (2005): public sector premium is higher
for women than for men, and this premium differs across the pay distribution. The lower part
of the distribution gains from staying in the public sector.
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Figure 2 Predicted log of monthly wages - 1994
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Figure 3 Counterfactual log of monthly wages for civil servants - 1994
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Figure 4 Counterfactual log of monthly wages according to degrees
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7. Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the public-private pay gap. The model estimates sector-
specific wage equations controlling both for sector choice and employment selection. Thanks to
panel data, it captures unobserved heterogeneity which differs between equations. It is modeled
using the method of Heckman and Singer (1984) via a discrete distribution.
We find that, when choosing the sector, mimicking the parents has a great importance. But
only sons imitate their father’s choice. As expected, the public sector attracts more people when
the local labor market is depressed. We observe that the wage public premium is effective at
the bottom of the public wage distribution. But it turns out to be false at the upper tail. This is
in line with empirical observations: low-wage civil-servants are weakly mobile, whereas high-
wage civil servants move more frequently from the public to the private sector.
However these results are mitigated when gender is distinguished. The female public sector
workers have a comparative advantage in the public sector. Their counterfactual wages in the
private sector would be lower. Graduated men would have higher wages in the private sector; in
the case of graduated women, the public wage premium is close to zero.
Finally we find that wage differences between the public and the private sectors result from
three factors: first the raw mean is greater in the public sector, second the returns to different
observable characteristics differ between both sectors, finally the unobserved productivity civil-
servants would have in the private sector is roughly equal, though inferior, to the one they have
in their current occupation. Unlike them, a part of workers employed in the private sector seem
to acquire specific human capital, that they could not transfer to the public sector.
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A. Structural model
From (2.3), differentiating this latter equation with respect to w yields:
ρV
′
Pr(x) = 1− δV
′
Pr(x)− λPr,PrV
′
Pr(x)F (x)
⇒ VPr(x)− VPr(w) = −
∫ wPr
x
1
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF Pr(y)
dy
Let us consider both cases.
• Case 1: dPu = 0
When the individual does not search for a public job, if he receives an offer with a
wage w greater than w∗d=0, he accepts this offer. The reservation wage w∗d=0 checks:
V d=0n = VPr(w
∗
d=0). Henceforth:
V d=0n ρ = (b− c) + λn,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=0
(VPr(x)− Vn) dFPr(x)
= (b− c) + λn,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=0
V
′
Pr(x)F Pr(x)dx
⇒
 ρV d=0n = (b− c) + λn,Pr ∫ ww∗Pr,d=0 V ′Pr(x)F Pr(x)dx
ρV d=0n = w
∗
Pr,d=0 − c+ λPr,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=0
V
′
Pr(x)F Pr(x)dx

And:
w∗Pr,d=0 = b (A.20)
+ (λn,Pr − λPr,Pr)
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=0
F Pr(x)
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrFPr(x)
dx
• Case 2: dPu = 1
Let us proceed the same way thus we get:
ρV d=1n = (b− c− cPu) + λn,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=1
V
′
Pr(x)F Pr(x)dxλn,Pr
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+ pλn,Pu
∫ w
w∗
Pu
V
′
Pu(x)F Pu(x)dx
ρV d=1n = w
∗
Pr,d=1 − c+ λPr,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=1
V
′
Pr(x)F Pr(x)dx
V d=1n = VPr(w
∗
Pr,d=1) = VPu(w
∗
Pu) =
w∗Pu
ρ
Hence:
w∗Pu = w
∗
Pr,d=1 − c+ λPr,Pr
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=1
F Pr
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF Pr(x)
(x)dx
w∗Pr,d=1 = (b− cPu) + (λn,Pr − λPr,Pr)
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=1
F Pr(x)
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF Pr(x)
dx
+
λn,Pup
ρ
∫ w
w∗
Pu
FPu(x)dx
The values we have to compare to determine whether the individual searches for a public
job, are V d=0n and V d=1n , i.e. VPr(w∗Pr,d=0) and VPr(w∗Pr,d=1):
VPr(w
∗
Pr,d=1)− VPr(w∗Pr,d=0)
=
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=0
1
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF (x)
dx−
∫ w
w∗
Pr,d=1
1
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF (x)
dx
VPr(w
∗
Pr,d=1) = VPr(w
∗
Pr,d=0)⇔ w∗Pr,d=1 = w∗Pr,d=0
and VPr(w∗Pr,d=1) ≥ VPr(w∗Pr,d=0)⇔ w∗Pr,d=1 ≥ w∗Pr,d=0
The nonemployed person searches for both public and private jobs when w∗Pr,d=1 ≥ w∗Pr,d=0.
From equations (w∗Pr,d=0), (w∗Pr,d=1) and (w∗Pu), we get:
w∗Pr,d=0 = f(w
∗
Pr,d=0)
w∗Pr,d=1 = f(w
∗
Pr,d=1) + g(w
∗
Pr,d=1)
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with
f(x) = b+ (λn,Pr − λPr,Pr)
∫ w
x
F Pr(x)
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrFPr(x)
dx
and g(x) = −cPu + λn,Pup
ρ
∫ w
h(x)
FPu(x)dx
and h(x) = x− c+ λPr,Pr
∫ w
x
F Pr(x)
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF Pr(x)
dx
h is an increasing and bounded function with first derivative:
h
′
(x) =
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + λPr,PrF Pr(x)
Hence g is a decreasing and bounded function and three different cases are possible. Indeed,
∀x ∈ [0, w], 0 ≥ f ′(x) ≥ f ′(x) + g′(x).
• f(0) + g(0) ≤ f(0): it means that a nonemployed person never searches for a public job
for w∗d=0 > w∗d=1.
• f(0) + g(0) ≥ f(0) and f(w) + g(w) ≥ f(w): it means that a nonemployed person
always searches for both public and private jobs.
• f(0) + g(0) ≥ f(0) and f(w) + g(w) < f(w): it means that a nonemployed person may
search for a public job depending on g(w∗d=0). If g(w∗d=0) ≥ 0 the nonemployed person
will search for a public job, whereas she won’t.
We show that
w∗d=0 ≤ w∗d=1 ⇔ g(w∗d=0) ≥ 0
Indeed,
♦ On one hand,
w∗d=0 ≤ w∗d=1 ⇒ f(w∗d=0) + g(w∗d=0) ≥ f(w∗d=1) + g(w∗d=1)
And w∗d=0 ≤ w∗d=1 ⇒ f(w∗d=0) ≤ f(w∗d=1) + g(w∗d=1)
Thus f(w∗d=0) ≤ f(w∗d=0) + g(w∗d=0)⇒ g(w∗d=0) ≥ 0
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♦ On the other hand
g(w∗d=0) ≥ 0⇒ f(w∗d=0) ≤ f(w∗d=0) + g(w∗d=0)
Thus w∗d=0 ≤ f(w∗d=0) + g(w∗d=0)
And f(x) + g(x)− x is a decreasing function such as f(w∗d=1) + g(w∗d=1)− w∗d=1 = 0f(w∗d=0) + g(w∗d=0)− w∗d=0 ≥ 0

⇒ w∗d=1 ≥ w∗d=0
Proposition A.1 Search for a public job
The nonemployed agent decides to search for both public and private jobs when:
cPu ≤ pS λn,Pu
ρ
∫ w
h(w∗
d=0)
F Pu(x)dx
where h(w∗d=0)is a function of
(
b, λn,Pr, λPr,Pr, w, ρ, δ, F Pr
)
with:
− cPu the cost to search for a public job
− λn,Pu the public job offer arrival rate
− pS the individual probability to succeed public entrance exam
− h(w∗d=0) = λn,Prλn,Pr−λPr,Prw∗d=0 − c−
λPr,Pr
λn,Pr−λPr,Pr
b
He only searches for private jobs when:
cPu > pS
λn,Pu
ρ
∫ w
h(w∗
d=0)
F Pu(x)dx
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Figure 5 Quantile differences between counterfactual and public log of wage distribution.
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Figure 6: Function value comparison
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
f+g
f 
y=x 
w(d=1) 
w(d=0) 
179
B. Descriptive Statistics
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C. Implementation
Let me describe precisely the implementation of the M-step.
l
(
y
i
, zi, wi|Ti = k
)
=
T∏
t=1
(P (yit = 0|Ti = k))yit=0 (C.21)(
P
(
yit = 1, zit = 1, w
Pr
it |Ti = k
))yit=1,zit=1(
P
(
yit = 1, zit = 0, w
Pu
it |Ti = k
))yit=1,zit=0
Given the individual type, for a given date, residuals are independent, hence:
l
(
y
i
, zi, wi|Ti = k
)
=
T∏
t=1
(P (yit = 0|Ti = k))yit=0 (P (yit = 1|Ti = k))yit=1 (C.22)
T∏
t=1
(P (zit = 1|Ti = k))yit=1,zit=1 (P (zit = 0|Ti = k))yit=1,zit=0
T∏
t=1
(
P
(
wPuit |Ti = k
))yit=1,zit=0
T∏
t=1
(
P
(
wPrit |Ti = k
))yit=1,zit=1
Therefore, we can maximize separately each equation once we condition on the individual
type.
D. Cross-section results
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Figure 7 Wages according to degrees in 1994
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Table 9. Public wage equation without selection - 1994
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Intercept 4.568 0.329
Women -0.183 0.025
Paris 0.133 0.033
Age/100 5.692 1.016
Age/100 squared -5.162 1.259
Age of end of study/100 11.644 2.508
Age of end of study/100 squared -27.296 5.949
Vocational degree -0.019 0.033
High School degree 0.244 0.053
College and Under Graduate 0.323 0.034
Graduate 0.590 0.043
Part-time -0.609 0.033
Source: French European Household
Table 10. Private wage equation without selection - 1994
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Intercept 4.785 0.178
Women -0.252 0.020
Paris 0.234 0.026
Age/100 7.903 0.685
Age/100 squared -8.384 0.887
Age of end of study 4.622 1.207
Age of end of study squared -8.349 2.792
Vocational degree 0.076 0.021
High School degree 0.307 0.036
College and Under Graduate 0.382 0.033
Graduate 0.698 0.044
Part-time -0.687 0.027
Source: French European Household
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Table 11. Switching regression model with sector selection - 1994
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Private wage equation
Intercept 4.787 0.178
Women -0.256 0.023
Paris 0.234 0.026
Age/100 7.872 0.690
Age/100 squared -8.361 0.887
Experience/100 4.618 1.204
Experience/100 squared -8.344 2.785
Vocational degree 0.077 0.022
High School degree 0.307 0.036
College and Under Graduate 0.379 0.034
Graduate 0.693 0.046
Part-time -0.687 0.027
Variance of residuals 0.432 0.006
Public wage equation
Intercept 5.817 0.322
Women -0.365 0.031
Paris 0.138 0.030
Age/100 3.092 1.189
Age/100 squared -2.725 1.482
Experience/100 12.772 2.088
Experience/100 squared -30.091 4.918
Vocational degree 0.039 0.038
High School degree 0.202 0.062
College and Under Graduate 0.107 0.042
Graduate 0.353 0.053
Part-time -0.508 0.031
Variance of residuals 0.592 0.021
Source: French European Household
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Table 12: Switching regression model with sector selection - 1994 - continued
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Sector choice equation
Intercept 1.767 0.373
Women -0.466 0.049
Men - -
Age/100 -3.316 1.871
Age/100 squared 2.329 2.345
Married 0.098 0.040
Vocational degree 0.169 0.057
High School degree 0.069 0.095
College and Under Graduate -0.377 0.066
Graduate -0.474 0.086
Women times Father civil servant -0.248 0.073
Men times Father civil servant -0.229 0.072
Women times Mother civil servant -0.044 0.079
Men times Mother civil servant -0.203 0.088
Local unemployment rate -0.005 0.007
Source: French European Household
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E. Quantile differences between the public log of wage distri-
butions and the counterfactual distribution
Figure 8. Quantile differences between the public log of wage and the counterfactual
distributions given sex and degrees.
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Table 13. Quantile differences between the public log of wage and the counterfactual
distributions.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Quantiles Estimates
Standard Errors
0.050 0.156 0.168 0.155 0.155 0.153 0.154 0.155 0.157
0.018 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
0.100 0.144 0.157 0.152 0.150 0.153 0.150 0.146 0.148
0.017 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
0.150 0.130 0.142 0.143 0.138 0.142 0.140 0.136 0.136
0.019 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
0.200 0.118 0.128 0.130 0.126 0.132 0.129 0.127 0.125
0.019 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018
0.250 0.109 0.117 0.120 0.116 0.122 0.120 0.119 0.116
0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018
0.300 0.102 0.108 0.111 0.108 0.113 0.111 0.111 0.109
0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018
0.350 0.095 0.100 0.102 0.100 0.106 0.103 0.104 0.102
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018
0.400 0.090 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.099 0.096 0.097 0.096
0.019 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018
0.450 0.084 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.092 0.090 0.091 0.090
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018
0.500 0.079 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.084 0.085 0.085
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018
0.550 0.074 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019
0.600 0.070 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.074
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019
0.650 0.064 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.068
0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019
0.700 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.059 0.060 0.059 0.062
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
0.750 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.054
0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019
0.800 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.042 0.044 0.041 0.044
0.018 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019
0.850 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.029 0.031
0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
0.900 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013
0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.019
0.950 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018
0.021 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020
Source: French European Household
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Chapitre 4
Who is confronted to insecure labor market histories?
Some evidence based on the French labor market transitions.
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1. Introduction
Flexible employment has drastically increased in France since the introduction of short-term
contracts (Contrats à Durée Déterminée, CDD) and temporary work (mission d’intérim) in
the early 1980’s. Short-term contracts represent 66% of hirings in 2005 while 60% of the
transitions from employment to non-employment concern a short-term job ending. These
flexible devices, which may be justified by the need to maintain the competitiveness of
the firms, induce a higher frequency of labor market transitions. The transition rate between
employment and nonemployment has significantly increased between 1975 and 2000 (Behaghel
(2003)). Risks of involuntary job loss were higher in the 1990’s than in the 1980’s (Givord and
Maurin (2003)). In this context, studying transitions on the labor market and the distribution of
mobilities within the workforce is of first interest.
The nature of the job contract occupies an important place in the French debate on labor
market and labor legislation. The current controversy on the "Contrat Unique", following those
on the "Contrat Nouvelle Embauche" (CNE) and the "Contrat Première Embauche" (CPE)
in 2005 and 2006, stresses indeed that the nature of the job contract is a crucial feature of
job quality.1 Then, it is interesting to distinguish job spells in long-term contract and job
spell in short-term contract. Hence, four states stand out on the French labor market: stable
employment, which contains long-term contract jobs and self-employed; contingent work,
which refers to short-term contracts and temporary or seasonal jobs; unemployment and
nonparticipation. The scope of this paper is to analyze and quantify the different kinds of labor
market histories entailed by the transition dynamics between those states.
Short-term jobs may be a stepping stone in an integration process or a trap into insecurity.
The economic literature supports both aspects. On the one hand, theories of imperfect infor-
mation (Spence (1973)), transaction costs (Williamson (1975)) and insider-outsider (Lindbeck
and Snower (1986, 2002)) give some explanations of a dual labor market which either rely on
1On the one hand, the pros of a "Contrat Unique" advocate for standardizing the multiple kinds of jobs contract
in a single form. On the other hand, in recent years, the government made two attempts to introduce new forms
of job contracts: the CNE, introduced in August 2005, was a long-term contract with simplified and lightened
termination rules only available for firms with at most 20 employees; the CPE was an attempt of generalization of
the CNE available only for young workers (under 26). These two attempts aborted: the CPE was canceled due to
tough demonstrations in spring 2007; the CNE was declared unconstitutional just two years after its introduction.
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the heterogeneity of the labor supply productivity or on the existence of negotiation power in a
context of imperfect information.2 These theories stress the role of signalling in perpetuating a
vicious circle. Employers may consider a long history through unemployment and contingent
work as a bad signal on a worker’s ability and then they may offer him or her insecure positions
rather secure ones (Katz (1986)).3 Further, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Blanchard and
Landier (2002) relate the labor market duality to the coexistence of short-term jobs and highly
protected long-term ones. Besides, theories of segmented labor markets stress the outstanding
role of firms in shaping the labor market duality with the existence of internal labor markets and
human resources’ management or human capital investment which differ according to the job
sector; see for instance the seminal work of Doeringher and Piore (1971). On the other hand,
temporary jobs, more precisely short job spells, can be viewed as opportunities, especially for
young workers but also for people out of the labor force, to accumulate general human capital.
Temporary job spells may also provide a worker with enough time and/or information to find
out the best firm match; see Burdett (1978b),Jovanovic (1979a),Jovanovic (1979b), Mortensen
(1988), Topel and Ward (1992).
Cross-sectional studies on labor market duality (see L’Horty (2004), Gazier and Petit
(2007)) do not take into account the (complete) labor market histories. Here, we adopt a
totally different strategy. The identification of the sectorisation structure relies only on the
observed transitions between the different positions/states on the labor market. More precisely,
we use a mover-stayer approach (Blumen, Kogan, and MacCarthy (1955), Kamionka (1996)),
which distinguishes workers who remain stuck to contingent work (typically those alternating
nonemployment spells with short-term jobs) from those who may access to stable jobs and
benefit in a sense from an integration process. The approach proposed is conditional on
individual characteristics, which extends Kamionka (1996). Hence, this method enables us to
separate labor market histories which are confined to contingent work and non-employment
from those which are not and to characterize the individuals who experience them.
The discrete time mover-stayer model was first introduced by Blumen, Kogan, and
2Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 2002) summarize theoretical breakthroughs and list key references.
3Blanchard and Landier (2002) provide some semantic advice: whereas the French have a specific word des-
ignating a succession of short-term jobs and unemployment spells (précarité), there does not exist an equivalent
expression in English. We follow Blanchard and Landier’s suggestion to use insecurity instead.
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MacCarthy (1955) to study industrial mobility on the labor market; see also Anderson and
Goodman (1957), Goodman (1961), Spilerman (1972), Singer and Spilerman (1976) and
Frydman (1984). This model relies on a mixture of Markov chains which accounts for different
dynamic patterns among individuals. Its most basic version assumes that two kinds of workers
coexist on the labor market: while the movers can move from unemployment to employment,
the stayers remain indefinitely in the state they initially occupy.4
In the version proposed by Kamionka (1996), some workers, named unconfined movers, can
have access to any kind of jobs whereas some others, called confined movers, can only transit
between unemployment, short-term jobs and non-participation. The introduction of different
individual types allows one to account for the so-called partially observed heterogeneity.
We use the same partition but we explicitly let the mixture probabilities (being a mover,
confined or unconfined, or being a stayer) depend on observed characteristics, (conditional
confined-unconfined model). This allows us to investigate which individual characteristics are
correlated with specific dynamic patterns on the labor market. In other words, the version that
we propose enables us to highlight who the stayers, the unconfined movers and the confined
movers are. Further, the share of unconfined movers in the economy and amongst the movers
may provide an indicator of the labor market sectorisation level.
Apart from the mover-stayer models, labor market transitions are usually studied using
discrete choice models and/or duration models. Discrete-choice models explain the individual
status given his/her past (and notably his/her past status) and covariates; see for instance Card
and Sullivan (1988), Magnac (2000) or Havet (2006). Duration models explain the duration of
a spell in a given state by the past and a set of individual characteristics; see for example in the
French labor market context, Bonnal, Fougère, and Sérandon (1997) and Magnac and Robin
(1994). Duration models capture state and duration dependence whereas Markov-chain-based
approaches account for state dependence and partially observed heterogeneity. So our study
completes previous studies of the French labor market by focusing on partially observed
heterogeneity.
4Mover-stayer models have also been adapted to continuous time Fougère and Kamionka (1992a, 1992b, 2003,
2008) such as other Markov chain models Kalbfleish and Lawless (1985), Geweke, Marshall, and Zarkin (1986a,
1986b).
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The discrete time mover-stayer-type model proposed in this paper aims to separate histories
when individuals never accede to stable jobs from histories when individuals have a potential
access to both unstable and stable jobs. This partition is chosen in response to the sectorisation
issue in the French labor market. The population who experiences confined mover histories is
of first interest for policy concerns. Moreover, a statistical approach à la Heckman and Singer
(1984), which does not require to a priori impose the nature of types and nonzero-constraints
on the transition matrix components, does not reject the relevance of the partition postulated
here. In this alternative approach, the form and the number of the transition matrices are let
free but more structure is imposed on the state dependence. Transitions are actually modeled
by a dynamic multinomial logit with unobserved heterogeneity - which entails restrictions; see
Magnac (2000) and Brodaty (2007).
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood on a sample composed of 30-49 years
old people who finished their studies. The data come from the French Labor Force Survey.
We focus on middle-aged people to avoid life-cycle effects that may violate stationarity
requirements of Markov Chain models (labor market entrance of youth, retiring). Our main
findings are the following. Individuals trapped into confined mover histories represent about
5% of the total population. This is much less than the 13% computed in summary statistics,
showing the relevance of our model to handle heavily censored data. Individuals falling into
the confined-mover category are more likely to be less educated, younger and single. At
stationary equilibrium, 30% of them occupy unstable jobs, nearly a half are unemployed, while
the remaining do not participate.
The paper is organized as follows. The data and summary statistics are presented in section
2, and the model in section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to the estimation results. Section 5 contains
the results of the Heckman-Singer approach and some specification tests. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
The data come from the French Labor Force survey (LFS), 2003-2007, undertaken by Insee, the
French national statistical office. The LFS is a rolling panel in which individuals are interviewed
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on their labor market status, once per quarter, six times. This scheme enables one to construct
individual labor market histories over 15 months. Each quarter, one surveyed individual out
of six is replaced. In this paper, we use the LFS answers of the 30-49 years old individuals
who entered the survey from 2003Q1 to 2005Q4, who finished their studies and who were in-
terviewed 6 times. This panel consists in 33,206 individuals. The LFS contains information on
labor market states - employment, unemployment and nonparticipation - as well as a detailed
description of the job occupied by the employed. Long-term contracts, short-term contracts,
temporary jobs, internships are distinguished. In what follows, we consider four labor market
states: nonparticipation (NP), unemployment (U), unstable job state (UJ) which contains public
and private short-term contracts, temporary jobs and seasonal jobs, and a stable job state (SJ)
which contains private long-term contracts, self-employed and civil-servant positions. Unem-
ployment refers to the ILO definition: unemployed are nonemployed, available to work within
two weeks and actively search for a job. So, non-employed who search for a job are classified
as nonparticipants if they do not satisfy the availability criterion.5 Finally, the panel contains
information on individual characteristics, age, gender, educational level, residential location,
family characteristics, etc..
2.1. Summary statistics and representativeness
First, we briefly describe the current French labor market. In 2006, the average participation
rate amounted to 69% for 15-64 years old, 74.5% for men and 63.8% for women; see Attal-
Toubert and Lavergne (2006). The French labor market is characterized by a weak participation
rate of youth and the oldest compared to other European countries. This feature is often linked
to the fact that in the 1980’s and the 1990’s the government and social partners answered to
a growing mass unemployment by promoting early retirements and longer studies. In 2006,
around 10% of the 15-64 participants were unemployed, nearly half of them having been
unemployed for more than one year.6 Higher unemployment risk is correlated with: a low level
of education, youth, female gender, and blue-collar occupation. 13.5% of the employed oc-
cupied an unstable job that is training, apprenticeship, fixed-duration or temporary contract jobs.
5See Jones and Riddel (2006) for a deep analysis of the frontiers between nonparticipation and ILO unemploy-
ment; see also Flinn and Heckman (1983).
6The definition of unemployment and the estimation method of the unemployment rate changed in 2007 in
France. The definition used here is the one prevailing before 2007.
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We focus on 30-49 years old people who finished their studies, because we are interested in
rather stable labor market histories, once integration is completed and before that the retirement
process begins. Furthermore, we ensure stationarity of underlying processes when concentrating
on individuals aged between 30 and 49. The descriptive statistics assessed on the panel data on
the one hand, and on the pooled LFS 2003Q1-2007Q1 on the other hand, are quite close; see
Table 1. Nonetheless, a slight under-representation of men and of unemployed people can be
observed in the balanced panel. This is due to attrition. Unemployed people usually move more
often and they are less likely to be interviewed six times. The results presented in the sequel are
those holding for the panel.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Panel subsample LFS whole sample*
(obs. 33,206× 6) (obs. 395,077)
(30-49 years old)
(Studies finished)
Population
% women 52.3 50.4
% men 47.8 49.6
Participation rate %
Women 81.2 82.3
Men 95.6 95.4
Total 88.1 88.8
Unemployment rate %
Women 7.5 7.8
Men 5.8 6.4
Total 6.7 7.1
Employment rate %
Women 73.7 74.5
Men 89.9 88.9
Total 81.4 81.7
Share of long-term contracts %
Women 86.2 86.2
Men 92.9 91.5
Total 89.8 89.1
* pooled analysis.
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2.2. Descriptive statistics on transitions
The transitions between nonparticipation, unemployment, unstable jobs and stable jobs ob-
served in the balanced panel are described in Table 2. First, 75% of the sample sojourn within
long-term jobs or do not participate during the whole observation period, while only 25% expe-
rience in-sample transitions. Second, 19% of men and 27% of women experience one or more
transition within the observation period. Half of them accede to long-term contract job and half
of them transit without acceding to a CDI. So the apparent ratio of individuals trapped into "con-
tingent work" is 9% for men and 15% for women. Labor market histories greatly differ between
men and women. Women are more likely to be nonparticipant during the whole observation
period than men (13% versus 20%) and men are more likely to occupy a stable job during the
whole observation period.
Table 2. Data description
Men Women
Individuals... 15,847 100% 17,359 100%
sojourning in long-term jobs 12,497 79% 10,495 60 %
staying nonparticipants 382 2% 2,188 13%
moving between long-term, short-term jobs and without job spells 1,571 10% 2,065 12%
moving between short-term jobs and without job spells only 1,397 9% 2,611 15%
A simple Markov-chain model also provides some insightful summary statistics, see Table
3.
Table 3. Four-state Markov transition matrices
Men
T → T + 1 SJ UJ U NP
SJ 0.989 0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UJ 0.084 0.759 0.128 0.029
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
U 0.067 0.147 0.696 0.090
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
NP 0.074 0.024 0.112 0.791
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009)
Women
SJ UJ U NP
0.983 0.003 0.005 0.009
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.062 0.785 0.113 0.040
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)
0.059 0.136 0.669 0.137
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
0.037 0.016 0.059 0.887
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
* bootstrapped standard deviations with 50 replicates.
Stable jobs and nonparticipation are the most persistent states: 99% and 79% of persistence
within three months for men, and 98% and 89% for women. Around 75% of workers with
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unstable jobs and 66% of unemployed remain in the same state three months later.
The propensity to accede to stable jobs is more state-dependent for women than for men.
6.7% of male unemployed, 8.4% of male temporary workers and 7.4% of male nonparticipants
obtain a stable job within three months whereas 5.9% of female unemployed, 6.2% of female
temporary workers and only 3.7% of female nonparticipants obtain a stable job within three
months. Female nonparticipants are further away from the labor market than men are.
About 75% of unemployed individuals, whether male or female, transit to employment via a
temporary job (15% versus 6% for stable jobs). On the one hand, this underlines the potentially
integrating nature of temporary jobs. Before finding a long-term job, a large part of the unem-
ployed go through temporary jobs. On the other hand, this may also suggest a dual labor market.
Unemployed people have more frequently access to unstable jobs rather than to stable positions.
The relationship between unemployment and non-participation is asymmetric for women: 14%
of the unemployed leave the labor force each quarter, whereas only 6% of the non-participants
become unemployed. For men, these proportions are quite the same: 9% of male unemployed
exit the labor force, 11% of male nonparticipants become unemployed.
3. Methodology: the conditional confined-unconfined
worker model
The former Markov-chain model assumes that labor market transitions are generated by the
same underlying process for all individuals. This approach is restrictive in that it does not
provide information on coexisting different dynamic processes. To cover a potential labor
market heterogeneity, we turn to mover-stayer-like models. Mover-stayer models rely on a
mixture of Markov chains; see Blumen, Kogan, and MacCarthy (1955), Goodman (1961),
Spilerman (1972), Singer and Spilerman (1976), Frydman (1984). The model developed in this
section extends the version of Kamionka (1996)
Let us consider N individuals i = 1, . . . , N , observed at dates t = 0, . . . , T . These individu-
als can transit between K states relating to their labor market situation (K = 4 in what follows)
- stable jobs (1), short-term jobs (2), unemployment (3) and nonparticipation (4). The individ-
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ual i experiences a sequence of states denoted by the T -vector (ei0, . . . , eiT ). Ci denotes the
kind of dynamic process generating the transitions experienced by individual i. Four dynamic
processes are assumed to exist: stable-job stayer (S1), nonparticipant stayer (SK), unconfined
mover (M), confined mover (I). The two stayer processes generate histories sojourning indefi-
nitely in the same state and the two mover processes generate histories with transitions.
• The unconfined-mover process corresponds to labor-market histories where individuals
can access to any of the K states, and in particular to stable jobs. Those histories are
associated to an unconstrained Markov chain with transition matrix M = {mij}.
• The confined-mover process corresponds to labor-market histories where workers cannot
have access to stable jobs. Formally, the underlying stochastic process is a degenerated
Markov chain with transition matrix Q = {qij}, in which the row and the column com-
ponents related to the stable-job state are set to zero.
Furthermore, individual i is endowed with characteristics Xi. The dynamic heterogeneity
which is taken into account by the random variable Ci is not observed but is assumed to depend
on observables.7 Then,
• pS1(Xi) is the probability to be a stayer in stable jobs (state 1), conditional on starting in
state 1 and covariates Xi;
• pSK (Xi) is the probability to be a stayer out of the labor market (state K) , conditional on
starting in state K and covariates Xi;
• pI(Xi) is the probability to be a confined mover, conditional on not starting in state 1 and
covariates Xi, i.e., whether the individual starts in state 2, 3, . . . , or K.
The contribution of individual i to the likelihood conditional on the initial state depends on
the observed history.
1. When individual i is observed to start in state 1, stable job, alternatives cases may occur.
If a transition is observed during the observation period, individual i is, for sure, an un-
7Kamionka (1996) describes this dynamic heterogeneity as a partially observed heterogeneity since the labor
market histories, partially observed, provide information on the individual types, in contrast with other unobserved
individual heterogeneity methods.
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confined mover. His or her contribution to the likelihood is thus:
(
1− pS1(Xi)
) T∏
t=1
mit−1it .
If no transition is observed, individual i may either be a stayer in state 1 or an unconfined
mover. His/her contribution is:
pS1(Xi) +
(
1− pS1(Xi)
) T∏
t=1
mit−1it .
2. When individual i starts in states 2 or 3, there are also two options.
If individual i occupies a stable job at least once, then he or she is an unconfined mover.
His or her contribution is:
(1− pI(Xi))
T∏
t=1
mit−1it .
If individual i does not occupy a stable job during the observation period, then he or she
may either be a confined mover or an unconfined mover. His or her contribution is:
pI(Xi)
T∏
t=1
qit−1it + (1− pI(Xi))
T∏
t=1
mit−1it .
3. When individual i starts by a nonparticipation spell, three cases may occur.
If individual i occupies once a stable job, then he or she is an unconfined mover. His or
her contribution is:
(1− pSK (Xi))(1− pI(Xi))
T∏
t=1
mit−1it .
When individual i does not occupy a stable job during the period, then he or she may be
a confined mover or an unconfined mover. His or her contribution is:
(1− pSK(Xi))
[
pI(Xi)
T∏
t=1
qit−1it + (1− pI(Xi))
T∏
t=1
mit−1it
]
.
If individual i remains in state K, then he or she may be stayer, confined mover or uncon-
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fined mover. His or her contribution is:
pSK (Xi) + (1− pSK(Xi))
[
pI(Xi)
T∏
t=1
qit−1it + (1− pI(Xi))
T∏
t=1
mit−1it
]
.
Finally, the conditional likelihood is the product of the N individual contributions. The
model is identified if the number of periods of observation is at least 3. The identification
relies on the fact that the stayer transition matrices are set to be the identity matrix and that the
individuals who move at least once in the stable job state are known to be unconfined movers.
If they are observed at least three times, they are supposed to experience the 4 × 4 kinds of
transitions, which enables the identification. The model is estimated by a standard maximum
likelihood method. For a more detailed discussion on identification and consistency of ML
estimators, see Kamionka (1996) and Frydman (1984). In practice, the model is reparameterized
to take into account that, in the transition matrices, the exit probabilities belong to [0, 1] and
sum to unity by row. The conditional probabilities of being of a given type are modeled by logit
models.
4. Results
The conditional confined-unconfined model is estimated separately on men and women, in order
to take into account gender heterogeneity of labor market dynamics. This approach is justified
by a specification analysis presented in section 5.2.8 The covariates used to explain the con-
ditional probabilities of being of a given kind are the following: age, marital status, having
children, education, residence location (in Paris region vs. outside, in a distressed area (ZUS)
vs. outside). In what follows, a discussion of the main results is presented. The detailed figures
are reported in Appendix C (see Tables 11-15 and Figures 1 and 2).
4.1. Sectorisation in the labor market
First, table 4 reports the probabilities that a worker is of one of the four types.
Around 63% of women and 73% of men are stayers, either in stable jobs or out of the
labor market, while the remaining are movers. Confined movers are around 5% of the whole
8In section 5.2, we investigate whether the labor market dynamics can be modeled by the same processes for
both gender. Tests confirm that transition matrices differ across gender groups.
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Table 4. Marginal probabilities for each type, given gender and age.
stayer unconfined confined stayer out
in stable job mover mover of the labor market
Women 30-49 51.0% 32.1% 5.2% 11.7%
Men 30-49 70.6% 22.5% 4.3% 2.5%
population, but around 15% of the movers.
The 5% figure of confined movers has to be compared to the empirical ratio of confined
movers found without accounting for truncation, which amounts to 13% [Tables 11 and 14].9
So the model structure is successful in controlling for the truncation induced by the 15 months
of observation.
Table 5. Average Type-probabilities conditional on initial states.
confined stayer in nonparticipant % confined
mover stable job stayer movers |2,3,4
Women 30-49 0.153 0.771 0.610 23%
(0.033) (0.014) (0.012)
Men 30-49 0.285 0.832 0.546 36%
(0.043) (0.012) (0.018)
* st. errors obtained by bootstrap, using 100 sample replicates.
Table 5 reports the marginal probabilities of being of a given type conditional on the initial
state. This table sums up the last rows of tables 12 and 15 for readability.
4.1.1. The confined movers
The confined-mover population keeps on alternating nonemployment spells with short-term
jobs without being able to accede to a stable position. The confined-mover labor-market
histories concern approximately 29% of the 30-49 men and 15% of the 30-49 women who do
not start in a stable job [Table 5].
Figures 1 and 2 report the densities of the individual probabilities of being of a given type
estimated on the sample. Their spread provides some insight about the way the included co-
variates explain the propensity of being of that type. In a sense it gives an indication on the
goodness-of-fit of the model. When the covariates are poor predictors, the distributions of the
9i.e., the share of people that never reach stable jobs during the 15 months observed.
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predicted probabilities are expected to be peaked around the mean value. Here, on the contrary,
they stretch over [0, 1], which indicates that a notable part of the heterogeneity is explained by
the observables.
The effects of the covariates on the probability of being a confined mover are reported in
the first column of Tables 13 and 16. Education is the only relevant variable we find to explain
females probability to be confined movers: lower degrees tend to be correlated with higher
probabilities. Not surprisingly, for males, education is relevant as well. But family variables
also enter significantly: men with lower probabilities to be confined movers are more likely to
be married and to have children. They are also less likely to live in more distressed areas (ZUS).
4.1.2. The nonparticipant stayers
55% of men who were initially out of the labor market are nonparticipant stayers versus
62% for women (table 5). This illustrates the fact that French women are further from the
labor market than are men. After a nonparticipation spell, women are more likely to stay
nonparticipant than men; after a long-term job spell, they are more likely to move to short-term
jobs or nonemployment.
The effects of the covariates on the probability of being stayers out of the labor market
are reported in the third column of tables 13 and 16. Non participants stayers are rather older
(being over than forty is significant for both gender groups), and less educated. However, the
degree stratification does not look the same across groups. Among men, the distinction is
between having a degree or no degree at all: the quality of the degree is not correlated with the
probability to stay out of the labor force. Among women, on the other hand, there looks to exist
a strict hierarchy in degrees: women with university degree are less likely to be non participant
than high school graduates, who themselves are less likely than women with some elementary
or no degree at all. For men, having children is correlated with lower probabilities to be non
participants. The effect of children is more complex for women. Of course, having a 0 to 3 year
old child is correlated with higher probabilities to stay our of the labor market. However, having
a 4 to 6 years old child is correlated with lower probabilities to stay our of the labor market. The
fact of being married and living outside the Paris regions are two characteristics of women who
are further away from the labor market. These results illustrate that family variables affect the
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female labor market histories and dynamics whereas their impacts are smaller and more subtle
on male ones. They directly refer to the traditional separation of roles between men and women.
4.1.3. The stable-job stayers
Between 30 and 49, 83% of men starting in stable jobs are stayers in stable jobs versus 77% of
women. The education level has a noticeable impact both for women and for men. Having no
degree or a basic vocational degree seriously reduces the chances of being a stayer in stable jobs.
Then, age has a strong positive effect, indicating that older workers enjoy more stable histories.
A distressed local labor market has a significant negative impact: living in a ZUS reduces the
probability of being a stayer in a stable job both for 30-49 men and women. Finally, family
variables have some, yet less important than for other probabilities, impact on the probability of
being a stayer in stable jobs. Being married is more frequent for men who are stayers in stable
jobs. As expected, having a child aged 0 to 6 is correlated with not being a stayer in a stable
jobs.
4.2. Dynamics on the labor market
Four different processes generating labor market transitions are estimated. Two of them are
stayer processes. People experiencing them remain indefinitely in their initial state, i.e. non-
participation or long-term job. The two other processes generate labor market transitions. The
unconfined-mover process generates histories in which individuals can access to the four states
without restriction. The confined-mover process generates histories in which individuals cannot
access to stable jobs. In this section, the estimated dynamics are compared.
4.2.1. Confined and unconfined mover transitions
The unconfined-mover-transition process and the confined-mover-transition process clearly
describe different labor market histories. The unconfined-mover-transition process generates
histories which refer much more often to employment states than the confined-mover-transition
one. This holds whatever the gender category.
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Table 6 reports the stationary occupation probabilities for each state depending on the un-
derlying dynamic. This table sums up the results of tables 13 and 16.
Table 6. Stationary equilibria
Unconfined equilibrium Confined equilibrium
SJ UJ U UNP UJ U UNP
Women 30-49 0.585 0.143 0.134 0.138 0.299 0.403 0.297
(0.023) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.059) (0.044) (0.069)
Men 30-49 0.680 0.143 0.122 0.055 0.289 0.541 0.169
(0.026) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) (0.054) (0.042) (0.032)
*bootstrap standard errors using 100 sample replicates
A given woman (resp. man) in unconfined-mover dynamics is in employment at the
stationary equilibrium with a probability of 73% (resp. 82%). For a woman (resp. man) in
confined-dynamics, this probability is only 30% (resp. 29%). Therefore, being employed is
twice as likely for individuals in unconfined dynamics than for those in confined ones. Further-
more, the unconfined-mover-transition process generates histories which refer slightly more
often to participation than the confined-mover one. At equilibrium, unconfined males (resp. fe-
males) are 94% (resp. 86%) to participate, versus 83% (resp. 70%) of confined males (females).
These results suggest that the main part of the difference between the unconfined and the
confined-mover dynamics cannot be explained by an underlying difference in participation
behaviors. This difference is rather explained by the fact that people in confined-mover
dynamics more often experience difficult episodes on the labor market such as unemployment
than people in unconfined-mover dynamics. This is obvious when the unemployment proba-
bility is examined (around 12% for unconfined movers versus 40% to 54% for confined movers).
The parameters in transition matrices stress the unemployment risk faced by individuals
with confined-mover histories. Around 30% of individuals initially in unstable jobs and
with a confined-mover dynamic would experience unemployment three months later versus
around 7% of those with unconfined-mover dynamics. 38% of nonparticipant men with a
confined-mover history would become unemployed three months later versus 20% of those
with a unconfined-mover history. These remarks hold also for women.
The male and the female unconfined-mover dynamics are significantly different, as shown
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by specification tests. Men in confined dynamics tend to be less mobile than women and display,
for example, higher persistence in unemployment. The picture is rather different for unconfined
dynamics. Unconfined males are more mobile than women and they more often get access to
employment, both to stable and unstable jobs.
5. Robustness analysis
5.1. Heckman-Singer approach
In mover-stayer-type models, the form of the heterogeneity is imposed ex ante by the model
(i.e., stayers, unconfined movers, confined movers). In this section, we adopt a more agnos-
tic approach and we consider an alternative model, which does not require to fix a priori the
nature of types and constraints on transition matrices, in order to see whether the entailed par-
tition shares common features with the one we proposed. We follow the approach of Brodaty
(2007) which is inspired by Magnac (2000) and Heckman and Singer (1984). The number of
the transition matrices is let free but more structure is imposed on the state dependence (δjk).
Transitions are modeled by a dynamic multinomial logit with unobserved heterogeneity (αik).
This unobserved propensity to move from one state to another is type-specific. If yit denotes the
labor market state occupied by the individual i,
yit = k if only if y∗ikt = max
j=1,...,4
(y∗ijt) ∀(i, t)
y∗ijt =
4∑
j=1
δjkIyi,t−1=j + αik + ǫikt ∀(i, t)
Constraints exist in the following methodology, the odds ratios satisfy the following constraints:
∀(j, k, l, l′),
P(SJ |State=k,Type=l)
P(SJ |State=j,Type=l)
P(UJ |State=k,Type=l)
P(UJ |State=j,Type=l)
=
P(SJ |State=k,Type=l′)
P(SJ |State=j,Type=l′)
P(UJ |State=k,Type=l′)
P(UJ |State=j,Type=l′)
Hence this model does not turn to be more flexible than the mover-stayer approach.
The model is estimated sequentially. The first step consists in a conditional maximum
likelihood estimation that yields consistent estimates of the state dependence parameters. The
type-specific terms are estimated in a second step using an EM algorithm, given the first-stage
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estimates. The number of types is determined iteratively. The initial condition problem
is tackled by using a likelihood conditional on initial states (Brodaty (2007)). Hence, the
probability of being of type r depends on the individual initial state.
For men as well as for women, the iterative procedure suggests to retain a partition in five
categories. Table 7 details the probabilities of these five types conditional on the four possible
initial states. Women who are initially out of the labor force have a high probability (60%) to be
type-1 individuals or type-5 individuals (28%). This is not as clear cut for men: when they start
out of the labor force, they tend to be rather in types 1 (57%) and 5 (18%), but also in 2 and 4
(11% each). Almost all individuals starting in stable jobs are in type 2. Conditional on starting
in unstable jobs, men are mainly type-3 (84%) and type-4 (13%). Women, apart from type-3
(83%) and type-4 (10%) are, in fewer cases, type-5 (6%). Finally, men and women starting in
unemployment have similar distributions across types: mainly 4 (around 65%), 3 (around 20%)
and 5 (around 15%).
Table 8 contains the transition matrices associated to each type. These matrices and the
heterogeneity distribution that may be analyzed together, are used to give an interpretation of
the individual types that were found. Table 9 contains the stationary occupation probabilities
for each type.
• High transition probabilities leading to non-participation, as well as the fact that individu-
als who are initially out of the labor market are mainly of type-1, lead us to conclude quite
unambiguously that type-1 individuals are close to be "stayers out of the labor market".
• The same kind of argument may be used to assert that individuals following type-2 process
are stayers in stable jobs.
• The three last types are more intricate. Individuals of type-3 spend most of their time in
unstable jobs. Their probability to accede to a stable job from an unstable job, during a
given quarter, is low and even lower for women (6%) than for men (9%). These may be
considered as confined movers.
• Type-4 individuals are mainly unemployed. From unemployment, the most likely for
them is to find a unstable jobs if they are male (10%) and to exit the labor market if they
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are female (8%). Their probability to exit unemployment obtaining a stable job is as weak
for men and women (5%). They are also good candidates to be confined movers.
• Finally, individuals belonging to type 5 have strong probabilities to accede to a stable job,
whatever the state they start in (around 25% for men, and 15% for women). However,
they almost never pass through unstable jobs and not frequently in unemployment. They
are obviously unconfined movers.
This analysis does support the relevance of the mover-stayer-confined partition. First, non-
participant stayers and stayers in stable jobs appear clearly. Results are less clear-cut for the
mover categories, since all have a chance to get a stable job. This may be induced by the equal-
ity constraint on the odds ratios. But for two types, this probability turns to be rather small.
Hence the results obtained here underline that clear differences exist in the transition dynamics,
and that the confined/unconfined movers difference matters.
5.2. Specification tests: stability of transition matrices across gender
In section 4 we focused on the results of separate estimations on sub-samples by gender. This
was justified by the results of the present section, in which we test whether, once controlling for
conditional heterogeneity, the transition dynamics on the labor market are the same for men and
women. To do this, we consider three testing hypotheses.
• H10 : both confined and unconfined-mover transition matrices are stable across gender,
• H20 : the unconfined-mover transition matrix is stable across gender,
• H30 : the confined-mover transition matrix is stable across gender.
H10 can be tested by a classical LR test: we estimate the model on men and women sep-
arately (M1) and simultaneously with adequate covariates (M0), and compute a LR statistic.
For testing H20 and H30 , we use a χ2-statistic (denoted DA, hereafter) based on the difference
of the estimates between the two groups which are assumed to be independent (the method
is described in details in appendix B). Results are reported in Table 10. The stability of the
labor market dynamics across gender is rejected due to different unconfined-mover dynamics
whereas the stability of the confined-mover dynamics cannot be rejected. For the latter, labor
market histories differences can be explained conditionally, by differences in covariates.
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Table 7. Types Distribution
Women Initial State
SJ UJ U NP
Type 1 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.601
Type 2 0.907 0.019 0.011 0.044
Type 3 0.020 0.831 0.220 0.024
Type 4 0.018 0.094 0.611 0.056
Type 5 0.053 0.056 0.148 0.275
Men Initial State
SJ UJ U NP
Type 1 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.572
Type 2 0.925 0.020 0.000 0.106
Type 3 0.025 0.839 0.207 0.030
Type 4 0.015 0.131 0.657 0.114
Type 5 0.035 0.000 0.136 0.179
Note: Each column sums to unity.
Table 8. Transition matrices according to types
Men
First type
0.243 0.006 0.010 0.741
0.031 0.074 0.024 0.871
0.015 0.019 0.034 0.931
0.006 0.005 0.009 0.980
Second type
0.998 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.950 0.032 0.011 0.008
0.933 0.017 0.033 0.017
0.924 0.011 0.020 0.044
Third type
0.856 0.079 0.046 0.019
0.086 0.810 0.086 0.018
0.103 0.534 0.316 0.048
0.132 0.454 0.254 0.161
Fourth type
0.710 0.027 0.213 0.050
0.089 0.346 0.507 0.058
0.046 0.097 0.790 0.067
0.058 0.083 0.635 0.224
Fifth type
0.902 0.002 0.029 0.068
0.399 0.083 0.243 0.275
0.221 0.025 0.411 0.343
0.159 0.012 0.185 0.645
Women
First type
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.995
0.000 0.000 0.009 0.991
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.986
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.997
Second type
0.998 0.000 0.000 0.001
0.956 0.021 0.010 0.014
0.940 0.009 0.026 0.025
0.921 0.006 0.014 0.058
Third type
0.804 0.108 0.060 0.028
0.059 0.828 0.089 0.024
0.082 0.512 0.344 0.062
0.105 0.457 0.244 0.194
Fourth type
0.726 0.023 0.196 0.054
0.094 0.312 0.513 0.082
0.052 0.077 0.788 0.084
0.070 0.072 0.585 0.273
Fifth type
0.830 0.007 0.030 0.133
0.223 0.194 0.164 0.418
0.145 0.056 0.296 0.503
0.093 0.025 0.104 0.778
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Table 9 Limiting Probabilities
Men SJ UJ U NP
Type 1 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.977
Type 2 0.998 0.000 0.001 0.001
Type 3 0.386 0.492 0.097 0.025
Type 4 0.154 0.114 0.658 0.075
Type 5 0.650 0.007 0.108 0.234
Women SJ UJ U NP
Type 1 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.997
Type 2 0.998 0.000 0.001 0.001
Type 3 0.247 0.600 0.117 0.036
Type 4 0.176 0.087 0.640 0.097
Type 5 0.384 0.025 0.096 0.495
Note: Each row has to sum to unity.
Table 10. Tests for stability of dynamics across gender (p-values).
Null hypothesis H10 H20 H30
30-49 0.000 0.000 0.513
Note: Test statistics LR is the first column and DA for the second and
the third ones. p-values are computed using χ2 distributions. Degrees
of freedom are resp. 18 (24 and 12) for the first (second and third)
columns.
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6. Conclusion
This paper proposes to model labor market transitions accounting specifically for individual
heterogeneity in the ability to accede to stable jobs. The model used is based on a Markov-
chain mixture of four types of transition dynamics: the stayers in stable-jobs, the stayers in
nonparticipation, the unconfined movers, and the individuals stuck on confined states and who
cannot accede to stable jobs. Conditional heterogeneity is allowed. The probabilities of being
of a certain type depend on observable individual characteristics. Estimation is done focusing
on a population already well inserted in the labor market but yet not ready to retire: men and
women aged 30 to 49.
Our main results are the following. Individuals trapped in confined mover histories repre-
sent 5% of the population under study (versus 13% apparently observed). Unconfined-mover
dynamics depend on gender, whereas male and female confined movers cannot be proved to
experience different dynamics. At equilibrium, an individual whose labor market history is
generated by the confined mover process has between 3 and 4 times more chances to be unem-
ployed than a confined mover. Participation, however, is not different across the two categories.
The probability to be a confined mover decreases with the quality of education. For men, a high
probability is also correlated with being single, and living in a distressed area.
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A. Stationary occupation probabilities
Confined-unconfined models, just like mover-stayer models, satisfy the Markov assumption
conditional on the initial state. The stationary occupation probability vector represents the
probabilities associated to each state once the process converged to the steady state and can
be defined for any Markov-chain process. Let us consider a Markov-chain process with transi-
tion matrix A. The stationary occupation probability vector, denoted a∗, is defined such that it
is invariant by pre-multiplication by the transition matrix:
A′a∗ = a∗. (A.1)
Moreover, it is a vector of probabilities. Hence, its components remain in [0, 1] and sum to
one. The stationary occupation probability vector is a useful tool to describe the labor market
segmentation.
Stationary occupation probabilities (conditional on the initial values) are easily extended to
mixtures of Markov chains by:
pMm∗ + pQq∗ + pS1s∗1 + p
SKs∗K ,
wherem∗, q∗, s∗1 and s∗K are the stationary probability vectors (as defined in A.1) relating to each
elementary Markov chain, and pM , pQ, pS1 , and pSK , the mixture coefficients relating to each
elementary Markov chain. In the conditional confined-unconfined model, sample stationary
occupation probability vector can be estimated by the sample average of the weighted sum of
the stationary probability vectors of each elementary Markov process composing the mixture.
1
N
N∑
i=1
pMi m
∗ + pQi q
∗ + pS1i s
∗
1 + p
SK
i s
∗
K ,
wherem∗, q∗, s∗1 and s∗K are the stationary probability vectors (as defined in A.1) relating to each
elementary Markov chain, and pMi , p
Q
i , p
S1
i , and p
SK
i , the individual probabilities of following
each elementary Markov chain. Note that pMi , p
Q
i , p
S1
i , p
SK
i sum to one.
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B. Darmois-type test for coefficient equality across subsam-
ples
The idea is the same as the the classical Darmois test for testing the equality of the means in
two subsamples with unknown different variances; see Darmois (1954). Data is composed of
two samples: sample 1, with n1 observations {Y1i }i=1,...,n1 whose distribution is function of
the parameter of interest β1 ∈ Rk; and sample 2, with n2 observations {Y2i }i=1,...,n2 whose
distribution is function of β2 ∈ Rk. {Y1i }i=1,...,n1 and {Y2i }i=1,...,n2 are independent and both
composed of i.i.d. observations. βˆ1 (resp. βˆ2) denotes the estimate of β1 (resp. β2) based on
sample 1 (resp. sample 2). Consider testing H0 : β1 = β2 = β0 against H1 : β1 6= β2. Assume
that CLT theorems apply for β1 and β2, i.e. under H0:
√
n1(βˆ1 − β0) → N (0,Vas(βˆ1)) (B.2)
√
n2(βˆ2 − β0) → N (0,Vas(βˆ2)) (B.3)
and βˆ1 and βˆ2 are independent. Hence, it follows that under H0,
DA = (βˆ1 − βˆ2)′
(
1
n1
Vas(βˆ1) +
1
n2
Vas(βˆ2)
)−1
(βˆ1 − βˆ2)→ χ2(2k). (B.4)
A test for H0 with asymptotic level α rejects H0 when DA > c1−α, where c1−α is the 1-α
quantile of a χ2 distribution with 2k degrees of freedom.
C. Detailed results
C.1. Women between 30 and 49
Women between 30 and 49, 4 states : out of the labor market (4), unemployed (3), short-
term contract (2), long-term contract (1). Asymptotic standard-errors are obtained by bootstrap
(design matrix bootstrap centered around the sample estimate) with 100 sample replicates.
Table 11 describes the observed histories.
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Table 11. Data : women between 30 and 49.
Individuals... 17,359 100%
staying in 1 10,495 60 %
staying in 4 2,188 13%
moving between 1, 2, 3 and 4 2,065 12%
moving between 2, 3 and 4 only 2,611 15%
Figure 1. Densities of individual probabilities of being stayer in 1, stayer in 4 and confined
conditional on initial states
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C.2. Men between 30 and 49
Men between 30 and 49, 4 states : out of the labor market (4), unemployed (3), short-term con-
tract (2), long-term contract (1). Asymptotic standard-errors are obtained by bootstrap (design
matrix bootstrap centered around the sample estimate) with 100 sample replicates.
Table 14 describes the observed histories.
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Table 12. Coefficients: women between 30 and 49.
Estimates - MLE
Covariates confined mover stayer in stable job stayer in non-participation
intercept -1.244 0.931 -1.187
(1.409) (0.359) (0.626)
30-39 - - -
- - -
40-49 0.124 0.640 0.576
(0.179) (0.101) (0.108)
married -0.234 0.125 0.627
(0.188) (0.096) (0.096)
university degree 0.386 0.172 -0.453
(bac+3 and more) (0.357) (0.218) (0.211)
college degree or more 0.141 0.174 -0.229
(bac+2 and more) (0.475) (0.172) (0.213)
completed high school - - -
(bac) - - -
basic vocational degree 0.622 -0.359 0.096
(0.299) (0.142) (0.141)
elementary high school 0.236 0.054 0.504
(0.380) (0.211) (0.165)
no degree 1.081 -0.994 0.835
(0.326) (0.139) (0.154)
ZUS 0.262 -0.421 0.190
(0.385) (0.231) (0.121)
Paris -0.416 -0.153 -0.312
(0.288) (0.135) (0.135)
one 0-18 year-old child or more 0.258 -0.154 -0.395
(0.205) (0.104) (0.111)
one 3- 6 year-old child or more -0.038 -0.601 0.607
(0.643) (0.155) (0.137)
one 0- 3 year-old child or more -0.114 -0.282 -0.365
(0.252) (0.126) (0.121)
Experience above 7 years -0.636 0.397 0.905
(1.336) (0.307) ( 0.632)
Average conditional 0.153 0.771 0.610
probability (0.033) (0.014) (0.012)
Asymptotic standard errors estimates are obtained by design matrix bootstrap centered around the sample estimate
with 100 sample replicates.
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Table 13. Transition matrices: women between 30 and 49.
Unconfined transition matrix:
T → T + 1 SJ UJ U NP
SJ (k = 1) 0.931 0.011 0.023 0.036
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
UJ (k = 2) 0.079 0.836 0.061 0.023
(0.006) (0.033) (0.024) (0.008)
U (k = 3) 0.082 0.099 0.720 0.099
(0.009) (0.025) (0.030) (0.019)
NP (k = 4) 0.133 0.029 0.113 0.724
(0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019)
boot. st. err. : 100 replicates
Confined transition matrix:
T → T + 1 SJ UJ U NP
SJ (k = 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UJ (k = 2) 0.000 0.600 0.302 0.098
0.000 (0.090) (0.074) (0.025)
U (k = 3) 0.000 0.227 0.540 0.233
0.000 (0.076) (0.070) (0.058)
NP(k = 4) 0.000 0.094 0.320 0.586
0.000 (0.080) (0.063) (0.096)
boot. st. err. : 100 replicates
Stationary equilibria:
SJ UJ U UNP
Unconfined equilibrium 0.585 0.143 0.134 0.138
(0.023) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Confined equilibrium 0.000 0.299 0.403 0.297
(0.000) (0.059) (0.044) (0.069)
Total equilibrium 0.698 0.062 0.064 0.177
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
boot. st. err. : 100 replicates
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Table 14. Data : men between 30 and 49.
Individuals... 15,847 100%
staying in 1 12,497 79%
staying in 4 382 2%
moving between 1, 2, 3 and 4 1,571 10%
moving between 2, 3 and 4 only 1,397 9%
Figure 2. Densities of individual probabilities of being stayer in 1, stayer in 4 and confined
conditional on initial states
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Table 15. Coefficients: men between 30 and 49.
Estimates - MLE
Covariates confined mover stayer in stable job stayer in non-participation
intercept -0.480 1.141 0.892
(3.666) (0.391) (0.826)
30-39 - - -
- - -
40-49 0.028 0.475 0.832
(0.233) (0.094) (0.182)
married -0.870 0.347 0.038
(0.245) (0.096) (0.209)
university degree -0.019 0.089 -0.146
(bac+3 and more) (1.930) (0.175) (0.415)
college degree or more 0.270 0.306 -0.281
(bac+2 and more) (0.484) (0.243) (0.446)
completed high school - - -
(bac) - - -
basic vocational degree 0.361 -0.145 0.179
(0.447) (0.146) (0.306)
elementary high school 1.257 -0.049 0.481
(0.616) (0.220) (0.353)
no degree 1.391 -0.448 0.784
(0.486) (0.162) (0.314)
ZUS 0.872 -0.644 0.312
(0.311) (0.211) (0.285)
Paris -0.564 -0.123 -0.210
(0.494) (0.132) (0.332)
one 0-18 year-old child or more -0.957 -0.062 -1.053
(0.253) (0.108) (0.225)
one 0- 3 year-old child or more 0.069 0.057 -0.312
(0.374) (0.138) (0.408)
Experience above 7 years -0.187 0.216 -1.108
(3.533) (0.370) (0.747)
Average conditional 0.285 0.832 0.546
probability (0.043) (0.012) (0.018)
Asymptotic standard errors estimates are obtained by design matrix bootstrap centered around the sample estimate
with 100 sample replicates.
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Table 16. Transition matrices: men between 30 and 49.
Unconfined transition matrix:
T → T + 1 SJ UJ U NP
SJ (k = 1) 0.934 0.014 0.029 0.023
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
UJ (k = 2) 0.115 0.800 0.069 0.016
(0.011) (0.032) (0.028) (0.005)
U (k = 3) 0.118 0.136 0.670 0.076
(0.012) (0.025) (0.024) (0.009)
NP (k = 4) 0.256 0.045 0.197 0.502
(0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.030)
boot. st. err.: 100 replicates
Confined transition matrix:
T → T + 1 SJ UJ U NP
SJ (k = 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UJ (k = 2) 0.000 0.650 0.286 0.064
(0.000) (0.098) (0.091) (0.016)
U (k = 3) 0.000 0.163 0.729 0.108
(0.000) (0.052) (0.044) (0.018)
NP(k = 4) 0.000 0.077 0.378 0.545
(0.000) (0.037) (0.065) (0.079)
boot. st. err.: 100 replicates
Stationary equilibria:
SJ UJ U UNP
Unconfined equilibrium 0.680 0.143 0.122 0.055
(0.026) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006)
Confined equilibrium 0.000 0.289 0.541 0.169
(0.000) (0.054) (0.042) (0.032)
Total equilibrium 0.860 0.045 0.051 0.045
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
boot. st. err.: 100 replicates
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